Farmers and herders in Ghana: examining the impact of livelihood and autochthony on the land conflict between indigenes and migrants by Boakye Gyan, Collins Kwaku Gyan
 
 
FARMERS AND HERDERS IN GHANA: EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF 
LIVELIHOOD AND AUTOCHTHONY ON THE LAND CONFLICT BETWEEN 
INDIGENES AND MIGRANTS 
 
by © Collins Kwaku Gyan Boakye Gyan 
 
A Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of  
 
 
Master of Arts 
  Department of Political Science 












This study examines the underlying drivers of the conflict between Indigenous farmers and 
Fulani herders in two districts in Ghana: Asante Akim North and Gushegu districts. These two 
districts have witnessed the most violence in Ghana between 2001 and 2020. The research is 
anchored on land-use and land access theories, as well as autochthony and narratives of "Sons of 
the Soil". Based on data gathered from forty-five (45) media sources of local, national and 
international news articles in newspapers and online, including transcripts of extended interviews 
of leaders of both Indigenous farmers and Fulani herders done on national television and 
documents from the police, judicial service, traditional Council and Regional Security Council. 
This Study argues that the differences in the livelihood of the two groups of land users and the use 
of autochthony identity to deny Fulani herders access to land are the underlying drivers of the 
violent conflict between farmers and herders. Both farmers and herders need land for their 
livelihood; however, land access and use are contested and interpreted continuously within the 
spheres of identity. The focus on the farmer-herder conflict in Ghana emphasizes that theories that 
seek to identify and explain the causes of group conflict must go beyond simple linear explanations 
to include complex multi-dimensional explanations. 
Keywords: farmers, herders, conflict, Fulani, livelihood indigenous, land-use, Asanti-Akim 
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Since the start of 1980, more than 28 Sub-Saharan African states have been at war, 
according to the International Development Organization, ID211( IDO, as cited in Sani, 2013, p. 
122).  Ghana is considered one of the more stable countries in West Africa since its transition from 
military rule to the multi-party electoral system in 1992 (Global Peace Index, 2015 -2017). 
Compared to most of its neighbours, Ghana is politically stable and stands out in a chaotic region. 
Nevertheless, the periodic escalation of conflicts into serious violence has become a source of 
worry. One such conflict is the conflict between migrant Fulani herders and indigenous farmers, 
popularly known in Ghanaian media as the “Fulani menace.”  
The relationship and interactions between farmers and herders are not new in Ghana and 
the West African region in general. The relationship between indigenous farmers and migrant 
Fulani herders in Ghana is generally marked by conflict, cooperation and “complementarity” 
(Tonah, 2002). Competition in many parts of Africa has replaced the past mutual beneficial 
relationship between these two groups in contemporary times. In West Africa, the farmer-herder 
conflict is not only rampant but, according to some scholars, on the increase (Shettima and Tar, 
 




2008).2 This “low-intensity conflict” (LIC)3 has attracted the attention of researchers and 
policymakers. However, it has been obscured by the prevalence of “High-Intensity conflict” (HIC) 
or “complex political emergencies” that beset the West African subregion in the 1990s (Shettima 
and Tar, 2008). In Sub-Saharan Africa, cases of farmers-herders conflict are widespread (Tarhule, 
2002). For instance, in 2013, approximately 300 people were reported dead in Nigeria due to the 
farmers-nomads conflict (Okoli and Atelhe, 2014). Again, in 1989 clashes between herders and 
farmers at the borders between Senegal and Mauritania resulted in multiple deaths, scores of 
wounded people, and destruction of properties when reactions extended across the borders 
(Homer-Dixon, 1999; Salmone, 2010). In December 2009, 32 people died, many injured, houses 
burned, and several farms destroyed in a clash between pastoralists and farmers in Udeni-Gida, a 
town in central Nigeria’s Nasarawa State (IRIN, 2012). The spate of violence between the herders 
and farmers in Nigeria is showing no signs of decline. In one of the recent and bloodiest 
occurrences yet, on June 23, 2018, over 200 people were left deceased after an attack on some 
villages in Plateau, a state in Nigeria’s middle belt. This follows an earlier attack in January 2018, 
where 73 people were killed in Benue, another state in central Nigeria, sparking the rhetoric of 
genocide (BBC News, June 2018). 
In Ghana, the conflicts between nomadic Fulani herdsmen and farmers have been a 
significant problem and challenging to resolve not only for the societies in which they occur but 
also for the government at the national level. Several confrontations and conflicts resulting in many 
 
2 The claim  that the conflict between farmers and herders is on the increase in Africa has been challenged by 
some scholars.e.g. Hussein (1998) 
3 According to a release by the Environment, Conflict and Cooperation (ECC) library in 2014, low-intensity 
conflicts are disagreements which are mostly local, sporadic and without the direct involvement of governments and 
government security forces (ECC document, 2014). LIC is below conventional war, and above the routine, peaceful 





deaths and the destruction of crops and properties have been reported in different countries. Citing 
the case of the Fulani-Konkomba conflict in Ghana in 2011, investigation reveals thirteen (13) 
deaths, while eleven (11) people were seriously injured. Many houses were burnt and properties 
destroyed (Abubakari and Longi, 2014, p.103; Olaniyan, 2015, p.335). In October 2017, it was 
reported by major news outlets in Ghana that Nine Fulani herdsmen and some Kwahu farmers had 
been killed at Dwerebeafe, Aboyan and Mpeamu in the Kwahu East District in the Eastern region 
of Ghana (modernghana.com October 28, 2017). While generally similar to other conflicts that 
arise in the sub-region, it can be concluded that Ghana’s conflicts have been on a relatively lower 
scale than those of its neighbours, perhaps, accounting for the relatively limited attention paid to 
it. However, what is new is the widespread reports of an increase in violent confrontations among 
farmer-herder in many parts of Ghana. 
Thus, the changing dynamics of the relationship between the Fulani herders and indigenous 
farming groups need to be extensively analyzed. The conflict appears to be prevalent and pervasive 
in Ghana’s northern and middle belts, mostly witnessing violent clashes between farmer and 
pastoral Fulani migrants. What accounts for the incidents and prevalence of conflict between the 
Fulani migrant herders and indigenous farmers in Ghana? How does the struggle over land use 
between groups with different livelihoods lead to conflict? How does Fulani herders’ migrant 
status contribute to the conflict? Does the use of autochthony discourses by local farmers affect 
the conflict? How does Fulani land access and rights in Ghana (which borders on identity/belonging) 
affect relations between farmers and Fulani herders in terms of conflicts increase conflict? 
While there has been much attention paid to many factors that cause the conflict, including 




Oppong, 2015; 2001, Asaah et al., 2017), the inability of traditional and governmental institutions 
to deal with the conflict at an earlier stage (e.g. Moritz, 2010; Tonah, 2002; Hussein et al.,1999; 
Mwanfupe, 2015), declining interdependent relationship between farmers and nomads (e.g.Tonah, 
2000 and 2006), engagement in social vices by herders (Abubakari and Longi, 2014; Ahmadu, 
2011; Ofuoku and Isife, 2009; Tonah, 2000) there has been relatively less attention to the land-use 
among people with livelihood differences, indigenous “Sons of the Soil”(SoS) claims, and the 
exclusionary “autochthony” discourse employed by the local farmer’s identities, which revolves 
around questions of ‘first-comers’(Lent, 2005) and the concept of the indigenes as the bearer of 
land.  The purpose of this study is to examine the causes of the conflicts between Fulani migrant 
herders and indigenous farmers in the two districts in Ghana: 1) Asante Akim North District 
(AAND), and 2) Gushegu district (GD) in the Ashanti and Northern regions of Ghana respectively. 
These districts have gained much coverage in the media over these conflicts in recent times. This 
research attempts to explain the underlying drivers of these conflicts. This study hypothesizes that 
the farmer-herder conflict (dependent variable) in these areas of study is caused by land-use 
disagreement and land access and compounded by livelihood differences and the use of identity as 
the determiner for land access (independent variables). It argues that although the difference in 
livelihood activities and land-use disagreement are relevant causes of the conflict, the non-
indigenous outlook of the migrant Fulani herdsmen is at the core of this. They are regarded as non-
autochthonous in the two study areas and thus have no land rights and limited land access and use.  
The study examines specific instances of land conflict compounded by autochthony claims and 
questions surrounding the identity of Fulani herders. Hence, this thesis aims to treat the farmer-





According to Ericksen(1997), the term “Fulani” is generally used to classify the 
pastoral/herder migrants and their relationship with each other (Ericksen, 1997. P.34). The Fulani 
categorization is widely accepted in Ghana and the West African region (Oppong, 2002). Thus, it 
is difficult to discard. Traditionally, the Fulani inhabit the ‘Sudano-Sahelian’4 region north of 
Africa (Soeters et al., 2017; Tonah, 2006a). From the pre-colonial period until today, the 
Fulani’s livelihood traditionally is based on seasonal transhumance. During the dry season, 
Fulani herdsmen migrate into the southern Savannah belt, including in Ghana, searching for 
pasture and water for their livestock. As Tonah (2005) noted, the influx of permanent Fulani 
settlers in (northern) Ghana started in the 1960s; they were mostly allowed to settle on existing 
farming communities’ peripheries. However, during the Sahelian droughts of the 1960s and 1970s, 
larger numbers of Fulani started settling on a more permanent basis in Northern Ghana and later 
migrated to the greener southern parts (Soeters et al.,2017). Ghanaian citizenship and immigration 
policies tend to put Fulani herders at a disadvantage. For instance, Fulanis, per the 1992 
constitution of Ghana, even if born in Ghana but has none of his /her parents or grandparents born 
in Ghana before 1957, are explicitly excluded from Ghanaian citizenship except through marriage, 
naturalization or adoption.  
The term “Indigenous people” used in this study refer to the first people to occupy the area 
and are regarded as natives of the place. In this sense, it refers to people who belong to ethnic 
groups of Ghanaian origin. Thus, the Fulani migrants are excluded.  In this study,’ Farmers’ will 
apply to crop farmers (local farmers), although pastoralists are also farmers (livestock farmers). 
 
4 According to a Map by Hijmans et al. (2005), the Sudano-Sahelian regions of Africa stretch from the coast of 
the Atlantic ocean to the Red sea. The region extends across the whole northern parts of West, central and eastern 




The term ‘farmers’ in this essay is therefore adapted to create a distinction between crop farmers 
and cattle herdersFor this research, the term conflict will be conceptualized as a competition and 
disagreement over scarce resources (such as land), property (including the destruction of crops, 
the killing of cattle, burning of houses), and violent clashes. Conflict in this sense is understood as 
“an expressed struggle between at least two interdependent parties who perceive incompatible 
goals, scares resources, and interference from others in achieving the goals” (Wilmot and Hocker 
1998, p.34). Thus, conflict in this regard may include non-violent encounters. This thesis will 
examine the factors that lead to conflict escalation from non-violent into violent clashes. 
1.1 Theoretical Framework and Research Argument 
This research project challenges the usual trend, which uses land scarcity and climate 
change as the leading cause of violent conflict in most parts of Africa (Peluso and Watts, 2001; 
Benjaminsen et al., 2012; Okoli and Atelhe, 2009, Bukari, 2017). Komey’s work (2010) suggests 
that the resource scarcity argument misses an important point: resource scarcity neglects other 
dimensions of the causes of conflict, such as identity and claims to land and territory, which are 
often an integral part of land conflict. Moritz (2010) also argues that for a conflict to be fully 
understood, it is important to employ a multi-faceted approach that seeks to capture all critical 
drivers of the conflict, which may be ignored when a single cause is adopted. 
For others, it is the destruction of crops that is the primary source of conflict, e.g. Tonah 
(2002 and 2006a);  Oksen (2001). However, attributing the conflict between indigenous farmers 
and Fulani migrant herders to only the destruction of crops oversimplifies the conflict’s cause. It 
cannot explain many clashes between the two groups, mostly if the crop is not destroyed. Instead, 
as Assah et al. (2017) put it, the destruction of crop explanation can be classified as a “trigger” or 




farming, encroaching of farmlands and grazing lands into the perspective of land use between the 
two groups. 
In Ghana, like many West African countries, the Fulani herdsmen are regarded as 
‘strangers’ (‘aliens’) and are denied equal rights of land tenure (Bukari, 2017; Tonah, 2002). 
According to Tonah (2002), in almost every part of Ghana, the Fulani herders and their families 
are considered ‘strangers’; thus, rules governing the use or ownership of the land have been 
formulated or have evolved to reflect the interest of indigenous crop farmers thereby neglecting 
the interest of other people who migrate to settle with those areas (Tonah, 2002, p. 45). Thus, to 
access land in many communities, one must be associated with an indigenous group. 
One factor that has been identified as a major cause of group conflict is “Inter-ethnic 
variation” (Tonah, 2006c, p. 153). Inter-ethnic variation involves stressing the significant 
differences among groups, especially their livelihood and the differences in orientation, aspirations 
and interest of the Fulani migrant herders and indigenous farmers. Thus, the use of “autochthony” 
discourses has become a well-known feature of contemporary conflicts, especially in Africa and 
worldwide (Dunn, 2009). Autochthony discourses create a linkage between identity and space, 
enabling the one who employs it to establish a direct claim to territory by asserting that one is an 
original inhabitant, or a ‘son of the soil’ (SoS) (Dunn, 2009. p.113). 
In some cases, however, the arrival of sizeable numbers of migrants tend to generate violent 
clashes between distinct ethnic groups, usually between indigenous populations and migrants 
(Côté and Mitchell, 2015). These types of conflicts involving indigenous inhabitants and in-
migrant ethnic groups are commonly referred to as ‘Sons of the Soil’ (SoS) conflicts (Fearon and 
Laitin, 2011). According to Côté and Mitchell (2018), migration dynamics should not be 




provides a comprehensive framework for understanding and explaining the triggers of violent 
conflict between migrants and indigenous settlers (Côté and Mitchell, 2018). 
This study will provide a useful perspective on the nature of group identities, highlighting 
the variables of migration, the character of group boundaries, identity and belonging, access to 
resource and the need for a theory that moves beyond assumptions of resource conflict to capture 
the indigenous claims and discourse that revolves around questions of autochthony, identity and 
claims to land as well as variations in their livelihood goals and interests. 
1.2 Research Design 
The thesis’s primary analytical aim is to analyze the causes of conflict among the indigenous 
farming population and the migrant pastoralist groups in Ghana. The study seeks to answer in a 
comparative analysis two districts in Ghana: Asante Akyem North District (AAND) andGushegu 
District (GD), emphasizing the underlying factors that shape conflicts between local farmers and 
migrant herders in Ghana. The two cases were selected because they represent different areas and 
local groups. However, the cases have the same dependent variable (conflict), and also, there is 
the presence of one or more independent variables. In all the selected districts, Fulani herders have 
been granted concessions of land by local chiefs leading to a widespread protest by the youth, 
sometimes leading to a violent confrontation between Fulani and local farmers. These areas were 
chosen in Ghana because they have hosted comparable farmer-herder conflicts in Ghana, many of 






Figure 1.0.A Map of Ghana showing study areas. 
 
 
     
          
 
 
Source: Authour’s Construct, 2020 
 
Figure 1.1. Map of Asante Askye North District.  















Source: Ghana Statistical Service, (2014, p2) 
These cases are also spread from the north (GD) to the south (AAND) of Ghana. Therefore, 
it is possible to extend the findings of these study to a broader theory and understand new and 
existing theories (Firestone, 1993 as cited in Huberman, 1994, p.27). The multiple case study offers 
a broader dimension of the farmer-herder conflict’s complexity in Ghana and West Africa in 
general. By offering a broader dimension to the study of complex issues on the farmer-herder 
conflict, this study will also help contribute to comparative knowledge on this topic.   
Like many other conflicts in Africa and other parts of the world, Ghana’s farmer-herder 
conflicts lack reliable and exhaustive information, making it challenging to undertake a 
quantitative assessment of migration and conflict between the Fulani herdsmen and indigenous 
farmers in Ghana. According to (Moritz 2006), farmer-herder conflicts are hardly ever observed 
firsthand by researchers. Consequently, analyses of them depend primarily on data from post hoc 




Ghanaian media and complementary secondary data from chapters of books and articles to analyze 
the underlying causes of Ghana’s farmer-herder conflict.  
The analysis of Ghanaian media reports involves electronic, print and online sources from 
2010 to 2020 as the violent conflict between the two factions has increased in magnitude and 
numbers. Again, critical evaluation accounts of community leaders, reports, and accounts of 
people within the security agencies; the media reportage of the conflicts: print and electronic were 
subjected to analysis to ascertain their validity and relevance to the study. This use of media 
allowed this research to gather a wide range of data over an extended period within a limited 
period. Content analysis will be adopted to appraise the meaning and messages within the media 
sources themselves. This research’s content analysis will allow researchers to study a broad range 
of ‘texts,’ interviews, narratives, discussions, films, TV, editorials, and contents of newspapers 
and magazines on the conflict between the farmers and Fulani.  
1.3 Importance of Research and Relevance of The Issue 
A better understanding of the conditions and factors surrounding the farmer-herder conflict 
would improve our knowledge of forces at work in the conflict in at least three ways. First, farmer-
herder conflict is a phenomenon in its own right, generating thousands of deaths and displacements 
worldwide. Second, the conflict between groups can degenerate into a national conflict group 
(Warren and Troy, 2014). Communal conflict dynamics (such as farmer-herder conflict) involving 
land use have been noted as the most significant obstacles to domestic peace in divided societies. 
As Horowitz (2002) puts it, communal conflicts can be an effective way of gaining access to land. 
Many people are often displaced, even when the number of deaths is relatively limited (Horowitz 




were the key actors in the Kenyan post-election communal conflicts (Human Rights Watch 2008; 
International Crisis Group 2008). A complete understanding of the farmer-herder conflict 
processes will thus be impossible without a better grasp of the forces generating inter-ethnic 
cohesion and fragmentation. Third, this research study of the conflictual relationship between 
migrants and indigenous farming groups in Ghana focuses on the cross-border and interstate 
migration of Fulani-herders from neighbouring countries as well as from the northern parts of 
Ghana to the forest and middle belts of the nation, rather than on merely local or provincial 
phenomena. It also examines the consequences of migration on the access to resources and the 
resulting conflict from limited access to resources (land) on the part of the migrant group.  
1.4 Structure of The Thesis 
This study is organized into six chapters. The first chapter introduces the research project. 
The second chapter will review relevant literature and theories on the factors that cause farmer-
herder conflicts in Ghana and Africa. Land is an indispensable resource on which most individuals 
and group’s livelihood and income depend on. Thus, when perceived under the identity lens, land 
becomes a reference point for both individual and group identity. Consequently, the question of 
land and identity has been the subject of conflict between farmers and herders.  
The third chapter justifies the selection of two sub-national districts to investigate factors 
affecting conflict between migrants/farmers in the two districts under study, namely, Asante 
Akyem North District (AAND) and Gushegu District (GD). It also justifies the reliance on media 
reports of conflict, the use of qualitative analysis and the challenges encountered in collecting data.   
Chapters Four and Five embody the analysis of data gathered in this research. Chapter Four 




farmers and herders in AAND and GD. Here I show how the differences in livelihood goals lead 
to contestations for land and how that contributes to an overall understanding of farmer-herder 
relations and conflict. The two cases will emphasize the differences between groups in terms of 
livelihood goals and interest and the consequences of competition over land use. This paper argues 
that land use among the two groups leads to triggers, which translate into conflict. 
The fifth chapter discusses another important driver of farmer-herder conflicts that is 
intricately linked to land use. Unlike Chapter Four, which addresses how land-use issues 
contributing to farmer-herder violence in Ghana, in this chapter, I elaborate on how land access 
and rights in Ghana (which borders on autochthony and belonging/citizenship) affect relations 
between farmers and Fulani herders in terms of conflicts.  I highlight the migration of the Fulani 
herders to the communities being studied in this research, how land tenure laws are formulated to 
favour indigenes, the use of autochthony discourses by indigenous (Sons) farmers and how that 
set the stage for the escalation of the conflict. I also examine how land tenure insecurity on the part 
of Fulani migrant herders, which is a result of their lack of land rights and limited access, affect 
the conflict  
The conclusion in this study will sum up the main findings,  make suggestions for further 
studies and introduce multiple caveats with regards to the study of farmer herder conflicts. The 
arguments advanced here can inform future research on migration victim profiles (their livelihood 
and rights) and serve as a basis for making predictive models on migration and conflict risk using 
sons of the soil and autochthony theory and the difference in livelihood activities between local 








An extensive body of literature on Sub-Saharan Africa has consistently acknowledged 
farmers’ and herders’ historical co-existence in symbiotic relationships (Bassett, 1988). Tonah 
(2006) acknowledges the long historical record of fluctuating conflict, competition and 
cooperation between settled (indigenous) farmers and Fulani migrant herders in West Africa. 
Similarly, Turner et al. (2006) concluded that the relationship between farmers and herders has 
been multi-dimensional, comprising cooperation and conflict. Farmers and herders forged a 
healthy relationship through reciprocity, exchange and support (Barrot, 1992; Moritz, 2010). 
According to Turner (2004), the relationships between farmers and herders in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
like most social relationships in other parts of the African continent, have been characterized by 
cooperation and conflict. Tonah (2006) indicates that conflicts between farmers and herders have 
been a common feature of economic livelihood in West Africa. In recent decades, farmer-herder 
conflicts in many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa have escalated into widespread violence, leading to 
property loss, massive displacement of people, and loss of lives (Hussein, Sumberg and Seddon, 
2000). This chapter intends to review theories about the causes of farmer-herder conflict in Africa 
and develop a conceptual framework to guide the research in the study areas, namely Asante 
Akyem North District (AAND) Gushegu District (GD) in Ghana.  
As indicated in the previous chapter, the popularity of the farmer-herder conflicts in Africa 
has triggered various viewpoints from scholars from different fields of study.  While some scholars 




violence that characterizes the farmer-herder conflict in recent times. Others have also focused on 
the effects of the conflict on the societies and finding practical solutions and remedies to the 
conflict . This conflict is caused by the complex interaction of factors, some of which are related 
and overlaps. Although the literature on farmer-herder interaction and conflict touches on the 
origin and migration of the Fulani to their present-day locations, this research focuses on factors 
that cause conflict between farmers and herders. However, this chapter will touch briefly on the 
history of the Fulani herders in present-day Ghana. 
2.1 History of Fulani in Ghana 
According to Tonah (2005), the Fulani’s migration to present-day Ghana predates 
colonialism. However, as compared to other West African states, the movement of the Fulanis into 
Ghana is quite a recent phenomenon (Tonah, 2005, p.14). The Fulanis first settled in the Northern 
parts of Ghana (Tonah,2005,p.14). For instance, the Lawra-Tumu district census report in Ghana 
estimated the population of settled Fulani rising from 100 persons in 1911 to about 302 persons in the 
1921 census (Tonah, 2005, p.15).   According to Tonah (2005, p.15), the Fulani were the largest non-
centralized ethnic group in the Lawra-Tumu district. However, their population was less than 1% of 
the total population of the entire district. This figure is said to have increased to 784 in the 1931 census, 
made up of 400 males and 384 females, indicating that they might have probably moved with their 
entire families (Tonah, 2005, p.15).   By the 1920s, the Fulani had permanently settled in the Northern 
territories (Tonah, 2005, p.15). 
Fulani pastoralists started migrating to Ghana’s southern parts in the early 1990s, mainly 
Eastern and Ashanti regions (Tonah, 2005, p.16). According to Tonah (2005), most of them settled 




from neighbouring countries and northern Ghana migrated to Ghana’s forest zones due to pasture 
availability and settled with indigenous cattle owners and chiefs’ help. Although the Fulani 
population in the area has increased, the number of the Fulani herders in Ghana is unknown since 
the recent Population and Housing Census conducted in 2000 and 2010 did not capture Fulani 
herdsmen due to their frequent movement (GSS, 2014).  
In recent time the relationship between farmers and herder in various parts of Ghana have 
led conflict and violent clashes between them. Among the notable areas of the conflict between 
herders and farmers include Asanti Akim North and Gushegu. The various factors advanced as the 
causes of the violent conflict between local farmers and migrant Fulani herders have been 
categorized into four in this chapter. Namely; environmental factors and climate change (Okoli 
and Atelhe, 2014; Benjaminsen, 2009; Tonah, 2006a; Moritz, 2012), resource scarcity (Homer-
Dixon, 1999; Kahl, 2006; Beachler, 1998; Shettima and Tar, 2008; Peluso andWatts, 2001; 
Nmona, 2008), Land tenure and land insecurity (Desinger and Castagnini, 2006) and stereotype 
and prejudice attached to a faction (Kaplan, 1994, Bukari and Schareika, 2015). These factors are 
explored in turn in the rest of the chapter. 
2.2 Role of Climate Change in Violent Conflict 
During the past few decades, violent conflicts have escalated between various groups, 
particularly between farmers and herders and linked to climate change (Benjaminsen et al., 2012). 
According to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Climate 
change refers to “the change in climate over time, whether due to the natural variability of as a 
result of human activity” (UNFCCC, 2011, p.1). Climate change has led to unfavourable weather 




resources’ availability. Thus many scholars and civil servants have been attracted to the idea that 
there is a causal link between climate/environmental change and violent conflict (Benjaminsen, 
2009; Moritz, 2012; Fabusoro and Oyegbami, 2009;). According to  Moritz (2012), the conflict 
between the farmers and herders can be classified as a climate-change-induced conflict. Climate 
change is an essential factor that influences the availability of resources for farmers’ and herders’ 
livelihood. Scholars, including Okoli and Atelhe (2014) and Abbass (2014), noted that climate 
change leads to the shrinking of environmental space and natural resources, further increasing 
competition and pressure on the available natural resources and conflict among those who use. 
According to Moritz (2012), although climate change is taking place everywhere, it has been 
volatile in the Sahel regions of Africa. In those regions, climate change leads to conflict as it gives 
the incentive to groups (especially Fulani herders) to migrate from areas affected by drought to 
new places where their livestock can have access to pasture. Across the entire West African sub-
region, the Fulani generally practice nomadic or semi-nomadic cattle-raising5  due to arid and 
semi-arid conditions of the West African region (Dafinger, 2004, p.189). The Fulani herders 
migrate southwards to the forest regions. The southward migration of the Fulani herders has been 
cited as a major factor in increasing farmer-herder conflict rates in sub-Saharan Africa (Moritz, 
2010, Benjaminson et al., 2012) 
Similarly, the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) draws a similar link 
between environmental/climate change and conflict in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa. In 2007, 
the former United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, in an article published by 
 
5  Mabe (2003, p.143) explains a nomadic lifestyle as a practice of  having no fixed location or settlement and 
moving from place to place without returning to any fixed location, whereas a semi-nomadic lifestyle can include a 
fixed settlement of non-temporary materials and the practice of transhumance usually within a distances of up to 100 




Washington Post, suggested a direct correlation between global warming and the conflict between 
the Sahel’s farmers and nomadic groups regions (Ki-Moon, 2007). In that same year, the former 
vice president of the United States, Al Gore and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize based on the link between climate change conflict 
(Benjaminsen et al., 2012). Defending the decision to award the 2007 Nobel Peace Price to Al 
Gore, the chair of the committee, Danbolt Mjøs, declared that “environmental change/global 
warming not only has negative consequences for human security but also can fuel violence and 
conflict within and between states” which he referred to as “climate war” (The Nobel Peace Prize, 
2007)6. This suggested a link between climate change and conflict.  
 However, in a working paper by the Swedish International Development Cooperation 
Agency (SIDA) in 2018, the researcher Johan Schaar found out that there is no direct and linear 
relationship between climate change and violent conflict, but under certain circumstances, climate-
related change can influence factors that lead to or exacerbate conflict. To buttress this, Danbolt 
Mjøs, in attributing conflict in the Darfur and Sahel region to environmental change admitted that, 
the conflict in the region is caused by a clash of different ethnic groups suggesting that there are 
different dimensions to the conflict and not just environmental change. In a study set out to 
examine the alleged relation between environmental/climate change and violent conflict, 
Goldstone (2001) questions some of the most popular climate change-conflict arguments. 
Attributing all conflict between migrant herders and host entirely to climate change can 
overshadow social processes that are important in bringing about large-scale conflicts, such as 
leaders’ role in exploiting the conflict for personal gains, breakdown of traditional authority, 
 
6 Speech by Ole Danbolt Mjøs in 2007, The Nobel Peace Prize 2007. NobelPrize.org. Nobel Media AB 2020. 




alliances and state weakness. Again, (Goldstone, 2001) stressed that high-profile climate change 
issues might only serve as a scapegoat or rallying point for actors with hidden agendas. 
  Also, Reuveny (2007) noted that whether adverse climatic changes and subsequent migration 
will result in any social effects will depend mainly on the affected area’s characteristics. For instance, 
as Buhaug et al. (2008, p.20) explained that “economically developed” and “politically stable” 
societies can manage and adapt to conceivable environmental conditions. Thus it is not expected 
that there will be an influx of migrants resulting from climate change, increasing climate 
variability, and worsening conditions to constitute a significant security threat in these countries. 
Contrarily, societies that are characterized by other conflict-promoting conditions, such as bad 
governance, extreme social inequalities, large and heterogeneous populations, and a history of 
violence, constitute probable cases where climate-induced conflict might occur Buhaug et al. 
(2008). Therefore, climate change exacerbates conflict risk by reducing the supply of livelihood 
resources, increasing economic loss, and weakening government institutions in societies with pre-
existing tensions. In sum, climate change may be an intermediary factor leading to conflict and not 
necessarily the root of violent conflict. This is because climate change only leads to violence or 
conflict under certain pre-existing conditions and has to interact with several socio-political and 
economic factors. 
2.3 Resource Scarcity and Violent Conflict Argument   
Most scholars often present conflict between farmers and herders groups as a typical 
illustration of resource scarcity conflicts, that is in tune with the dominant argument of the 
‘environmental scarcity’ literature (Bächler, 1998; Homer-Dixon, 1999; Percival and Homer-




conflicts in the literature in various parts of Africa, including the Rwandan genocide (Bächler, 
1999), clashes in Kenya (Kahl, 1998, 2006), violence in South Africa (Homer-Dixon and Blitt, 
1998, Percival and Homer-Dixon, 1998),  and the civil war in Sudan (Suliman, 1993). Proponents 
of the resource scarcity theory argue that an increase in population growth, shortage or reduction 
in the quality of renewable resources as well as unequal access to resources results in 
environmental scarcity. Environmental scarcity then leads to a decrease in economic productivity 
and or migration which acts as underlying factors of violent conflict (Homer-Dixon, 1999; 
Theisen, 2008). Homer-Dixon and Blitt (1998) argues that scarcities put additional stress on 
already fragile societies, limiting their capacity to cope with negative changes in resource access, 
thus reducing agricultural and economic activity and, in the end, weakening the state (Homer-
Dixon and Blitt, 1998. p.280). 
  The idea that resource scarcity leads to violent conflict, in general, can be regarded as an 
extension of the Malthusian concept of resource scarcity as a cause of environmental degradation, 
increased poverty, population growth and an escalating struggle for resources (Homer-Dixon, 
1994). Homer-Dixon further noted that decreasing access to renewable resources increases 
frustration, which, in turn, creates grievances against the state, weakens the state and civil society 
and increases the opportunities for instigating an insurrection. Like Homer-Dixon (1999, 1994), 
Tonah (2006) maintains that conflict theory views constant competition over scarce resources as 
the main source of conflict between users of those resources. The users of land resources here refer 
to farmers and herders. The assumption that an increase in resource scarcity due to lack of 
renewable resources, primarily agricultural land, is the leading cause of violent conflicts in most 
of Africa and most parts of the world. This assumption formed a common description in the debates 




alleged to be rapidly increasing in many parts of the developing world due to the ongoing 
modernization and population growth processes, which lead to unequal access in these societies. 
For example, Hagberg (1998) argues that conflicts between farmers and herders stem from 
competition for resources that are mostly caused by population growth, migration, and a decrease 
in land resource quality and quantity. 
 
Other scholars have attributed resource scarcity to the rapid rate of population growth in 
many parts of Africa, resulting in pressure and reduced quality on the resource. Hagberg (1998) 
noted that since the beginning of the 1950s, there has been an increase in human and livestock 
populations and livestock populations in West Africa. According to Adebayo (1997) and Breuser 
et al. (1998), the increase in population among countries located on the coast of the region 
increased pressure on natural resources, most especially land, generating rivalry between users of 
the land. Similarly, Ayih (2003) attributed the herder-farmer conflicts in the Middle Belt of 
Nigeria, to what he called “population explosion.” This he suggest is attributable to the high birth 
rate and migration of herders and other groups from Northern and Southern parts of Nigeria. 
Further, Abbass (2012) and Okoli and Atelhe (2014) noted that as the population increases in an 
area inhabited by farmers and herders, the demand for farmland and grazing also increases, leading 
to fierce competition and a constant struggle between them. Thus, the rapid population growth had 
led to a scarcity of farm and grazing lands, which were abundant when the population was less. 
The arguments above suggest that conflict is inevitable in areas where farmer and herder 





However, the resource scarcity argument only captures the “resource” (land) which is being 
contested for by herders and farmers and fails to address sufficiently the politics of land use 
(Bassett, 1988) and why the different groups are mostly from separate ethnic groups as well as 
land access and tenure arrangement. In his research of farmer-herder conflicts in the Ivory Coast, 
Bassett (1988, p. 455) noted that a “weakness” of the “human ecological analysis” on the conflict 
between farmer and herder is that it fails to address the “politics of land use sufficiently”. This 
suggests that the population growth/resource scarcity argument, which focuses much on the 
diminishing land resource, does not adequately explain why and how some groups can gain access 
to land use and why others do not. 
 
 Bleach (1998) also termed the resource conflict categorization as too broad and, therefore, 
not useful in explaining specific cases in Africa since in neglect details. Similar to Bleach’s (1998) 
argument, Theisen (2008) explains that the resource scarcity argument has limited explanatory 
power regarding violent conflicts.  
Another criticism level against the resource scarcity argument is that there is no empirical 
test to prove a direct link between it and internal conflict. For instance, Esty et al. (1998) and 
Hauge and Ellingsen (1998) conducted and empirical tests that produced two different results. 
While Hauge and Ellingsen’s (1998) research proved that resource scarcity was next to social 
development in causing internal conflict, Esty et al. (1998) noted that internal conflict and 
resource/environmental scarcity have no direct link. Thus, defeating the idea that scarcity is a 
leading cause of conflict between farmers and herders. Theisen (2008) also found out that there is 




To add to this criticism, Gleditsch’s (1998) criticises the literature on the link between conflict 
and the environment raises at least nine (9) flaws of the argument linking environmental scarcity to 
internal conflict. According to him, the literature on the environment and conflict generates the 
following problems: 
(1)there is a lack of clarity over what is meant by ‘environmental conflict’; (2) 
researchers engage in definitional and polemical exercises rather than analysis; 
important variables are neglected, notably political and economic factors which have a 
strong influence on conflict and mediate the influence of resource and environmental 
factors; (4) some models so large and complex that they are virtually untestable; (5) 
cases are selected on values of the dependent variable; (G) the causality of the 
relationship is reversed; (7) postulated events in the future are empirical evidence;  (8) 
studies fail to distinguish between foreign and domestic conflict; and (9) confusion 
reigns about the appropriate level of analysis (Gleditsch, 1998, p.381). 
Gleditsch argues that research literature may not possess all of the flaws but may contain at 
least one or more of the following problems, suggesting that the environment scarcity- conflict 
literature offers a narrow theory for analyzing conflict. Thus, he suggests that the theory of 
environmental scarcity-conflict literature should widen its scope to include other factors that go 
beyond just resources. 
 
2.4 Land Tenure, Land Insecurity and Weakening Traditional Institutions Argument 
Closely linked to the above are the land tenure7 and land insecurity hypothesis. Proponents 
of this argument explain the causes of farmer-herder conflict in Africa as related to land tenure 
system. Like the resource scarcity argument, this theory is linked to rapid population growth and 
resulting in land scarcity. For instance, (Deininger and Castagnini, 2006) attributed the recent 
increase in land-related conflicts in sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries due to population 
pressure and its attending problem of land scarcity. Also, Fratkin and Roth’s (2005) study attribute 
 




explains that the recent rise in conflict between farmers and herders is a result of land insecurity, 
resulting from recurrent evens of drought, which has affected the mechanism for resource sharing. 
According to Deininger and Castagnini (2006), aside from resource scarcity and rapid 
population growth, other factors such as inequalities inherent in land tenure systems in most 
African countries and the lack of clarity on the roles of formal and informal institutions in land 
administration are also leading causes of farmer-herder conflict. The lack of clearly assigned roles 
to traditional informal institutions and formal institutions’ power over the control and allocation 
of land results in difficulty in using interventions like titling and land registration. These 
interventions have proven to be successful in other parts of the world but have proved to be 
inadequate in the African contexts. The lack of such interventions to ensure adequate security of 
land tenure and ownership has resulted in higher conflict levels. In Africa and most parts of the 
developing world, land boundaries and laws of land transfer and ownership may be loosely 
defined. Transfers and ownership to land normally through usufructuary use based on membership 
of a family, clan or community rather than ownership (Deininger and Castagnini, 2006 p.323). As 
a result, land transfer transactions are mostly unwritten and done orally. These modes of land 
transactions are described as the leading causes of land conflict between farmers and herders. It 
does not ensure the security of tenure. Thus, people have to resort to conflict to defend their land 
as there are no written records of land transactions. 
 Deininger and Castagnini (2006) further describe that one of the main reasons behind the 
increased incidence of land conflict in Africa is the failure of existing land tenure systems to tackle 
challenges posed by the increased demand and the appreciation of the value of land in ways that 
improve land tenure security and ensure equitable distribution. Such an increase in land value can 




techniques, improved trade terms for agriculture, and the rise in non-agricultural demand for land 
(such as settlement). However, Bruce and Boudreaux (2013)  argue that weak institutions lead to 
weak land tenure arrangements that are unable to match the rate at which land value is appreciating 
and the growing demand for land. Thus, individuals and groups are denied essential rights and 
access to land.  
Additionally, scholars (Benjamison et al., 2009; Deininger and Castagnini, 2006; Sone, 
2012) argue that land insecurity is another cause of farmer-herder conflict in Africa. As already 
explained above, in most African countries, land ownership and transfer are most often based on 
oral transactions. When land users, mostly migrants who can only acquire land through purchase 
and lease agreement, fear that they may be forced to leave their lands, they engage in every activity 
possible to protect their land. Deininger and Castagnini (2006), noted that this is a major feature 
underlying the high occurrence of conflict between farmers. Sone (2012) argues that the recurrent 
conflicts involving farmers and cattle grazers in Cameroon’s northwest region have its roots in the 
‘poor’ application of land ownership laws to protect landowners from losing their land. 
 
However, there is little evidence to prove a direct link between weak land institutions and laws 
and farmer-herder conflict. Barrows and Roth (1990)  argue that studies on land tenure and land 
institutions leading to the conflict have provided little or no details of the relationship between 
land tenure policies and their consequences on conflict. According to Barrowsand Roth (1990), a 
strict focus on land tenure institutions and laws leads to neglect of other factors such as identity 
that can directly impact conflict occurrence. Thus, to determine whether land tenure policies or 
land insecurity are the cause of a particular conflict, it is necessary to show that over and above 




the land tenure laws to the conflict itself. This makes it challenging to attribute conflicts between 
groups or the absence of conflict to the legal framework that governs the acquisition of ownership 
of land without looking at other mediating factors. For instance, Aga’s (2014) research on land 
tenure-based conflict conducted in Oromiya region in Ethiopia in 2009 and 2010, demonstrates 
that the continuing relevance of land tenure institutions and land insecurity debates to the 
occurrence or otherwise of conflict is gradually losing its significance because the farmer-herder 
conflict in Africa goes beyond the provisions of the land policy and efficient land institutions. 
Although the importance of land tenure institutions and systems in accounting for the causes of 
farmer-herder conflicts cannot be discredited, its overreliance on land institutions and policies 
thus, neglecting other factors such as the nature and relationship between the parties involved in 
the conflict, cannot be ignored. 
2.5 Stereotype Prejudice and Crime Argument 
Lastly, scholars who have also examined the conflict between the Fulani herders and farming 
have described the cause due to the ethnic and tribal “stereotype” attached to the Fulani ethnic 
group (Bukhari and Schareika, 2015) and crimes they commit in their host communities Ofuoku 
and Isife (2009, p.50). Complaints lodged against the Fulani nomadic migrant population include 
accusations of rape, armed robbery, and farmland destruction.  In Opoku (2014, p.172), the causes 
of the farmer-herder conflict were explained as; the shooting of innocent citizens by a herdsman, 
destruction of food crops, raping of women on their farms, herdsmen causing bushfires, pollution 
of water bodies by herdsmen and cattle rustling. Agyemang (2017) states similar factors 
(destruction of crops, overgrazing of fallow land, contamination of streams by cattle, disregard for 




nomads by the youths of local communities, indiscriminate defecation by cattle, theft of cattle, 
stray cattle, indiscriminate bush burning) as the major causes of the farmer-Fulani herdsmen 
conflict and cites Ofem and Inyang (2014) and Ofuoku and Isife (2009) to support this claim. This 
widely held perception of violence and lawlessness about the Fulani migrant herders generates 
tension between them and other indigenous populations. 
Ofem and Inyang (2014, p.516) conducted another field research in the Yakurr region of 
River State in Nigeria, revealed the same factors mentioned by Ofuoku and Isife (2009, p.50). In 
their survey, both farmers and nomads agreed on the same factors as the causes of the conflict. 
Again in Nigeria, it is estimated that the conflict between nomads and farmers has accounted for 
more than two thousand deaths and the displacement of more than twenty thousand (Moritz, 2006, 
p.29; IRIN,2004) and most of these conflicts is said to have been triggered by cattle theft and other 
criminal activities by FulBe8 nomads (Moritz, 2006, p.29). These stereotype prejudices and 
accusations of crimes committed by Fulani herders, many scholarsbelieve, have led indigenous 
communities to mobilize for self-defence against the threat from herder or even sometimes to 
organize reprisal attacks against the herders. This mobilization tends to increase the escalation of 
violence.  For instance, in one report in north-central Nigeria, 64,820 cattle were stolen, leading to 
retaliation and killing of at least 2,991 herders (Egwu, 2016, p.417). Also, the Rural Banditry 
Reports by Centre for Democracy and Development, Pastoral Resolve (PARE) and Nigeria 
Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) disclosed that over 100 people were killed from 
January 1, 2016, to February 1, 2016, across Nigeria’s length and breadth over cattle stealing 
 
8 Fulbe is used synonymously with Fulani and refers to members of a pastoral and nomadic people of western 




(Kuna and Ibrahim, 2016, p.7). This data suggest that stereotype prejudice and crimes by the herder 
and farming groups have resulted in more violent clashes. 
However, it is problematic to generalize the activities and actions related to the Fulanis 
because, as Bukari and Shareika (2015) puts it in most cases, the nomadic herdsmen do not know 
each other and carry out their activities independently. There is no clear evidence that Fulani 
pastoralist ethnic groups have a single political agenda or belong to one unit since there are Fulani 
herders in almost every country in West Africa. Hence, it is erroneous to lump all Fulanis as a 
single militant group with a single agenda, which is to cause trouble. Also, using crime committed 
by an individual Fulani herder or few Fulani nomads as a principal cause of the farmer-herder 
conflict within a community or across a whole country fails to explain and provide details of how 
the conflict between individuals escalate into full-scale community conflict. Thus, this theory 
offers a narrow perspective of understanding the causes of farmer-herder conflict. 
 
2.6 Theorising Different Livelihood Interests and Land use disagreement, Land Rights 
and Autochthony claims. 
Although the above theories can explain the conflict to some extent, what is lacking is that 
they offer a narrow approach to understanding the conflict between indigenous farmers and 
migrant herders in AAND and GD in Ghana. Most of the explanations of these theories fail to treat 
other factors such as identity and livelihood differences as causes in their own right, thus, limiting 




theory 9 (Havel, 1986; Komey, 2010), which advocates that for conflicts and wars to be fully 
understood and comprehended, an analysis of the history and contemporary dynamics of land 
policies and practices of the parties involved (Kumah, 2010). This study also uses the lens of 
autochthony and SOS by indigenous farmers in Ashanti Akim North District and Gushegu District 
to highlight the differences between indigenous farmers and Fulani migrant herders in terms of 
land rights, land access and land use. The article contends that although land use, land tenure, and 
land insecurity lead to conflict among herders and farmers, the conflict cannot be fully understood 
without including other specific factors such as autochthony and differences in the groups’ 
livelihood goals involved in the conflict. Thus, this research seeks to place land use, land tenure 
and ownership and land insecurity within the context of livelihood interest and differences and 
autochthony to explain the causes of the conflict in AAND and GD. 
 
Again, the research argues that no single strategy fits the farmer-herder conflicts in Ghana, 
given the complexity of such conflicts. Hence this research argues that although many factors lead 
to the occurrence of violent conflict between farmers and herders, as seen above, land remains at 
the heart of these conflicts. In light of the results, this thesis employs a multi-faceted approach 
towards the farmers-herder conflicts. It explains other factors such as livelihood difference and 
autochthony claims, which will be suitable for acknowledging the context in which the conflicts 
occur. Thus, efforts by scholars to explain conflict through other means, such as singular causes, 
miss an essential point because the causes are all dimensions of the causes of the farmer-herder 
conflict, but they are not singular root causes.  
 
9 According to J.J.Havel, land use conflicts are defined as an interaction between groups of people with an 





This research theorizes that land use disagreement and lack of land access rights, coupled 
with indigenous farmers’ autochthonous claims, lead to conflict between farmers and herders. 
Competition over land due to the importance of land to the livelihood of both farmers and herders 
as well increase in human population growth, growth in the population of herds and extension of 
cultivated areas are the causes of the farmer-herder conflicts. Nchi (2013, p.222),  cited in 
Agyemang (2017, p.18), also argued that Fulani herders and settled farmers are continuously 
engaged in a competition for pastureland and farmlands, leading to a decrease of available land 
resources as the population of humans and cattle increase. While the increase in population, land 
tenure, climate change and land scarcity are vital in setting into motion the causes of farmers-
herders conflict in Ghana, it is essential to put the land (both land-use and land access rights) 
conflict into the context of cultural differences and the use of identity and autochthony discourse 
by local farmers against migrant herders in the selected cases in this study. 
 Although the above theoretical explanations for the causes of the farmer-herder conflict talk 
about land security and tenure, and scarcity, what they fail to do is discuss other issues such as 
cultural differences, which will help capture the complex nature of Ghana’s conflict. Baranyi and 
Weitzner (2001) observed that some conflicts start directly out of competition over land. However, 
land use is often not the sole cause of conflict; other factors, such as identity, land rights, 
marginalization, and differences between groups, contribute to conflict. Derman et al. (2007)  
noted that resource scarcity does not directly link to violent conflict but rather the presence of 
factors such land use and lack of access, lack of secure land tenure right, and identity discourse 




The ‘land question’ in many rural African communities and other parts of the developing 
world has for a long time been the subject of peace and war, cooperation and non-cooperation, 
progress or regress (Sone, 2012). The theoretical linkage between land and conflict is made more 
explicit by Guma Kunda Komey when he concluded that: 
“The centrality of land factor in conflicts stems from the fact that rights to land are 
intimately tied to membership in specific communities, ranging from a nuclear or 
extended family, clan, or ethnic group to the nation-state … Nothing evokes deeper 
passions—or gives rise to more bloodshed—than disagreements about territory, 
boundaries, or access to land and related resources. From national governments’ 
perspective, land in its entirety is a physical basis of political sovereignty and power, as 
well national economic wealth ... Nothing evokes deeper passions—or gives rise to more 
bloodshed—than disagreements about territory, boundaries, or access to land and related 
resources. From national governments’ perspective, land in its entirety is a physical basis 
of political sovereignty and power, as well national economic wealth. However, most 
rural communities see land as a symbol for their collective socio–cultural and political 
identities, as well as a basis for their economic survival. This relation among land, 
identity and livelihood implies that access to land is a fundamental human right. This 
becomes clear whereas its denial does not only deprive the affected communities from 
their economic and socio-cultural well-being but also endangers their very survival and 
existence. ” (Komey, 2010, p. 2). 
 
Komey’s argument provides the background for my analysis of how and why land access and 
land use can cause conflict between farmers and herders. As Derman et al. (2007) noted in their 
study of violent conflict that occurred in Burkina Faso, Tanzania and Kenya,  that resource scarcity 
does not have a direct link to violent conflict but rather the presence of factors such land use and 
lack of access, lack of secure land tenure right and the use of identity discourse concerning these 
factors. This research aims to examine the farmer-herder conflict in Ghana in light of these factors.  
 
According to Benjaminsen et al. (2012), the recent changes in land tenure systems, land 
rights and land use have led to the escalation of violent conflicts between farmers and Fulani 
herders in most parts of the West Africa sub-region. This makes it imperative to understand the 




within groups in nations or between nations can help policymakers and scholars develop strategies 
to reduce and manage conflict among groups, limit conflict, and potentially avoid violence (Collier 
et al., 2003). Land is the object of competition in several ways. For instance, it could be an 
“economic asset,” where users such as farmers and herders will have to compete to have rights 
over it, gain access to it and use it. It can also be a means through which an individual or a group 
can gain a “social legitimacy” and also serves as a “connection with identity” and as “political 
territory.” (USAID, 2013). Bruce (2013) noted that in almost all competition over land in Africa, 
the struggle is between any number and type of identity groups, be it ethnicity, race, gender, or 
religion (see USAID,2013). Therefore,  there is always the possibility of competition over land 
escalation into a large-scale violent conflict when groups of people, rather than individuals, are 
involved.  
Studying the causes of conflict between farmers and herders will be inadequate to examine 
only resource scarcity and sharing, as Gleditsch (1998) noted.  Ejigu (2009) emphasizes that 
violent conflicts among farmers and herders in Nigeria and that of Rwanda are multi-dimensional 
(Ejigu 2009, p.891), meaning they go beyond just the sharing of resources to include questions 
about identity and resource rights. Ohlsson (1999, p. 96)  also noted that although land scarcity 
and unequal distribution of land are significant causes of violent conflict, factors such as ethnicity 
and identity should be examined due to the complexity and violence that characterize farmers-
herders conflicts. Thus, theories that seek to explain the causes of farmer-herder conflict must go 
beyond the resource's struggle to involve other dimensions of the conflict to understand land use's 
impact better.   
Furthermore, conflict over land between farmers and herders in Africa does not take place 




often overlaid with other features such as identity and belonging. Similarly, Tonah (2006a) noted 
that the persistent nature of the conflict between farmers and herders in most parts of Ghana 
indicate that the conflict is fueled by identity and tribal sentiments. Other dimensions such as how 
differences in the groups' livelihood and why and how groups mobilize to gain access and control 
over land and its effect on conflict.  According to Buhaug et al. (2008, p.26), irrespective of the 
conflict’s origin, identity is widely regarded as a driving force for mobilization and demarcation 
lines between and among contending groups. Similarly, Kahl (2006) opines that ethnic identity is 
an opportunity to mobilize members of a group to protest against others and engage in conflict and 
collective violence.  
 
This paper identifies autochthony, that is, ‘the belief that a place belongs to its original 
inhabitants and that they are therefore more entitled’ (Dunn, 2009, Boone, 2017)-as an important 
new determinant of out-group prejudice and violence in conflict. According to Dunn (2009) and 
Geschiere and Jackson (2006), autochthony becomes the most useful asset to exploit when 
indigenes of a place are faced with a rapid exodus of migrant population and competition for 
resources.   
Similarly, Côté and Mitchell (2018) noted that when migrants arrive in large numbers, 
there is a tendency for SoS conflict to occur. Thus, this research hypothesized that autochthony 
within the study areas (Asante Akim North District and Gushegu District) guarantees indigenous 
farmers’ rights, access and control over land and predicts bias towards migrant Fulani herders of 
land access and use. Hence, indigenous farmers can utilize autochthony discourse to exclude their 
competitors (migrant herders), confiscate land they have purchased, and even ask for them to be 




and the indigenous farming population. Land-use and land access are vital in setting into motion 
between farmers' and herders’ conflict in Ghana. This research seeks to put land-use and land 
access conflict into the context of differences in livelihoods autochthony claims. The use of 
autochthony discourse by locals against migrant herders in this study’s selected cases is very 
critical to the research. Locals often ask for preferential treatment in terms of resource distribution 
and its use because Fulani herders are regarded as “aliens” in communities in which they live. 
Hence they do not require to be treated equally as ‘citizens’. 
According to Côté and Mitchell 2018, anti-immigrant sentiment is a universal and 
widespread phenomenon. In any community and society where migrants arrive in large numbers, 
there is a tendency to trigger violent clashes. Thus the ‘Sons of the Soil’(SoS) and autochthony10 
lens cannot be overlooked in discussing the causes of land conflict between indigenous farmers 
and migrant Fulani herders in Asanti Akim North and Gushegu District Assemblies in Ghana. Son-
of-the-Soil conflicts can arise when people who consider themselves as ‘indigenous’ or ‘local’ 
clashes with a migrant group (Jackson, 2006; Côté and Mitchell, 2015). Boas and Dunn (2014, p. 
8)  also explain it as conflict over agricultural land taken by immigrants. The adoption of the 
autochthony and SoS lens for explaining and understanding the farmer-herder conflict in Ghana 
allows for this research to fill the gap that arises as a result of the environmental context in which 
this conflict occurs. That is, it captures internal migration that characterizes this case, which is 
 
10 The concept of “Sons of the Soil’ (SOS) was first introduced in the classic work of Myron Weiner (1978) ‘Sons of 
the Soil: Migration and ethnic conflict in India’ where he focused on ethnic in- and livelihood competition as a 
combination capable of triggering conflict. Weiner’s major concern was the response of autochthonous “sons-of-the-
soil” groups to the arrival of in-migrants, when they are unable to compete with them economically. According to 
Côté & Mitchell, 2018 SoS conflicts combines an ethnic and indigenous components, and built around a sense of 
belongingness, that is if one group proclaim to be ‘sons) of a particular soil, there is a sense that another group exist 




usually being ignored by other arguments as well as the competition and contested claims and 
access to land.   
The terms ‘indigenes’ and  ‘citizen’ have often been used to refer to the natives of AAND 
and GD. On the other hand, migrant Fulani herders have been referred to as ‘strangers’, 
‘foreigners’, and ‘aliens’. The use of different identity labels for the otheroften clearly demarcates 
the ethno-religious boundaries between the Fulani and their supposed indigenous farmers as well 
as only reinforce the SoS claims by local farmers (Bukari and Schareika 2015, p. 2). As Komey 
(2010) explains, land in Africa is often overlaid with the discourses of autochthony and 
belongingness, which feeds on the land issue. In this sense, Komey (2010) suggests that issues of 
autochthony and ethnicity easily propel and structure the competition over land use. Therefore, by 
applying the SoS lens to the analysis of farmer-herder conflict, the conflict is multiple dimensions 
and complexity. 
Furthermore, the juxtaposition of different livelihoods among the group makes conflict 
more complicated as different cultures, interests and goals coexist in the same space and 
communities, leading to conflict (Gaye, 2018). According to Maiangwa (2017), conflicts in Africa, 
including herder-farmer conflict, have mostly converged around livelihood resources and identity 
issues. Conflict over resources is manifested in identity mobilization, as members of groups with 
differences in livelihood and exist and compete for those resources necessary for their livelihood. 
Patterns of identity-based conflicts contrived from perceived or real identity and livelihood 
differences have emerged with harmful consequences for nation-building projects in several 
African countries such as Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Kenya, Mali, Senegal, and the Republic 




represent an interesting case study for examining how identity-related issues instigate conflicts 
between two diverse groups in Ghana and most countries in Africa.  
 
The Fulani migrant herders differ in identity attributes to that of the indigenous farming 
groups at their arrival. Many of these differences involved rather prominent characteristics: 
language, food, names, clothing, kinship structures, religion, and, more importantly, 
livelihood. Like in most parts of West Africa and Africa, both the Fulani migrant ethnic group 
typically pursue a set of social and economic endeavours which differs from that of the indigenes 
after migrating to Ghana. With these differences, and the competition over resources, access and 
rights to resources framed in autochthony discourse which feeds on the very process of 
marginalization and exclusion, conflict thus becomes inevitable (Komey, 2010). This study seeks 
to place land at the center of the analysis of farmer-herder conflict in the study areas, examining 
its use and access by farmers and herders and how this escalates into violent conflict. Although 
this argument to emphasize the complexity of the conflict between farmers and herders in Asante 
Akim North and Gushegu District in Ghana, by putting land use and land access issue into the 
context of livelihood difference and autochthony and identity, the research is able to provide more 
understanding on the conflict and address areas of the conflict mostly ignored by scholars in 
explaining the causes of conflict between farmers and herders in Ghana. 
 As shall be revealed later on in this thesis, traditional leaders/chiefs in both AAND and GD. 
As Berry (2017, p. 115) noted in general chiefs in Ghana “mobilize and exercise power alongside 
rather than through the law—working informally through personal and professional networks” 
with government agencies and institutions, and “their own subjects, rather … playing a direct role 




of the land, overseeing the distribution and approval of land to clans and families as well as leasing 
or allocating other lands that are not under family control to migrants or corporation who are 
interested in using those lands. This role of chiefs is derived from the 1992 constitution to reflect 
the historical patterns where chiefs were in control of lands. The constitution enjoins chiefs to hold 
lands “on behalf of, and in trust for the subjects of the stool in accordance with customary law and 
usage” (Republic of Ghana Constitution Ghana, 1992, p.161). However, the role of chiefs in 
allocating and distributing lands which are not in use have resulted in overlapping claims to land 
and have been cited as a leading cause in exacerbating the conflict over land claims (Alhassan, 
2017). 
 
While fully recognizing the role, chiefs play in the governance of land in both AAND and 
GD and Ghana as a whole, in this thesis, the distribution and allocation of land are put in the 
context of land use and land access and claims to land by farmers and herders. Thus, much 
emphasis is placed on land use and land access and claims to land as well as mobilization based 
on identity. 
However, as already acknowledged at the beginning of this chapter, the farmer-herder conflict in 
Ghana as examined by various scholars is caused by several factors that mostly overlap. Thus, the 
argument of this thesis, of course, are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Neither does the 
arguments advanced in this thesis cover all the causes of land related conflicts between farmers 
and herders in the study area as other factors may interact with the factors proposed in the thesis 
and contribute to the heightening of each other. Rather than trying to cover all the causes of farmer 




AAND, GD and Ghana as whole as a result of multiple causes, drawing attention to livelihood 

























There are a number of research methods and approaches available for researchers to choose 
from when they wish to embark on a research journey. The methods and approach a researcher 
deploys will largely depend on his/her research questions as well as cases that are being studied 
(Creswell and Poth, 2018). As already stated in previous chapters, this research aims to identify 
and explain the causes of farmer-herder conflict in twodistricts in Ghana. For this study, I will 
adopt a comparative case study research design of two sub-national districts in Ghana -i.e. (1) 
Asante Akim North District (AAND) and (2) Gushegu district (GD)- using various Ghanaian 
media reports as the main source of data.  
 
3.1 Case Study Design  
This research employs a case study research design.  According to Creswell, “The case study 
method “explores a real-life, contemporary bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems 
(cases) over time, through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of 
information… and reports a case description and case themes” (Creswell, 2013, p. 97).  The reason 
for using case studies in this research as opposed to survey research, which has been used in many 
studies on the farmer-herder conflict in Ghana ( Bukhari and Schareika, 2015; Kuusaana and 




of the errors that may occur with survey research, including contradictory accounts, incomplete 
information, partial observation and the inability of survey research to capture the complexity and 
dynamics of how farmer-herder conflicts unfold (Moritz, 2006). Another significant reason for 
selecting case studies in this research is that they can examine causal relationships “in the real 
world” rather than in unnaturally created settings (Gomm et al., 2000). This is because the case(s) 
are studied in-depth and examines evidence over a period of time rather than at a single point. 
This, thus, gives the researcher the advantage of capturing cases in their uniqueness, rather than 
over a short period of time. This feature of a case study makes it possible to use them as a basis 
for more comprehensive empirical or theoretical conclusions whiles reducing the time required to 
make those conclusions (Lewis-Beck et al., 2004). 
 
The case study research design is commonly divided into a single-case study and a multiple-
case study. Recognizing that the choice of either of the two depends on the objective of the 
research, and acknowledging that multiple-case design is preferable when the research aims at 
evaluation and examination of causal relationships between the independent variables (IV) (land 
use and differences in livelihood, and autochthony claims in access land) and the dependent 
variable (DV) farmer-herder conflict, the research would employ the multiple-case study design. 
Thus the research will assess the conflict between migrant Fulani herders and the indigenous 
farmers in two (2) districts, namely, Asante Akim North District (AAND) Gushegu District (GD) 
in the Ashanti and Northern regions, respectively.  The multiple-case study design is particularly 
useful for understanding the reasons for the occurrence of the issues in the two study areas and 
understanding the causes of conflicts. Yin (2009, p. 142) noted that when the multiple-case study 




different cases. Also, a multiple case study allows for investigating and comparing two cases in 
their totality as well as also enables multiple levels of analysis within a single study (Yin, 2009). 
Adopting a multiple case study in this research allowed for the establishment of generalization 
across several regions in Ghana and also to compare study of areas where there are frequent farmer-
herder clashes AAND and places where there are fewer clashes as in GD. What is interesting is 
that these two districts are otherwise very similar. The similarities include: in both GD and AAND, 
farmers are indigenes and the majority, while Fulani herders are the migrants and minority; farmers 
and herders have a different livelihood, which results in competition for the same resource leading 
to conflict, and also autochthony is the defining factor for the access to land which has generated 
conflict. However, these factors have resulted in a variation in the escalation of conflict into a 
violent conflict in the two cases. GD witness less violent conflict between farmers and herders as 
compared to AAND. What then leads to their different frequency and intensity of farmer-herder 
clashes? This research, therefore, employs Mill’s Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) as this it  
seeks to establish a general causal relationship between the IVs (Different livelihood, land use, 
Autochthony claims and land access) and the DV (violent conflict between farmers and herders) 
in GD and AAND. According to Mills (1843), when cases with similar background and results 
except for one outcome of interest (DV) are selected in a study, it helps to control for many 
alternative explanations of the phenomenon. Although the two study areas witness conflicts 
between indigenous farmers and migrant herders, the selection of these two cases will help to 
explain how the livelihood difference and autochthony claims help in the escalation of the conflict 
over land (land use and land access) into a violent one since the two cases possess more similarities. 
These similarities among the two cases will help serve as a control for many alternative 




many similarities as possible. However, Lieberson (1991, p.313-314) criticized Mill’s MSSD for 
treating independent variables as something simple and, therefore, unable to possess multiple 
causes. Thus, in this study, the background IVs are kept constant as the underlying drivers of the 
conflict, while other plausible explanations for the variation in the escalation of violence in the 
farmer-herder conflict within the two districts are identified. 
There have been several clashes between indigenous farmers and migrant herders in the two 
study areas, which is related to land-use (as this research will establish) and how to access land. 
However, GD (north) has fewer reported clashes than in the south (AAND). For instance, amongst 
the media reports gathered in three major media news archives, (Ghana web, Citi news and 
Myjoyonline news), seven major incidents of violent conflict was reported between indigenous 
farmers and herders across these three news platforms in GD between 2010 and 2020 as compared 
to over thirty-eight in AAND. This may partially be due to the area's remoteness and the absence 
of media presence to record and report conflict incidents when they occur. Hence, I chose these 
two cases with the hope to make the results more potent than those from a single case and 
demonstrates the issues across a more varied range of circumstances than a single case can provide.  
 
3.2 Study Area Justification 
As already mentioned, the research is carried out on two (2) study area, namely Asante 
Akim North District (AAND) and the Gushegu District (GD). These areas were selected for two 
reasons. First, a sizeable amount of conflict between farmers and Fulani herder has been reported 
in both regions from 2010 to 2020 (Bukari, 2017; Bukari and Shereika, 2015).  Also, a close look 
at the dossier of Ghanaweb.com  archive on “fulani-indigenes clashes in Ghana” gives AAND and 




conflicts reported in Ghana.11 Table 3.0 below shows a police report of conflicts, deaths, and 
injuries in the two districts from 2009 to 2013. Secondly, they highlight the role of land use and 
autochthony claims in the conflict between farmers and herders. In both cases, the Fulani group is 
the minority group. AAND hosts a sizable amount of farmer-herder conflicts covered in the media 
(Bukari and Schereika, 2015). To add to this, my media analysis of Ghanaweb.com indicates that 
in 5 districts in Ghana where conflict between herders and farmers occurred from 2015 to 2020, 
AADA and GD are the only two districts that reported more than 2 cases in every single year 
involving groups. This is represented in Table 3.0 below. 
Table 3.0. Media Reports of  Farmer-herder Conflict in 5 Districts 2015-2019 



















5 4 4 8 7 16 
Gushegu District 2 3 3 3 2 2 
Sekyere East 1 1 0 2 2 1 
Afram Plains 0 1 1 3 2 1 







Table 3.1 Police Report of casualties in Clashes between farmers and Fulani herders between 
2009-2018. 
 
11DOSSIER: Fulani clashes https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/dossier.php?ID=822 













15 9 21 houses burnt 
Source: reports of violence between 2009 and 2018. Compiled from REGSEC (2012) Various 
media sources, Bukari (2017), Agyemang (2017). 
 
For instance, a report from the Agogo Youth Association (AYA) estimated that in AAND 
(Agogo) alone, over forty people had been killed between 2000 and 2016 (Citifmonline.com, 
2016). Selecting cases with similar features and outcomes allows the study to extend the analysis 
to more than a single case without compromising the case study's depth.  Table 3.2 shows statistics 
of the similarities between the two districts. 
Table 3.2: Features of the Study Areas 
Name of 
district 
Main Economy No. of 







74.5% $ 2,500 Per 
capita13 
Wet  semi-equitorial 
climate. Double annual 
rainfall(1250mm and 1260mm) 
GD Agriculture 
(Crop farming) 
88.5% $2,500 per 
capita 
Double annual 
rainfall(900mm and 1000mm) 
 








AAND is in the middle forest belt part of Ghana, specifically in the Ashanti. AAND has a 
distinctively agrarian economy, with over 72.7% of its population are employed in the agricultural 
sector, out of which 98.4% are crop farmers (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014a, p. ix). Among the 
predominant crops grown in the area include plantain, maize, cocoa, rice, yam, cassava, oil palm, 
yam, watermelon, tomatoes, and beans (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014a, p. 69). GD is located in 
the northern part of Ghana and shares similar socio-economic, climate, and hosts a considerable 
number of farmer-herder conflicts. Like AAND, agriculture remains the dominant economic 
activity employing more than 75% of the population with 62% engaged in crop farming (Ghana 
statistical Service, 2014b, p. xii ).  
 
3.3 Data Collection 
The study's reliability and validity demanded that both primary and secondary sources of 
data be used. Herder-farmer conflict is not often observed first-hand by researchers, as such 
analyses of them mostly rely primarily on data from post-hoc interviews and reports (Moritz, 
2006). Primary data was acquired from news reports, accounts and interviews in the media by 
reporters who either witnessed the events or reports containing quotes by people who witnessed 
the events, speeches and interviews of leaders and members of both parties involved in the conflict. 
The media reports and interviews gathered include electronic, print, and online sources from 2010 
to 2020 on the violent conflict between farmers and herders. The media reports gathered were 
mainly from Ghana News Agency.org, Daily Graphic Newspaper, Graphic.com.gh, Ghana 
Broadcasting Cooperation (GBC), GHOne Tv, TV3 News, UTV, myjoyonline.com, Modern-
Ghana.com, Peacefmonline.com, Daily Heritage, VibeGhana.com, and Ghanaweb.com. I searched 




Gushegu,’ ‘indigenous residents,’ ‘farmlands,’ from the year 2010 to 2020.  In total, forty-five 
(45) news articles, including eight video and audio interviews on media platforms, were collected.  
 Table 3.3 below provides a list of key community leaders from both camps who were 
interviewed by the media, along with information about the profile of those individuals.  Secondary 
data sources were also collected and used to complement the primary sources for the analysis. 
These include book chapters and peer-reviewed articles on the topic.  

















Legal Practitioner GHOne TV February 2016 
Nana Kwame 
Nti 
Krontihene GHOne TV, 
Ghanaweb.com 
February 2016 
Head of Fulani 
Association Ghana 
Alhaji Osman Bin 
Armed 
Ghanaweb.com February 2018 
Charles Yaaba Programs Officer 
(Peasant Farmers 
Association Of Ghana) 
MyJoyOnline Tv February 2016 
Joe Nti Obeng Secretary Of The 
Concerned citizens of 
Agogo Association) 




Association of Cattle 
Farmers) 
MyJoyOnline Tv February 2016 
 
 
Alhaji Fuseini District Chief 
Executive (DCE), Gushegu 
Savannah News December 2011 
Francis Oti 
Boateng 
District Chief Executive 
(DCE), Asanti Akim North 




Asanti Akim North 




Executive (DCE), Gushegu 
Modern Ghana.com April 2018 
Kingsley Obeng  Agogo Youth 
Association 
Peacefmonline.com September 2011 
DSP Tanko District Police 
Commander, Gushegu 






Head of Fulani in 
Ashanti Region 










Asanti Akim North 
UTV News February 2016 







3.4 Data Analysis Procedure  
After gathering media reports, videos and interviews with leaders of both the farmers and herders, 
content analysis was adopted to appraise the meaning of those narratives. The content analysis 
used in this research allowed the research to investigate a broad range of ‘texts,’ including 
interviews, narratives, discussions, TV, editorials, and contents of newspapers and magazines on 
the conflict between the farmers and Fulani.  Thus, the study will analyze the presence, meanings, 
and relationships of concepts being discussed, with the reports and incidents making a connection 
between the evidence and the hypothesis. As Krippendorff (2004) points out, content analysis 
allows the researcher to make valid inferences from texts in a manner that enables him/her to 
answer research questions. Content analysis also allows the researcher to systematically study and 
review different forms of recorded information to identify and compare meaning to generate and 
improve the reliable and objective answers to research questions (Burnette and Kolbe, 1991). Here, 
content analysis will follow a descriptive analysis anchored on land use and autochthony claims 
to land. More specifically, it will seek to explore how land use disagreement and land rights based on 
identity remains at the heart of the conflict amidst other factors. Content analysis is aimed to 




show overlapping interests in the use of land between the two factions, as well as how local 
farmer's identities and  "autochthony" discourse to either make claims to land or deny others of the 
right to land. Thus, incidents and interviews from members of the indigenes and migrant herders 
will be placed in context and explained in light of the theories proposed. 
Weber (1990) explained that sometimes using content analysis poses difficulty in 
interpretation. The problems of interpretation arise because several interpretations can be given to 
a single text by different scholars making it challenging to choose the one that best fits a particular 
text (Weber, 1990,p.79-80).  Regardless of this challenge, content analysis allows the researcher 
to gain a great deal of knowledge about individuals, groups, organizations, and institutions, 
provided that their examination is sensitive to both the context and the purpose of the study 
(Durepos, Mills, and Wiebe, 2010). Hence, content analysis was adopted because it allows the 
researcher to examine perceptual and socio-cognitive subjects that are difficult to study through 
traditional quantitative methods. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined in detail the methods used in collecting data for the study and how 
the data gathered was analyzed in respect of the theories discussed in Chapter two. The following 







 LAND USE DISAGREEMENT AND VIOLENT CONFLICT DEBATE 
 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents empirical evidence on the land-use of indigenous farmers and migrant 
Fulani herders to support their livelihood in the AAND and GD and how their diverse goals and 
interest in the use of the land escalate into violent conflict.14 As shall be discussed, one of the 
underlying factors leading to conflict between local farmers and migrant herders remains the 
competition over land use in terms of supporting their livelihood. This thesis draws from Komey’s 
(2010) analytical premise, which explains that land resources for agriculture can be a breeding 
ground for conflict. This study reveals that in the act of pursuing their interests and livelihood 
goals, indigenous farmers and migrant herders must compete on the use of the same resource 
(land). 
The co-existence of Fulani herdsmen with crop farmers in the same area is crucial. It involves 
groups whose livelihood and economic survival are tied to agriculture (livestock farming and crop 
farming). According to Turner (2011), while the convergence of livelihood goals and interests 
have strengthened relationships between groups through the expansion of shared common interests 
and cross-group, production-related affinities, it has also arguably led to an increase in the 
frequency of conflict triggers. In most cases, the goals of the groups overlap and depend on the 
 




same resource, which in turn increases the competition. In an agricultural setting like Ghana15, one 
issue mostly under contention is access and land use (Komey,2010). Thus, competition over land 
use triggers conflict between Fulani herders and indigenous crop farmers in Asante Akim North 
District and Gushegu District. 
Before I look at the conflict-land use nexus from the perspective of farmers and herders’ 
interactions, I will first detail the drivers of herders’ migration to Ghana in general and the two 
districts in particular, because there are many views that the migration of the Fulani herders to 
these locations for land resources are part of the indirect drivers of the conflicts. I also present the 
perceptions and knowledge of both the migrant Fulani herders and indigenous farmers' livelihood 
assets and how this shapes their goals. Explaining the livelihood assets of the parties involved in 
the conflict will give the impetus to discuss how the different interest in the use of land leads to 
competition over land use, and more specifically, to damage over crops, burning farm products, 
and encroachments of grazing land.  
 
4.1 Migration of the Fulani to Ghana (Asante Akim North District and Gushegu 
District) 
The migration of Fulani herders into Ghana started in the early twentieth century and 
increased during the 1950s and 60s due to recurrent drought and worsening environmental 
conditions that engulfed the whole of the West Africa sub-region during that period (Tonah, 2005, 
Olaniyan et al., 2015). The Fulani, from their original location in neighbouring West African 
countries (Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali) into Ghana, initially began as a seasonal migration 
 
15  According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Ghana is predominantly 





(Tonah, 2005, Bukari, 2017. They originally moved to the northern parts of Ghana, which was 
closer to their original locations, to find grass for the cattle and returned later when the dry season 
has ended in their home country (Tonah, 2006c). Permanent migration began subsequently in the 
late 20th century around the 1970s and 80s following the recurrent drought in the Sahel regions ( 
Olaniyan et al., 2015; Tonah, 2005).  
After settling permanently in Ghana's northern regions16, the Fulani herders later migrated 
southwards to find better opportunities in areas including Sekyere Afram Plains, Kwahu Afram 
plain, Kumawu and AAND. However, other Fulani pastoralists migrated from outside Ghana 
either with their herd or in search of employment as caretaker herders by indigenous cattle owners 
as caretakers (Tonah, 2002; Tonah, 2005). The area had a wet climate and double season rainfall, 
which made it conducive to support sustaining the vegetation cover (Agyemang, 2017, Oppong, 
2015). The Veterinary Service Department in AAND also confirmed that there is enough natural 
pasture in the area that is suitable for mass cattle production (quoted in Agyemang, 2017, p.57). 
According to the Meteorological Agency of Ghana and Ministry of Agriculture (Ghana), the 
combination of three major vegetation types (the Open Forest, the Closed Forest and the Wooded 
Savannah) makes the area suitable for both crop farming and animal rearing. This is consistent 
with Tenuche and Ifatimehin's (2009) findings, that resource endowment of an area, including 
land, vegetation, and water resource of an area, is most important when selecting an area for grazing. 
Fulani herdsmen mentioned that it was due to the availability of abundant pasture in the area that 
they migrated from either the northern parts of Ghana or from other neighbouring countries – 
 
16 The Norther regions of Ghana referred to the three Northern regions, namely; Upper East, Upper West and 





Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Togo (Oppong 2015, Bukari, 2017; Agyemeng 2017).  The Fulani Chief 
confirmed this in a press briefing to media that; 
There is no place like Ghana, and you cannot have any other place as peaceful as this 
country across West Africa. We have abled leaders who are in charge of the country. 
Our forefathers were here and did not leave the country, so we are not ready to also 
leave this country … (Chief Ahmed Osman, Press briefing, February 7, 2018)17 
 
The statement above indicates that the Fulani herdsmen believe that the AAND area is 
endowed with the natural resources required for their livelihood to thrive, hence their constant 
migration to the area regardless of the challenges they face in the area.  
On the other hand, in GD, the Fulani herders migrated mostly from countries that share 
common borders with Ghana to find pasture and water and later returned. However, noticing that 
the conditions of GD (Northern Ghana) supported cattle rearing, most of them settled there 
permanently (Tonah, 2002; 2005). Although the climate of Gushegu is made up of a wooded 
Savannah area accompanied by a long spell of dry weather and a single rainfall season mostly 
lasting for only three to four months annually, it supported cattle rearing since settlements were 
mostly scattered (Bukari, 2017). Thus, the Fulani migrant herders who previously practice 
transhumance found the area conducive for cattle rearing because grass for cattle and water bodies 
existed throughout the year. The migration of Fulani herders to the GD, which began as a seasonal 
process, has since become common. Fulani herders have now settled more permanently in the area. 
In the GD communities, most Fulani herders migrate daily with their cattle from one community 
to another to find pasture for their cattle. In an interview to a freelance journalist of ‘The Guardian’ 
 
17 Speaking at the National Forum, Chief Alhaji Osman Ahmed, Fulani Chief, 
Ashanti https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/We-are-Ghanaians-Fulanis-cry-out-624377 




Linus Unah published in ‘worldpoliticsreview’, one herder explained why the have to migrate to 
the area; 
We are always trying to get the best grazing condition for our animals, and we roam 
from one place to another because we have no choice, … during the dry season, we have 
to keep seeking pasture for our herds. Without access to land and water, our animals 
die. (interview with Fulani herdsman, worldpoliticsreview 24/03/2017). 18 
 
A few settled there with their herds until the rainy season and then returned to their original 
settlement or countries (Tonah,2002). Many Fulani herders migrate south-wards, especially to 
towns and located in and towards southern Ghana, including Afram Plains and AAND.  Thus, 
Tonah (2006) and Bukari and Sheraiki (2015) believed that most Fulani herders in AAND 
migrated from Northern Ghana, including GD haven,stayed there for long periods, and even in 
most cases, some of them were born and raised there. The Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS, 
Fondation Pour la Recherche Strategique), in their February 2019 publication, estimated the 
number of Fulani in Ghana to be around 4600. However, this figure is disputed as it contradicts 
with early figures by researchers and officials of government. In 2015, The Joshua project data 
estimated the number of Massina Fulani (a sub-set of the Fulani group) in the Northern part of 
Ghana alone to be 490019. Bukari and Shereika (2015) also estimated the number of Fulani 
herdsmen in Ghana to be 14,000. The population of Fulani herders in Ghana is unknown as all 
previous censuses conducted either did not account for them separately or did not include them. 
4.1.1 History of Cattle rearing and nomadism in AAND(Agogo) and GD (Gushegu) 
 
18Accessed  on 18 July,2019. https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/migration=fulani+in+ghana  





Keeping cattle is not a new phenomenon in Ghana as a whole, and it has been in existent to 
the inhabitants of the area since the colonial era (Tonah, 2002; Agyemang, 2017).  According to 
Tonah (2006), cattle rearing in AAND dates to the 1950s. However, during those periods, the 
relationship between farmers and herders was marked by peaceful coexistence and cooperation 
rather than competition and conflict (Tonah, 2005). This was partly because cattle rearing was 
done on a small scale under the semi-intensive system either for consumption or domestic purposes 
(Baidoo, 2014). Thus, Fulani herders or cattle owners cooperated with farmers by exchanging 
products such as the exchange of milk for crops. As practiced today, nomadism was not in 
existence because under the semi-intensive system, and cattle were confined and fed with cut grass 
and water (Agyemang, 2017). Sometimes the cattle were led into nearby bushes by the herdsmen 
to graze and return to their kraal at sunset. Consequently, the cattle grazed without destroying 
crops on other people's farms, neither did herders have to encroach on people’s land, resulting in 
herders competing with farmers to use the land. Thus, the people of AAND were not familiar with 
the rearing of cattle on a large scale through nomadism. According to the elders and people of 
AAND, nomadism began in the area in 1997 due to an agreement between the Fulani cattle owners 
and the paramount chief of the area20. The “Krontihene21” of the area speaking to the researcher in 
an interview explained: 
From my infancy, through to the 1960s and 1970s, this has been the situation. The cattle 
were not in the bush; they were inside a fence. So, anytime they were (are) going outside, 
herdsmen followed them, and by sundown, followed them back to their kraals. Cattle are 
animals that will not cross a fence even if is made up of palm fronts. There was no 
destruction of farms, there were harmony and peace between the people.  (Agyemang, 
2017, p.52-3).  
 
20As shall be discussed in chapter five, in Asante Akim, and Gushegu there is the practice of customary land 
tenure system where control and allocation of lands are the powers of chiefs.  Even though land rights are the preserve 
of subjects or indigenes, chiefs had the power to allocate land to outsiders” 
21 The Krontihene is the caretaker of the land and second-in-command after the paramount chief in the leadership hierarchy 





The secretary of the Concerned citizens of Agogo in an interview on MyJoynews’ PMexpress 
hosted also recounted: 
[…] For us in Agogo, it is not that we hate Fulani or cattle or something. After all, from 
my childhood, we’ve lived with the Fulani and their cattle. No violent conflict occurred 
when crops were not destroyed. The cattle will eat everything they see on the land when 
you take them there (to the farm). (Joe Nti Obeng, MyJoynews, 2016, 14:30)22 
 
According to the elders and people of AAND, although cattle rearing has been practiced in 
the area for a long time, peace prevailed in the area because cattle were not raised in large numbers 
and they were kept in a kraal and were not allowed to move freely to graze on crops of farmers.  
Nomadism began when the paramount chief of the area signed a contract with at least three (3) 
Fulani migrant cattle owners to lease land to them for a fee.23 The initial agreement was with these 
three herders. However, more herders started arriving with time since they saw the opportunity to 
acquire land through other means since they did not have land rights. Since these Fulani migrants 
were nomads and move from place to place, their presence in the area introduced a new form of 
cattle rearing, which was alien to the people of AAND. In the year 2000, the paramount chief of 
the AAND area, Nana Akuoko Sarpong, together with his council, released portions of lands 
(usually at the outskirts of towns and villages) to some cattle owners for cattle rearing (Agyemang, 
2017). However, a formal agreement between Fulani Cattle owners and the Traditional leaders of 
AAND was signed in 2006 and 2007, despite herders' operations haven starting as early as 2000 
(Agyemang, 2017,p.54; Indenture agreement, 2000). The land lease agreement24 required each 
 
22  MyJoy Online Documentary 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aI_aBPhz8KA&t=2406s&ab_channel=JoyNews 
23 The initial contract with the three cattle owners could be found in the indenture document attacked to this 
research in appendix 3. 
24 The cattle owners sign an agreement with chiefs of the AAND. The Tenancy agreement document have been 




cattle owner or herder to pay GH¢500 approximately (US $87) yearly as a lease period of fifty 
(50) years.25 As part of the main terms included in the agreement are; that the Fulani are not to use 
the demised land otherwise than for cattle ranch farming purpose only; Not to allow anything on 
the demised land, which may become nuisance damage or annoyance to the chiefs or any occupier 
of the adjacent property; that Cattle owners were strict to ensure that the cattle are kept within the 
area assigned to them and to ensure that the animals do not stray into other areas, and lastly, Cattle 
owners were to provide facilities in such a way that they do not pollute water bodies (Indenture 
Agreement, 2000)26. However, according to Agyemang (2017) and Oppong (2015), the cattle 
owners failed to confine their animals and provide them with feed and water as was initially agreed 
in the lease but instead brought in other Fulani herders' services to operate the open-grazing method 
of cattle rearing. This act attracted other Fulani herders from other parts of the country and 
neighbouring countries to troop to the area to be employed as herder or come with their cattle to 
settle. Hence, both the cattle owners and the alien nomads moved their cattle from one place to 
another on an open range grazing system. Thus, the agreement to lease lands to another group of 
land users (cattle rearing) in an area dominated by indigenous crop farmers is the genesis of the 
conflict –i.e. that groups with different livelihoods had to live within the same space and compete 
for the same resource use. 
 Unlike AAND, cattle rearing has been a long tradition of the people in northern Ghana 
(where Gushegu is located) before the arrival of migrant Fulani herders. This tradition fits well 
with Fulani migrant herders' livelihood, making the place an attractive destination for them 
 
25 The original amount for the lease agreement was 5 million (old Ghana cedis),  but after the redenomination 
of the Ghanaian currency in 2007, 5,000,000 old cedis was converted to 500 new cedis. 




(Bukari, 2017; Tonah 2002); thus, the cattle population keeps increasing in the area. According to 
the Medium-Term Development Plan of Gushegu (2010), the GD has the largest livestock 
population mostly dominated by cattle and is the largest cattle market in the Northern Region of 
Ghana. As already mentioned above, the Fulani herders migrated to northern Ghana on a temporal 
basis. However, as the occasional migrations continued, the locals and the Fulani migrant herders’ 
interaction grew stronger; thus, cattle belonging to natives were entrusted to Fulani herders leading 
to settling permanently in the community27.  
Many Fulani herders were attracted to the area in search of employment as cattle herders; 
others also brought their cattle as the area was already familiar with the practice (Tonah, 2005). 
The arrival of many herders and cattle had implications for the relations between farmers and 
herders. The population of cattle in the Gushegu District by a livestock survey organized by the 
District was estimated to be 31,866 in 2009 (quoted from Bukari, 2017, p.80). Tonah (2002) noted 
that the large population of cattle in the area attracted many herders to the area, increasing the 
original number of cattle since most herders came to the area with their cattle. Thus, the 
relationship between the indigenes in Gushegu and Fulani herders, in general, was marked by 
cooperation for a long period because the indigenes of GD contracted the Fulani herders to take 
care of their cattle.  
Cattle rearing is also organized on a largescale mostly kept by Fulani herdsmen and owned 
by themselves or by natives. Cattle rearing is mainly carried out through uncontrolled grazing, 
where herdsmen move with their cattle in search of pastureland (MOFA, 2016). Table 4 gives an 
account of a report obtained from the Agogo district police showing more than 16 cattle owners 
with about 10,000 cattle in the AAND. This report clearly shows that the kind of competition crop 
farmers are likely to face from these cattle farmers for the land. This phenomenon contributes to 
 
27 These accounts were given by a group of Fulani as well as local inhabitants the town of Zentile in the Gushegu 




the struggle for land in these areas leading to the potential conflict between the two groups of land 
users as they will need lands to support their livelihood goals and interests.  
Table 4.0. A police report Indicate registered Cattle owners and the number of cattle owned in 
Asante Akim 
NO. NAME OF CATTLE 
OWNER 
ESTIMATED NO. 
OF CATTLE OWNED 
1 Alhaji Bugor 1000 
2 Alhaji Dramani 1000 
3  Ahaji Buba  500  
4 Alhaji Hassan 700 
5 Alhaji Addi  400  
6  Alhaji Jofo  600  
7 Dousseh Imoro 700 
8 Alhaji Wantu 300 
9 Abu  200  
10 Kassim Dauda 700 
11  Bube  400  
12 Alhaji Innusah 1,200 
13 Alhaji Sambo 500 
14 Alhaji Issaka  400  
15 Alhaji Grunsah 630 
16 Alhaji Ahmed 200 
TOTAL  9,430  
Source: AAND Police report, April 2015, most of this can also be found in the Regional 





4.2.0 Livelihood and Assets of Indigenous Farmers and Migrant Fulani Herders in 
Asanti Akim North and Gushegu 
This section attempts to profile the parties involved in the conflict socio-economically to 
establish the vital role of differences in goals and interests in the use of resources (land) connecting 
the parties involved as well as how their interaction leads to competition. Carney et al. (1999, p.4) 
define livelihood as “comprising the capabilities, assets (including both material and social 
resources) and activities required for a means of living.” Scoones (2009, p. 172) also defines 
livelihood as “how different people from different places live.” Similarly, Chambers (1995, vi) 
defines livelihood as “the means of gaining a living.” Thus, livelihood among indigenous farmers 
and migrant herders could be explained in relation to the resource required by each group as well 
as activities they have to undertake in other to live.  Below I highlight some of the natural assets 
and activities of the Fulani and Local farmers, which are essential to their livelihood. An analysis 
of resources required and activities one has to undertake by the farmers and herders in their 
livelihood is necessary because it will improve understanding of how diversity among groups leads 
to competition and subsequently conflict (Scoones, 2009). Thus, this discussion is important as it 
will set the pace for further discussions on how the difference between the livelihood of the 
indigenous farmers and migrant herders generates competition for resources and how it contributes 
to the immediate drivers of conflict in the two study areas.  
4.2.1 Fulani Livelihood and Assets  
The Fulani are the main pastoralist or nomadic group across the West African sub-region and 
have dominated cattle production in the sub-region for centuries, including countries like Nigeria, 




assets in Ghana comprise land (grassland), grazing reserves, natural water bodies, and livestock. 
Land is the most significant natural asset to ensure the security of livelihood for a Fulani (Fabusoro 
and Oyegbami, 2009). However, due to their nomadic lifestyle, Fulani herdsmen are regarded as 
non-indigenous and are, therefore, ‘landless’ in many places they go. The need to find grazing 
areas for their cattle leads them to migrate from one location to another as they continue to search 
pasture and grazing land. In his research in southern Nigeria, Majekodunmi et al. (2014) found out 
that livestock proceeds were the most crucial income source amongst Fulani households. 
According to Adogi (2013), a “man’s” wealth among the Fulani is measured by the number of 
cattle he possesses. This means that th more cattle Fulani herders kept or owned, the more income 
they had. Speaking to Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN)28, a Fulani nomad from 
Nigeria said, “Our herd is our life because to every nomad life is worthless without his cattle. What 
do you expect from us when our source of existence is threatened?” (HameSaidu, a Pastoralist, 
2009-IRIN, 2009). Similarly, Nori et al. (2005) also noted that animal sale proceeds 
overwhelmingly represent the most significant income source for Fulani herders either by owning 
them or shepherding them for other people. 
According to Fabusoro and Oyegbami (2009), the pastoral production system is accompanied 
by a nomadic way of life during the dry season. The nomadic lifestyle of Fulani herders involves 
double transhumance; that is, “internal transhumance” (from northern regions of the country to 
pastures affluent areas in the southern regions); and a “longer transhumance” from the 
neighbouring countries (namely, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Niger, and Togo). As an 
essential aspect of a Fulani herder's life, mobility allows the Fulani herder to move their cattle from 
 
28 IRIN is a humanitarian News and Analysis affiliated to the United Nations Office for Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs charged with the responsibility of providing news and analysis about sub-saharan Africa, East 




one place to another in search of pasture and water. Thus, land constitutes the single most important 
natural asset for Fulanis to sustain their livelihood. 
Nori et al. (2005) noted that Fulani herders, due to their pastoral lifestyle, control their 
economic assets, that is, their cattle, but do not have control over natural resources (land) needed 
to enhance their economic assets (Turner et al. 2009). When they arrive in their host communities 
(as shall be discussed in detail in chapter five), Fulani herders struggle to access land since they 
do not have land rights29. In both AAND and GD, the only way Fulani migrant herders can gain 
access to land is through short or long-term lease agreements with traditional authorities or 
individual landowners in the communities they settle (Tonah, 2006c). The purchase is mostly 
through the land leasing system, where the Fulani are given a specific number of years to use the 
land30. Hence in most cases, they must share with other users (in this case, indigenous crop 
farmers) in their host communities. Their inability to control land resources is partly due to their 
nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyle, making them settle down temporarily at particular times of the 
season and wander away from a fixed location. The ability of the Fulani to settle in a fixed location 
is dependent on factors such as the availability of unoccupied land which can support livestock 
breeding (in terms of a constant supply of pasture and water reserves) that the areas are free from 
the recent outbreak of diseases, and low possibility of conflict with crop farmers (Fabusoro and 
Oyegbami, 2009, p.8). Thus, this suggests that Fulani herders are likely to settle permanently in 




29 Land Rights and Access is discussed in more detail in chapter five. 






4.2.2 Livelihood Assets and Interests of Indigenous people in AAND and GD 
Ashanti Akim North District is predominantly an agrarian community, with over 70% of 
inhabitants engaged in agriculture (GSS, 2014a, p.ix). According to the Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture (MOFA) of Ghana, “Agriculture is the dominant sector employing about 70% of the 
total number of people employed. About 15,186 hectares of land are under cultivation of staple 
food crops, namely maize, cassava, plantain, cocoyam and yam” (MOFA).31 Therefore, the 
majority of the household in AAND earn their incomes from crop farming. For instance, MOFA 
reports (2012) put the number of rural households involved in agriculture at 79.7%. The report 
further estimates that crop farming is the highest type of agricultural activity in the District 
(98.4%), followed by animal rearing (21.7%). Thus, many inhabitants rear animals in addition to 
crops, but not for commercial purposes. In an interview with MyJoy news, Mr. Joe Nti Obeng 
(Secretary of the Concerned citizens of AAND) claimed:  
[…]  basically the Asante Akim North, Agogo and the Afram plains, they are crop 
farmers, and for many years now, we’ve been having these problems of the free-ranging 
Fulani herdsmen. They have been ravaging our farms, and you know most of these 
farms have been done with bank loans, that’s peoples livelihoods …”. (Joe Nti Obeng, 
MyJoynews, 2016, 2:25)32.  
 
The Kontihene of the are also reiterated this when he met the president of Ghana: 
 







[…] Nana help us… it will be of immense benefit to the populace, because the 
cultivation of tomatoes and plantain happens to be the mainstay of residents of Agogo. 
(Ghanaweb.com, 2019)33 
 
Farmers in the area engage in commercial crop farming. As already mentioned, crops 
cultivated in the area include maize, cassava, cocoyam, plantain, tomatoes, watermelon, and other 
fruits and vegetables. This crop farming system in the study areas is linked to a sedentary lifestyle 
of crop cultivation34. Similar to AAND, GD was predominantly an agricultural setting. According 
to MOFA, the people of GD are engaged in crop production and raising a wide variety of livestock. 
The area's vegetation resembles that of the Guinea savannah, comprising of high and tall grasses 
and drought-resistant trees (MOFA). 
4.3 Dynamics of Land Use Between Herders and Farmers 
Land is a valuable resource that both herders and farmers need to increase productivity and 
maintain their livelihoods. As the population continues to grow, coupled with rapid urbanization 
rates, there is a rising demand for food crops and animal-based products (such as meat and dairy), 
providing market opportunities for local producers from the surrounding areas. According to 
Msuya (2013), generally, how a particular group of people use the land, in return, transform their 
livelihood. Consequently, the livelihood of indigenous farmers and migrant Fulani herders is 
attached to either of these two categories. Intergroup variations are significant as both farmers and 
herders depend primarily on the access to and use of the same resource to pursue different interests. 
Indigenous farmers need it to farm, while migrant Fulani herders need it to graze their cattle. The 
 
33 Ghanaweb.com 2019. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Save-us-from-slavery-
suffering-Agogo-Krontihene-to-Nana-456154 
34 The term sedentary farming refers to the type of agriculture practiced a place by a settled farmer/farmer in 
which fields are not rotated. Thus, the term is mostly used to refer to primitive agriculturists in tropical Africa who 





indigenous farmers and migrant Fulani herders' diverse goals mean that Fulani migrant herders 
must adjust to their new host communities and have to compete with each other to use the land 
(Tonah, 2006c).  
According to Bukari (2017), although not all disagreements over land degenerate into large 
scale violent conflict.However, the problem ensues when each group raises the argument that they 
have the right to use a parcel of land to achieve their goal. While indigenous farmers claim that 
they should have the right to use the land as they have been on the land for decades, Fulani migrant 
herders claim they should be given access to use the land as it has been rented out to them. Fulani 
herders mostly advance the argument of haven paid a sum of money to traditional authorities to 
use those lands and, therefore, should have unrestricted access to use them.  The herders and 
farmers in AAND and GD make their livelihood within the same geographical and socio-cultural 
conditions. Their livelihood activity is centered around the struggle over the same resources (land) 
(Tonah, 2002; Homer-Dixon, 1999). The struggle for land-use within the same geographical area 
leads to conflict triggers between the farmers and herders. For instance, in Tonah (2002), damages 
to crops and killing or stealing of cattle, clearing pastureland for farmland are mentioned as the 
frequent reasons by farmers and herders, respectively, as triggers of conflicts.  
This research aims to analyze the underlying factors that cause violent conflicts between 
indigenous farmers and Fulani herders in the study areas (AAND and GD). It was observed that 
the farmers and herders shared a common problem of resource scarcity and faced similar 
challenges in having to share the same piece of land in achieving their livelihood goal in both the 
north (GD)  and south (AAND). In both districts,farmers and herders depend on a limited pool of 
resources (land) to sustain their livelihood goals and assumed differences in terms of cultural and 




of the Member of Parliament (MP) of AAND, Kojo Baah Agyemang when he was speaking to a 
reporter of Peacefmonline.com. 
If someone gives you a piece of land to raise cattle, what you do is to fence it, so, your 
animals remain enclosed...You have your business, in this case cattle rearing, and 
another grows crops. Why do you want to destroy somebody’s farm with your work? 
Elsewhere, cattle are fenced and fed, but free-grazing happens here. If you are in Ghana, 
run your business in a way that it is not at the expense of another’s. Everybody has the 
right to work, but one’s rights end where another’s begin. 
. (Kojo Baah Agyemang, Peacefmonline.com, 2016)35. 
 
Like many local inhabitants, the MP believes that most clashes between the two groups of 
farmers often come from land use. The differences of livelihood between the Fulanis and the local 
farmers lead to one (the herders) operating their ‘businesses at the indigenous farmers' expense, 
which leads to confrontations. Similarly, another prominent legal practitioner and Member of the 
former government of Ghana (NDC) explained36 to GHOne TV that:  
[…]There are laws that regulating how animals should be kept in this country...I think 
the  has been we wil need to understand the conflict is between nomadic herdsmen and  
crop famers over the use of land…Because I know some Ghanaians are also cattle 
owners… so it is about nomadic herdsmen who are looking for grazing places, grass to 
feed their cattle as against crop farmers whos occupation is sedentary… (Abraham 
Amaliba, GHOneTv, 2016, 50:02)37. 
 
This statement confirms the views held by Alhassan (2017) that the quest to explore land 
resources' use to enhance their livelihood mostly results in a ‘win-lose’ situation between local 
farmers and migrant Fulani herdsmen, leading to violent conflict. However, as already stated in 
this research, land use itself does not directly cause conflict but provides an analytical framework 
for how land-use for agricultural purposes can serve as a breeding ground for violent conflicts 
 
35 Peacefmonline.com 2016: https://www.peacefmonline.com/pages/local/news/201601/268174.php 
36 The NDC National Democratic Congress is a party in Ghana that ruled the country from 2008 to 2016. 






among its users. The land-use conflict is manifested through various triggering activities, which 
various scholars (Tonah, 2006a; Alhassan, 2007; Bukari, 2017; Oppong, 2015; Agyemang, 2017; 
Dary et al., 2017) have classified as the immediate causes of the conflict among farmers and 
herders in AAND and GD. 
 
4.4 Competition Over Land-Use 
The evidence gathered in this research pointed out that the major cause, both as a trigger and 
underlying factor, of the conflict is competition for arable land. Land remains the single most 
important resource required by indigenous farmers and migrant herders in both AAND and GD. 
While farmers need land to grow their crops, herdsmen require the same land for grazing their 
animals. The most common method of raising livestock, most especially cattle in AAND and GD, 
is the free grazing method38. The cattle population in these areas continues to grow, leading to an 
increasing need for grazing lands to feed them. According to the Veterinary Service of the Ministry 
of Food and Agriculture Ghana MOFA (2000) and Ghana Livestock Development Policy and 
Strategy (2016), the number of Cattle populations in Ghana continues to increase over the years. 
From 804,000 cattle in 1980, 1,330,000 in 2000 to 1,677,000 in 2014 and is expected to exceed 
1,721,000 in 2016.39 The ministry also estimates the number of cattle coming into the country from 
neighbouring countries to be 127,000. There are no fodder banks or ranches within the study areas 
for herders to graze their cattle. Herdsmen feed their cattle in the bushes or acquire land from 
 
38 Open grazing Method used here refers to the method of raising cattle where the herders move with the cattle from 
place to place in search of pasture. The cattle are not confined. 
39 The figures provided here are only estimated figures by the Ministry in 2014 and not actual figures. Census for 




landowners, mainly traditional authorities and sometimes clan heads or family heads, without the 
knowledge of indigenous farmers who farm on those lands. 
Increased land investments for commercial or housing needs and the expansion of 
agriculture (both herding and farming) have led to an increase in the economic value and the 
competition over land in Ghana (Yaro, 2010). Bukari (2017) and Bukari and Schereika (2015) 
described this rise in the value of land has led to a subsequent increase in the sale of land to non-
indigenous groups and agro-food industries and herdsmen who pay more for the land, unlike 
indigenes who have land rights and do not have to purchase land for farming40. Thus, lands 
belonging to indigenous farmers are acquired by migrant herders without their prior knowledge 
for large-scale cattle production through chiefs (Alhassan,2017; RESAG,201241). By leasing land 
to cattle owners and herdsmen for cattle grazing, different actors' conflictual interest is brought to 
bear as they have to contest to use the land. A statement by the leader of one of the pressure groups 
in AAND, Agogoman Mma Kuo, during a protest against the presence of herders, attest to this: 
We have gathered here to protest for the government and chiefs to do something about 
these issues. Some time ago, the land of Agogo (AAND) was seen as a peaceful place. 
The only known thing about us was the production of food. Since the Fulani herders 
came here with their cattle, Agogo's peaceful land has been turned into a war zone. We 
all know that cattle and our crops cannot be on one land.  Our chiefs gave these people 
(Fulani) our lands. They do not have our interest at heart. Now we have to fight cattle 
before we can produce food… (Mr. Kojo Oduro, UTV,  2016, 2:30)42 
 




40 Indigenous farmers in both AAND and GD have usufructual land rights according to the customary land tenure 
systems practiced in those areas. They inherit land through their family lineage and do not have to pay for the land. 
Discussions on land tenure and land rights in AAND and GD can be found in chapter five. 
41 Document attached in appendix 2 
42 Protest against Fulani herdsmen: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7JmYoT5-
PPI&list=PLkBnfmwL4ER54A4oC5wVxwvqfurRa7i18&index=76&ab_chanel=UTVGhanaOnline 





[…] the chiefs are harboring the herdsmen on the land, therefore, their attraction to 
Agogo. Every piece of land belongs to or is under the care of a chief. There is no way a 
Fulani herdsman and his cattle can stay there without a permission... (cited in Agyemang 
2017, p. 57) 
 
The statement above indicates that farmers believe that the decision to lease out land to 
another group of people with a different livelihood means they would have to compete with them 
since both groups require the same resource. On the one hand, indigenous farmers seek to use the 
land for crop farming whiles; on the other hand, the Fulani nomads want to graze their cattle on 
that same land. The differences in how land should be used often lead to various triggering 
activities that fuel the conflict43. Therefore, the smallest provocation could trigger violent conflict 
between the two groups. Competition over land also leads to other triggering activities that escalate 
the farmer-herder conflict into a violent one (Dary et al., 2017). Among the triggering activities 
caused by competition over land include damage to crops and farmlands, burning of farmlands and 
produce, the encroachment of grazing or farmlands. 
 
4.4.1 Damage to crops and agricultural land 
A major cause of farmer-herder conflicts in the two districts is crop destruction.  Agriculture 
is exercised through farming system practices. According to Msuya (2013, p.473), farming 
systems describe the “decision making” and “land use units” as well as “cropping and livestock 
practices” that produce crops and animal products for either consumption or sale. In this regard, 
farming systems explain the in-depth description of agricultural practices among crop farmers or 
animal farmers/herders. The system of raising cattle in AAND and GD by Fulani herdsmen is the 
 
43 Dary et al (2017) explained that although the conflict between herders and farmers in the upper east region 
of Ghana is as a result of land use, land use does not directly lead to violent conflict but rather lead to triggering 




open/free grazing method. The herders follow the cattle to graze. In many cases, unsupervised 
cattle stray into farms and destroy crops, which farmers consider intentional acts. Figure 4.0 shows 
farms that have been run over and destroyed by cattle in AAND. This affects farming, which is 
their primary source of income and livelihood for the indigenes. Farmers claim that herders 
intentionally destroy their farms, which is their source of livelihood. Consider the following 
statements from an interview by GHOne TV44 in AAND in : 
The Fulanis are destroying our farms, we and upon our return, we erected these barriers. 
The Police ordered us to demolish them, but we told them we Will not take them off… 
We want the Fulanis out of here else there will be no peace (Man 1, GHOneTV, 2016, 
32:40) 
 
My farm of about 7 acres was destroyed  in a day. I virtually had to runaway and left 
my tools behind (Woman 1, GHOneTV, 2016, 32:10) 
 
I was going to my farm when a Fulani man saw me and said to me that I was working 
in vain for his animals (cattle). I ask him whether he gives me a share of the money 
when he sells it. It ended up in a confrontation They have destroyed all my crops 
(plantain). My children have been sacked from school because I didn’t get any money 
from my farm. (Woman 2, GHOneTV, 2016, 33:01) 
 
From the comments above, indigenous farmers accuse the Fulani herdsmen of intentionally 
driving their herds through peoples’ farms and destroying their crops, which is their livelihood 
source. As claimed by the locals, the Fulani herdsmen's actions negatively impact farming, which 
is their primary source of livelihood. 
Also, in Gushegu (Northern Ghana), a similar pattern takes place. While searching for 
fodder for their cattle, Fulani herdsmen are accused of setting their animals onto people’s farms to 
graze on their food crops (mainly maize, yam, millet, and sheer nut), which are the staple crops 
cultivated in the area. For instance, in a petition of the Peasant Farmers Association of Ghana 
 





(PFAG) to the president of the Republic of Ghana signed by the PFAG national president Abdul 
Rahman Mohammed, it was stated that: 
The presentation of this Petition has become necessary because of the debilitating effect 
of the activities of the Fulani Herdsmen on the livelihoods of farmers and property alike 
in the communities in which the Herdsmen operate. PFAG Members have over the years 
suffered many atrocities at the hands of the said Herdsmen including: Tonnes of 
harvested agricultural produce, on an annual basis, are burnt by Fulani Herdsmen [maize 
got burnt at Sape in the Northern Region]. Farmlands with growing crops and plants 
grazed on by cattle of Fulani Herdsmen [vegetables grazed on at Paga in the Upper East 
Region] ; Fulani Herdsmen unlawfully use shea nuts to feed their cows with the lame 
excuse that the nuts are healthy for the cows to produce nutritious milk [Northern 
Region]. Cattle use their horns to uproot cassava on the farms of our members in GD 
[Upper East Region]. Undoubtedly this account by the PFAG indicates that indigenous 
settler farmers in the GD and in the northern parts of Ghana face a similar ordeal posed 
by migrant Fulani herdsmen as their southern counterparts (Citinewsroom.com, April 
24, 2018)45.  
An observation made is that crop damage is not only limited to crops on the field but 
extends to harvested crops. This corresponds to the findings of Turner et al. (2006). The damage 
to crops confirms Turner’s (2004) suggestion that crop damage by cattle is common in agropastoral 
locations where crops and livestock are kept in the same area. Indeed, the PFAG further explained 
that cattle ate harvested crops while herdsmen watched on. Thus, the damage to crops by cattle of 
Fulani herders is a leading cause of clashes between herders and farmers. Indigenous farmers 







45 Peasant Farmers demonstration https://citinewsroom.com/2018/04/peasant-farmers-demonstrate-against-




















Source: Ghanaweb.com, 2017 and Ampress, 2012 
 
 
Further evidence from a report of REGSEC meeting in AAND corroborates the above 
accounts that crop damage and destruction of farmland is a leading triggering activity arising from 
land-use, which contributes to violent conflict between herders and farmers46. Submissions by 
various Assembly members47 who appeared before the committee to give information on the 
activities of herdsmen that lead to violent conflict in the area include: 
The communities of Eguoso, Kronkobi and Pataban all in my electoral area are 
inhabited by Fulani herdsmen and their cattle. Because the land is shared by farmers 
and the Fulani and their cattle who graze at night after farmers have left their farms, 
they destroy people’s farms/crops (Hon. Asare Boadu, Assembly member for Onyemso 
Electoral area, REGSEC report, 14/02/2012 Appendix 2). 
 
 
46 REGSEC refers to Regional Security council which is a committee established by the Security and 
Intelligence Agencies Act 1996 (Act 526) of the republic of Ghana and charged with the responsibility of providing 
early warning to the national government of the existence of any security threat Region. Each region in Ghana has its 
own committee which meets to discuss and investigate security matters. The report for the meeting have been attached 
in appendix 2. 




The District Chief Executive (DCE) of AAND, in his account to the REGSEC, also 
acknowledged damage to crops and farmlands by cattle as a primary issue they have to contend 
with48. He explained to the committee: 
Crop destruction is the main cause of this conflict. If you conduct your activity without 
interfering in mine, will there be any problem? If the Fulani nomads keep trespassing 
on the farms of the indigene, they will definitely react (District Chief Executive, 
REGSEC report, 14/02/2012). 
 
In addition to the above evidence on crop damage, data from the Ghana Police Service cited in 
(Oppong, 2015,p. 73) on 14 complaints received from indigenous crop farmers in the AAND 
between July 2014 and January 2015 (see Table 4.1). It is evident from the police data that the 
destruction of crops is a major cause of the conflict as reported by farmers. This situation is eased 
because farmers and herders share the same resources but engage in different activities on the same 
resource. Under such a circumstance, crop damage by cattle becomes inevitable and therefore 










48 The DCE, (District chief Executive) is an appointed public servant who heads the local administrative unit, 




Table 4.1. A Police report of complaints of damage to farms lodged by Indigenous farmers against Fulani 
herdsmen between June 2014 to January 2015 
 













2 Ndombe  Mankala January 07,2015 44 
hectors 




4 Lawrence and 
Charity 




5 Ampong and 
Abena 








7 Kwaku Amoako 
and two others 








9 Kwadwo Paul Brahabebome (AAND) July 18, 2014 14 
hectors 
10 Alhasan Bebuoso July 12, 2014 12 
hectors 
11 Mr. Amakye Nyamebekyere July 11, 2014 40 
hectors 
12 Joseph Bebome July 07, 2014 3 
hectors 
13 Amoah Pataban June 16,20 14 1 
hector 
14 Cecilia Abrewapong June 07, 2014 1 
hector 





Interestingly, some herders attested that a major cause of the conflict between them and the 
indigenous farmers is the destruction of crops belonging to farmers due to the ‘free-range method 
of grazing the use. However, they believed that the Fulani group is not a homogenous group as 
they have been labelled to be. According to them, there is the ‘Yaligonji/Jerigoji’ Fulani or the 
‘abonten’ Fulani (meaning Fulani who comes from outside Ghana) who move with their cattle 
onto farmlands at night to graze in farms belonging to indigenes.49When farmers are not on their 
farms at night, the herders sneak in to graze their cattle and damage crops. This was reaffirmed by 
two leaders of the Fulani group, the president of the Fulani Association of Ghana, Professor Bari, 
and the leader of the Fulani herders in the Ashanti region of Ghana, Alhaji Osman Bin Ahmed in 
separate interviews on GHOne Tv network and Ghanaweb.com respectively. 
[…] when they come they mingle with the locals. Sometimes you find it very hard to 
distinguish between someone who just recently came and someone who was there 
before. … with the crop damage. The foreign Fulani, especially those from Nigeria, 
Burkina Faso and Niger, are not known by the community and are difficult to locate as 
they reside in the bushes. When my people meet them and greet them in our language, 
they don’t even respond. It is very difficult to distinguish between ‘efie’(local) Fulani 
and ‘abonten’ (foreign) fulani, this situation makes it difficult to consult them for 
compensation. This results in anger and later violent clashes (Professor Osman Bari, 
GHoneTv, 2016, 13:24)50 
 
It’s not that the government hates Fulanis, it is how we are going about our business 
that they are condemning, it’s not right, and we don’t want it. We want a new system in 
the country. We must speak the truth at all times and speak against the wrong thing at 
all times and speak against the wrong thing at all times. My people sometimes don’t 
speak the truth. Herdsmen should be able to spend monies to acquire land for grazing 
for their livestock just as the farmers invest in their crops but for someone to invest time 
and resources into growing crops only for it to be destroyed by your cattle, that is 
 
49 ‘Yaligonji ‘ or ‘jerigoji’ is the local term used to refer to transhumance Fulani herders who come just to graze 
their cattle and leave (Bukari, 2017, p.108). This term is used by the people in Northern Ghana (Gushegu). In the south 
they are referred to as ‘abonten’. 




absolutely wrong and I as their leader will not buy that idea. ( Alhaji Osman Bin Ahmed, 
Ghanaweb.com, 2018)51 
 
Again Peacefm online reported  that a leader of the Fulani Ali Musah attributed the cause of 
crop damage to Fulani Strangers (Peacefmonline, 2015).52 
Similar in GD, there were reports in the media that there have been clashes between native 
farmers from the Konkomba tribe of Gushegu and Migrant Fulani herders. The headline 
mentioned, “One hacked, houses burnt in Konkomba-Fulani clashes” (Ghanaweb, 2018)53. 
Recounting what could have led to the attack to the media, the District Chief Executive (DCE) of 
the area, Ahmed Iddi told the media: 
[…] A farmer, according to sources, had tried to reprimand two fulani children for 
allowing some cattle to stray into his farmland and cause some destruction, but the 
children returned home to report they were beaten up by the farmer. This led to 
misunderstanding, and it resulted in the Konkomba man being butchered; so when it 
happened like that, the Konkombas launched something we call reprisal attack, … 
 
This incident indicates that just like AAND, in GD, the destruction of farms also leads to violent 
conflict between herders and farmers. The quote above indicates that the actions of either a few or 
even one Fulani herdsman or few herdsmen could escalate into widespread conflict among the 
groups. Both indigenous farmers and herders engage in acts of retaliation when their farms or cattle 
are damaged by a member of the opposite group, especially when compensation for the damage is 




52 Peacefm online 2015 https://www.peacefmonline.com/pages/local/news/201501/228547.php 






assumption of collective identity held by both the Migrant Fulani herdsmen and indigenous 
farmers. 
The quote by the president of the GFAP also is affirmed in the research of Bukari (2017, 
p.137), where Fulani respondents expressed their view of how the violent conflict between 
indigenes and migrant Fulani herders in the GD escalated in August 2011. As Bukari explained, 
in cases of damage to crops or farm belonging to an indigenous farmer, the herder or cattle owner 
is identified and asked to pay compensation based on the damage. However, when the herder or 
cattle owner fails to pay the compensation or continuously causes damage to the cattle's farm crops, 
the farmer confronts the herder, which in most cases leads to violence. The initial attack later 
triggers a counter or reprisal attack from the other party. At this stage, there is a mobilization of 
groups from the farmer's community and vice versa if the farmer is killed or is injured in the violent 
(Bukari, 2017, p.137). 
In the summary of how damage to crops leads to violence, it can be seen that the disagreement 
usually occurs between individuals. However, due to mobilization along identity lines, the conflict 
can escalate into widespread violence throughout the community and even districts, as happens in 
AAND and GD. The violent attacks and reprisal attacks involve the use of weapons such as guns 
and cutlasses. As already mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, land use in itself does not 
cause the conflict but leads to a series of events that escalate the farmer/herder conflict. Thus, the 
destruction of crops or farmland, which arise from land use, is a significant trigger of the conflict 
between herders and farmers.  
A further example of the competition on land leading to crop damage, the chairman of the 
Cattle farmers Association of Ghana said that: 
You know the system of grazing animals in sub-Saharan Africa is different from that of 




when there is a conflict between a crop farmer and a cattle farmer I always give the 
blame to the cattle farmer because the farm does not move, it is the cattle that 
move…There needs to be more monitoring of the movements of new nomads who come 
in. We, the nomads here, know the number of cattle a particular community can host 
based on the grazing areas available. When these alien herders come, they do not regard 
these laws and settle anywhere and cause pressure on the use of the land of the area. 
This situation is giving us a lot of pressure. (Imam Hannaf Sonde, MyJoynewsTV, 2016, 
10:04 and 25:28)54 
 
The herdsmen don’t follow the cattle themselves. See how we have built a cage for our 
animals…Most of them send their kids to shepherd these animals, and most of the kids 
cant prevent the animals from entering people’s farms (Fulani herder, GHOne TV, 
2016, 33:28) 
 
This quote raised further concerns on the issue of identity in the conflict between herders and 
farmers. It suggests that the Fulani group is not homogenous as the local farmers conceive them. 
However, whenever there is crop damage, farmers' attacks on the Fulani herders are based on their 
collective identity as ‘Fulani’ and not whether a local Fulani or an alien herder. 
News reports and interviews collected in the two areas of the study show that crop damage 
results from the competition for space between the two parties who have different interests and 
livelihood goals. According to the quote from the chairman of the Cattle farmers Association Of 
Ghana (CFAG), the newly arriving Fulani groups who migrate to Ghana and mingle among other 
Fulani groups who have already settled, thereby adding to the already existing pressure on land 









4.4.2 Burning of Farm Products 
Another complaint lodged against the Fulani herders by indigenous farmers is the burning of 
grasslands (Oppong, 2015), which is another trigger for conflict between farmers and Fulani 
herdsmen in the two study areas (AAND and GD). To get fresh grass to feed the cattle in the dry 
season, herders set fire to the bush to burn the dried grass to make way for green pastures sooner. 
This fire then gets out of control and extends to unintended areas, including farms belonging to 
indigenes. Farmers also explained that these fires destroy their crops on the field and their 
harvested crops since most farmers store their harvested crops in storage structures built on their 
farms. In a Tv interview with MyJoyOnline.com, a farmer disclosed that 
I saw the fire coming from the other side this morning when I came here but I didn’t 
think it will get here.The herdsmen are troubling us. Master (referring to the reporter), 
Do you see how the whole farm is burnt (pointing to his burnt farm)..When Fulani 
herdmen need more, do not get grass to feed their cattle, they set fire on your farm so 
that new grass can grow. When we are not here (on our farms), they come to set the fire, 
which they do that mostly in the night, so they cannot control the fire and spread to our 
farms. You Come here the next morning and everything you have toiled for is If you 
were in our shoes what will you do? (local farmer, MyJoyOnline.com, 2016, 39:05)55 . 
 
In a similar instance, in the Kumasi High court case involving a group of native farmers 
(Plaintiff) from the AAND and Fulani herder/ Cattle owners (defendants), the former made a case 
against the later that56,  
 […]That the Fulani herdsmen also set fire to the dry bushes in order that fresh weeds 
will germinate, and this has caused destruction to several farmlands, including cocoa 
and food crops farms as well as having caused the collapse of the Bebome clinic which 
serves the above-mentioned villages.  (Kumasi Court Ruling, 2012, p.4. Appendix 1) 
 




56 In legal terms a plaintiff is an individual or group of people who initiates a lawsuit or an action before a court 





The court identified that one of the incidents disturbing the peace of communities is the 
burning of crops by the Fulani herders. Subsequently, based on this evidence of the burning of 
bushes and the destruction of courts and others, the court ruled that the Fulani herdsmen should be 
evicted from the land.  The court ruling shows the severity of bush burning as a trigger due to land 
use in sparking up the area's conflict. The REGSEC report (2012)57 also identify bush burning in 
the area as one of the causes of the conflict, stating that attacks on Fulani for crop burns lead to 
violent reprisal attacks. Recounting events that led to clashes between herdsmen and indigenous 
farmers that occurred in Pataban, a village in AAND, to the members present at the REGSEC 
meeting the Assemblymember, Honorable Derrick Amoah Yaw, in the year 2011, two farmers set 
fire to the farm of a farmer. When the farmer went to the farm to see what has been done to his 
farm, he informed other farms who organized and attacked a nearby Fulani community (REGSEC 
Report, 2012, p.172). According to him, similar incidents have occurred in Onyem and 
Nyamebekyere, which are all towns in the area in previous years.  (REGSEC Report, 2012). Thus, 
an attack on one group leads to the other group mobilizing its members either from the farmer's 
community and vice versa to attack the other.   
Also, herders and farmers in Gushegu District explained that during the dry season, which 
is accompanied by dry spells and a general shortage of resources, fresh grass and water to feed 
their cattle become scarce. This is due to the grass and rivers or streams quickly drying up, making 
it challenging to find fresh grass and water in the dry season for cattle. They pointed out that this 
situation puts them into competition with indigenous farmers to use unoccupied lands and 
sometimes lands belonging to them. A farmer in GD recounted:  
 




These days, we people in this community see less rain than we use to see in the past. 
This affects our harvest, but there is nothing we can do. But for the Fulani, when they 
are struggling to find grass in the dry season, what they do is burn the dried grass so that 
fresh grass will grow. These are our farms we are talking about. We will make sure they 
are no more here. They are destroying the land. In fact, there have been more conflict 
between the Fulani and us in this community than any community around and most is 
because they destroy our farms. (Interview with a 32-year-old male farmer at, Gushegu, 
GH Vibe.com February 2014, 0:01)58.  
 
Further, the farmers alleged that the numerous bushes burning by the Fulani herders have 
reduced the soil's fertility. This triggering activity arising from pitching two different land users 
resonate with several scholars (e.g. Ofuoku and Isife, 2010; Baidoo, 2014; and FAO, 2017), who 
argued that bush burning by herders are among the notable triggers of the conflict between herders 
and farmers. 
 
4.4.3 Encroachment of Grazing Land/ Farmland 
Closely related to crop destruction and bush burning is the encroachment of grazing land or 
farmland. Like Fulani herders being accused by farmers of encroaching and destroying their farms, 
Fulani herders also accuse farmers of doing the same. The two main land users (farmers and 
herders) acknowledged the other party encroaching on either their farm or grazing land is the most 
crucial source of the conflict.  Farmers in AAND and GD complained that the presence and 
encroachment of Fulani herdsmen (who wield weapons) in their farms have brought ‘untold 
hardships’ among them because they have to abandon their farms due to fear of losing their lives 
and, as a result, been deprived of their source of income and livelihoods. In February 2016, 
 
58Link to interview could be found here : 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t1eelZvl088&list=PLkBnfmwL4ER54A4oC5wVxwvqfurRa7i18&index=3 




Ghanaweb reported that on Tuesday (February.02.2016), a 27-year old man was killed on his farm 
when he tried to prevent “some Fulani herdsmen with their cattle from encroaching on his 
groundnut farm” in the AAND (Ghanaweb.com, 2016)59. Subsequently, other indigenous farmers 
held reprisal attacks on the herdsmen in the area. 
In November 2017, in a statement jointly issued and copied to the Daily Graphic of Ghana 
by the ‘Agogoman Mma Kuo’ (Natives of Agogo) and Agogo Worldwide Association, the 
indigenes said that they feel neglected by the government for not coming to their aid when 
herdsmen have taken over their farms60; 
[…]We feel forgotten and abandoned. Fulani herdsmen have invaded our lands and 
chased people out of the farmlands, farms, and cottages… The atrocities committed 
against the people of Agogo by the alien lawless Fulani herdsmen are very well 
documented; and the nation is silent over them. The people of Agogo have, over the 
years, appealed to the government through demonstrations, protests, petitions, 
etc.  (Statement by People of AAND, Graphiconline.com, November 2017)61.  
 
Indigenous farmers further alleged that previously the herders lived in the bush, far away 
from their farms. However, the rapid increase in their population (both herders and their cattle), as 
well as overgrazing, had forced them to encroach on their farmlands.  Farmers also claimed that 
many people are engaging in cattle rearing, and that has further increased the population of cattle 
and herdsmen.  Speaking on the Citifm morning show after a reprisal attack by farmers against the 
Fulani herders, the Eastern Regional minister who is also a legislator said; 
Cattle rearing has now become a big business in Ghana, and all manner of people are 
getting into it. Chiefs, assemblymen and others are all getting into the trade in Ghana….I 
as a person, until 1970, I hadn’t even seen a cattle before. But now cattle are everywhere, 
even in our offices and the methods we are using to breed and rear them are primitive, 
 
59 https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Agogo-Military-to-flush-out-Fulani-412624 
60 ‘Agogoman Mma Kuo’ literally translated as Natives of Agogo group refers to a group of indegenes from 






and we will continue to witness conflicts (Interview with Eastern regional minister, 
Citifmonline, 2017)62. 
 
Fulani herders in the AAND and GD area move with their cattle in search of lands to sustain 
their livelihood. However, most of these lands are being occupied by indigenes who are crop 
farmers. Thus, herders have to compete with the farmers for those new areas leading to more 
violent clashes. Similar to what takes place in Asante Akyem North District, in Gushegu District, 
there have been violent clashes resulting from the encroachment of lands by the Fulani herdsmen. 
In June 2016, the Daily graphic published a report of a violent clash between the ‘Konkomba’ and 
the Fulani herdsmen, which led to five people's death (Graphic.com.gh, 2016).6364 The report 
claimed that the initial conflict is said to have taken place when some Fulani herders and their 
cattle went to a nearby land that belonged to a native farmer on June 17, 2016. When the farmers 
in the area confronted the Fulani to know why they have invaded their land, the Fulani herders 
became offended and inflicted machete wounds on one of the farmers, which led to his death. 
According to the reports, this development did not go down well with the Konkomba farmers, who 
vowed to take revenge. In a reprisal attack, the farmers shot and killed three Fulani herders who 
encroached on their farms (www.graphic.com.gh, June 2016). The reports indicate that the initial 
clash took place when cattle belonging to some Fulani herdsmen strayed onto a Konkomba man’s 
farm and destroyed his crops. Subsequently, the Konkombas in the area confronted the Fulani 
herdsmen, who became offended and inflicted machete wounds on the Konkomba farmer, leading 
to his death. This did not go down well with Konkombas in the area, who vowed to avenge the 
 








death of their kinsman. In a reprisal attack, the Konkombas killed two Fulani herdsmen. Later, 
three bodies identified as Fulani herdsmen were found in the bush (Graphic.com.gh, 2016)65. This 
was confirmed by the District Chief Executive (DCE) of GD when he gave the background of this 
attack ghana.com.gh news: 
[…] In October 2015, three Fulani herdsmen were found dead in the Afram Plains in 
the Eastern Region, following a possible reprisal attack by residents of the area. An 
earlier clash between the herdsmen and farmers in the area claimed the life of a farmer 
and injured seven others. Cattle belonging to the Fulani occasionally destroy crops and 
this leads to clashes in areas where Fulani headsmen live (Report on the background of 
the attack)66. 
 
The above evidence illustrates what farmers perceive as one of the causes of the conflict 
between them and the herders. Farmers claim that herders move from their original place of grazing 
into their farms or to lands close to their farms when they need new grazing areas. Thus, the 
competition between them and the herders over the land intensifies and makes conflict inevitable. 
On the other hand, herdsmen accused the indigenous farmers of farming along grazing 
routes and sometimes even farming on lands they purchased from the chiefs. Fulani herdsmen 
revealed that farmers choose to cultivate their crops close to kraals and cattle routes to fuel the 
conflict (TV3network, 2018). This was revealed when Fulani herdsmen held a press conference in 
the GD.67 Herdsmen and cattle owners accused the indigenous farmers of purposely doing this 
because they (the farmers) know that cow manure fertilizes the soil, making it an excellent medium 













farmlands are obtained legally (mostly through lease) for grazing, farmers encroach such areas 
after few years with the main argument that all lands belong to community members and that no 
‘foreigners’ have a share in it. 68 
Farmers also encroach the grazing lands and often farm along routes used by Fulani herders 
to graze cattle. Herders argued that it is hard to prevent the animals from feeding on crops 
cultivated by the farmers. The herders further alleged that farmers farm close deliberate to kraals 
and cattle routes with the intention to make money by claiming large compensation for damaged 
crops. According to the National President of the Cattle Farmers Association of Ghana, Imam 
Hanafi, the farmers' encroachment and the influx of alien herdsmen (referring to herdsmen who 
come from neighbouring countries) underline the conflict. He further explained that during the 
time he and his friends (referring to other cattle owners) were allocated the land, the place was a 
‘bush’ with no farming activity going on in the area. In his view, an increase in agricultural 
activities has led to the struggle for land use and survival in most areas in the country, hence the 
conflict (Interview with Imam Hanafi Sonde, chairman of Ghana National Association of Cattle 
Farmers on myjoytvonline, 2016). Another interview with ; 
 
I can’t pinpoint the exact time. As far back as the late 90s, some Fulani approached 
some local chiefs to give them areas to rear their cattle, and that is how they came in. 
Instead of keeping to the terms, they kept inviting others, and before we knew it, they 
were everywhere… Of course, naturally, they produce, but that won't create these 
problems. Even Alhaji Grunsah stated that he does that kind of business of bringing in 
more Fulanis who have cattle to Agogo (Joe Nti Obeng, Myjoyonline, 2016, 3:00) 
 
The discussion above reveals how the clash of livelihoods between groups who pursue 
different interests (farming and herding) puts them into a competition over land use, leading to the 
 





immediate drivers of violent conflict between them. The livelihood differences between farmers 
and herders and the land use in AAND and GD as discussed above do not cause the conflict directly 
but act as underlying drivers of the conflict by leading to triggers such as farm destruction, land 
encroachment, burning of farms and encroachment of grazing lands. These factors act as triggers 
of the conflict; however, these triggers only spark conflicts between individual farmers and 
herders.  
As this chapter has shown, in the two cases of Asante Akim North and Gushegu, the 
competition between farmers and herders have resulted in violent conflict. However, there is a 
difference in the level of violence in the two districts. There have been more violent clashes in 
AAND than in GD, as I found in my study of Ghanaian media reports. In terms of numbers, 
between 2006 to 2013, there were 24 official reports of death as compared to 16 reports in 
GD.69Also, between 2015 to 2019, there were 18 official reports of deaths in Ghanaweb.com as 
opposed to 4 in GD. However, residents of AAND claim the number of deaths exceeds 40. This 
makes it imperative to discuss in comparative terms the differences the farmer-herder conflict in 
AAND and GD presents despite their similarities. 
Again, the nature of historical contact between herders and indigenous farmers in GD plays 
an important role in mitigating the violence between them in the area. Unlike AAND, indigenous 
farmers in the Northern parts of Ghana had contact with the Fulani herders earlier in their history 
before the Fulanis later migrated southwards. Thus, the settlement of the Fulanis in the GD allowed 
them to establish close relations with the inhabitants of those communities through their 
interactions than in AAND. For instance, Bukari (2017) observed that in Gushegu, Fulani herders 
 




had daily interactions as they were contracted to take care of the indigenes' cattle. This 
patron/client relation between indigenes and Fulani herders enabled most conflicts involving crop 
destruction and encroachment to be resolved before they escalate into violence. This is because 
most of the cattle tendered by the Fulani herders were owned by indigenes who were in those 
communities. Prell et al. (2009) noted that actors who have been in contact for a long period and 
have frequent communication can avoid inflaming conflict while actors showing signs of week 
ties characterized by less frequent contact and communication will lead to a lack the in-depth 
dialogue for the understanding of issues. Thus, any misunderstanding that developed out of crop 
destruction, burning of farms and encroachment could be solved amicably without degenerating 
into violence. On the contrary, Fulani herders in AAND lived in the bushes and the outskirts of 
towns and tendered either their own cattle or cattle belonging to other people who were not 
indigenes of Agogo. For instance, Table 4.0 above shows a list of sixteen (16) cattle owners in 
AAND by the Agogo District Police. Among the 16 cattle owners who own close to 10,000 cattle, 
none of them are indigenes of AAND. Thus, in cases of destruction of crops or encroachments of 
farms, it easily triggers a violent reaction since there is little or no interaction between the actors 
involved.  
Further, I noted above that, unlike AAND, where nomadism and cattle rearing on a 
commercial scale is entirely a new phenomenon, nomadism and cattle rearing were practiced by 
many inhabitants of GD before the arrival of the Fulani herders.  Thus, the people of GD had 
already established mechanisms to address issues of crop destruction and encroachment. For 
instance, Bukari (2017) noted that in Zantile, a town in GD, chiefs, elders, leaders of the farming 
group, Fulani chiefs and elders, assemblymen and unit committee members constituted the body 




between herders and farmers. Also, were areas demarcated as grazing land, although as the 
population of cattle and farmers increased. On the other hand, in AAND, all the indigenous actors 
involved in handling conflict are behind the indigenous farmers to fight off the Fulani herders 
rather than acting as mediators. Hence, although the livelihood differences and land use have 
resulted in conflict between indigenous farmers and herders in AAND and GD, several factors 
such as historical contact, everyday interaction, the existence of conflict resolution mechanisms 
and the mobilization of primordial identity (which is discussed in Chapter Five) act as plausible 
explanations for the variation in the occurrence of violence in the two districts. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The violent conflict between farmers and herders in Ghana has a complex dimension with 
multiple triggers – all emanating from farmers and herders using the same resource  to achieve 
their interests and livelihood. It is evident from the above that the migration of herders from their 
original settlements to AAND and GD pitches them against farmers in these communities. The 
two groups vie to use the land to achieve their interests. Coupled with the increase in the sizes of 
farms and herds and the two groups’ land-use practices,  competition becomes inevitable. These 
competitions often lead to triggering activities, which in many cases escalate to violent conflicts.   
Thus, the conflict is about land resource; how is it being used by different users with different 
interests. The farmers need the land to grow their crops, while the herdsmen want it as grazing 
land. Meanwhile, they have to use the same land; but the land is fixed with no demarcations.  The 
indigenes are made up of several ethnic groups who are predominantly farmers; however, the 
complaints and conflict are not between a single ethnic group and the Fulani herdsmen but the 
indigenous farming population against the herdsmen refuting the claims that this is an ethnic 




into widespread violent engagements. According to him, those general patterns include the 
“development of group goals”, “enhanced group identity,”  and the stakes those actors hold in the 
conflict. Thus, this suggests that despite the differences in group conflict and how they escalate,  
factors such as differences in group goals and identity are significant factors for a  conflict to 



















 CHAPTER FIVE 
MIGRATION, AUTOCHTHONY, AND LAND CONFLICT BETWEEN 
FARMER AND HERDER 
 
5.0. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I have introduced the land-conflict debates in farmer-herder 
relations. The contest for land use between farmers and herders leads to significant triggers of 
violent conflicts between farmers and herders. It was evident that land use itself does not directly 
lead to violent attacks but instead leads to conflict triggers. As already mentioned in previous 
chapters, land use is not the only cause of violent conflict between farmers and herders in Ghana. 
Therefore, the question to ask is: what other factors interact with land use to cause violent conflict? 
Using cases from the two study areas in this study (AAND and GD), this chapter adopts an SoS 
and autochthony claims lens to discuss how land rights and land access are intimately linked with 
identity and territory. It also explains how the (‘Autochthons’ and ‘strangers’) frameworks define 
causal connections between competition over land (rights and access) and conflict. The 
convergence of livelihoods increases the frequency of conflict triggers among farmers and herders 
and draws attention to other issues such as the linkage between identity and belongingness and 
access to and use the land. According to Komey (2010), as land use issues are often overlaid with 
other features such as ethnicity, belongingness, and religion. Thus, this research tries to go beyond 
farmers' and herders' social and economic life to include their ethnic divisions, belongingness, and 




The attempt to gain rights and access to land resources resulting from the complex struggle 
for one's livelihood in most African societies is intimately tied to membership of a particular group, 
community, or territory (Komey, 2010). This makes the discussion of identity, citizenship and 
migration indispensable when discussing the land conflict between farmers and herders in AAND 
and GD. Dunn (2009) noted that the narrative of identity and citizenship provides the discursive 
framework through which access to and use of resources is enabled. Also, the rights to access and 
use these resources are justified through identity and membership of the community. Thus, any 
attempt to explain rights to use or access natural resources must draw on the narrative of identity 
and citizenship. Autochthony claims remain central in justifying these claims when the natural 
resource struggle involves an indigenous population and a migrant population. Therefore, this 
chapter attempts to explain the causes of the violent conflict between farmers and herders in 
AAND and GD within the framework of identity, autochthony, and SoS claims. 
In this chapter, I discuss the migration of Fulani herders from their original settlements to 
the study areas and how access to land and deprivation to the land lead to the escalation of violent 
conflict between the local farmers and migrant Fulani herders. The chapter address the specific 
question, "How does access to land affect the farmer-herder conflict? Here the modes of land 
ownership and land tenure in the study areas, Fulani land access and rights in Ghana (which hinges 
on identity/ belonging and land rights) are discussed using the framework of autochthony, and SoS 
claims. The land tenure arrangements and land rights in the host communities (AANDA and GD) 
favour indigenes, serving as an underlying driver of the Farmer-herders in conflicts. Further, this 
chapter also discusses the processual factor and how identity is used to mobilize identity as an 
asset in mobilizing groups for conflict. This aims to clarify how the narrative of identity and 




violent conflict between migrant herders and local Farmers in AAND and GD. The chapter begins 
by describing the discourse surrounding Fulani migration and how they are seen as ‘strangers’ 
even if they are Ghanaians. This is followed by a section on land ownership and land tenure 
arrangements within the study areas. These discussions are essential, as it highlights the use of 
autochthony and SoS discourse and ‘nonbelonging, which according to Côté and Mitchell (2018), 
are used to emphasis “the origin of a person or persons is from a different soil” and a lack of 
“legitimate claim to the soil” (Land). Subsequently, the chapter discusses autochthony and conflict, 
which draws heavily from the first two sections. 
 
5.1. Migration and Its Impact on Fulani Land Rights 
Whether international or internal, migration can give rise to conflict (Côté and Mitchell, 
2018). The migration of Fulani herders from several other neighbouring countries is mostly being 
driven by climate change and economic reasons (Tonah, 2006c, Bukari, 2017). While the causes 
of migration can vary, the influx of a new group of people, especially with a different defined set 
of livelihood and economic activity, into a place can lead to resentment (Tonah, 2006c). This is 
exacerbated when other factors such as identity differences, limited resources, and physical 
separation exist. Fulani pastoralists who live in the Northern arid countries of West Africa (Mostly 
Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali) are forced to migrate southward in response to drought and lack of 
pasture to feed their cattle, which is their source of livelihood (Tonah, 2006c). Most of them end 




Relating to the Free movement.70 The ECOWAS protocol allows for citizens' free movement from 
one member state to another without any restrictions (Ecowas  Free Movement Protocol, 1979, 
article 2). It also allows citizens of member states to reside in member countries for a period 
without any documentation (visas and permits). Therefore, Fulani herders can move from their 
home countries to other countries within the sub-region with their cattle and reside there. The 
mobility of Fulani herders from other countries into Ghana has had a significant negative impact 
on their interaction with local farming populations.  
Internal migration among Fulani cattle herders and cattle owners also occurs, especially in 
AAND. Fulani migrants from neighbouring countries cross into Ghana to settle in the Northern 
regions (including Gushegu) of Ghana (Tonah, 2002, Bukari, 2017). Subsequently, some of them 
migrate southwards in search of better forage in the dry season for their cattle due to the semi-arid 
climate in the northern region. Sward (2017) noted that internal migration from Northern Ghana 
to the forest and farming areas south of Ghana constitutes a major secondary internal migration 
pattern in the country, next to rural-urban migration to cities. The migration of Fulanis who 
migrated to northern Ghana and later southwards was revealed in an interview with a Fulani herder 
in AAND, a chief of AAND and the Fulani Herders Association of Ghana's president.  
I was born in Nyemso nearly forty-one years ago. My name is Musa Amadu. This is 
where I come from…(Fulani herder, GHOne TV, 2016, 33:58) 
 
 I was born in Karaga in the Northern Region. I am a Fulani. My father moved to Ghana 
in the 1950s. We always used to come to Agogo in the dry season and go back when 
the weather over there is good. I decided to settle in Bebume (in AAND) in 1994 
 
70 Article 2 of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free movement stipulates that  Commmunity citizens  have the right 
to enter, reside and esteerblish a territory within member states. A citizen of the the community simply refers to a 
person from any of the ECOWAS member states.  ECOWAS is an abbreviation for Economic Community of West 
African States formed. The organization consists of of 15 member states including Ghana, mali, Nier, Nigeria, Burkina 




because of the good weather and enough pasture to feed my cattle (Interview with Fulani 
herder, February 02, 2013, Tribal Ghana).71  
 
[…]Let me tell you this when it comes to the Fulani, we have the ‘efie Fulani’ and the 
‘abonten Fulani.’ The ‘efie Fulani’ are those who were born and raised in Ghana and 
later decided to move from their birthplace due to one or two reasons. I do not know 
why people keep linking us to the abonten Fulani (transhumance herders). (Prof. Osman 
Bari, GHOne TV, 2016, 13:25)72 
 
The heterogeneity and the historical origin, and the Fulani ethnic group's presence in other 
countries across the West Africa continent make it difficult to classify them as in-migrants or 
international migrants. However, there is enough evidence to suggest that Fulani herders and cattle 
owners are seen as non-native or non-indigenous to these areas (i.e. internal migrants) rather than 
international or cross-border immigrants. For instance, there have been attempts to distinguish 
between ‘Ghanaian Fulanis’ and Fulanis from other neighbouring West African countries in many 
instances. A case in point is the submission of the report of a thirteen (13) member committee in 
Ghana's Parliament after a clash between Fulani herders and indigenous farmers in December 
2011. The report indicated that Fulani herdsmen should not be treated entirely as foreigners who 
migrate from outside Ghana. Instead, there was the call for a distinction between Ghanaians who 
are of Fulani descent and those from outside. In his submission, the chairman of the committee 
pointed this out when he recounted that; 
The activities of the Fulani herdsmen pose a challenge to the very existence of our 
peoples and others. And so, as the representatives of the people, it is important that we 
do our best to address that, but in doing so, we should do so in the appropriate contest. 
First, they are Ghanaians of Fulani descent because, at independence, the law defined a 
Ghanaian to be anybody of West African descent who was resident in Ghana at the time 
 
71 Interview with Fulani Herdsman could be found here 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dHsZh6YlwPs&list=PLkBnfmwL4ER54A4oC5wVxwvqfurRa7i18&index=32
&ab_channel=THETRIBALISTTHETRIBALIST. Last Accessed on September 05, 2019 
72 Professor Barri’s comment could be found in 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ajIu2o4GgAk&list=PLkBnfmwL4ER54A4oC5wVxwvqfurRa7i18&index=2&t




we should not consider every Fulani as non-Ghanaian (Ambruce Derry, Ghana 
Broadcasting Cooperation GBC, 2011, 0:30)73 
 
The migration of Fulani herders, whether from outside Ghana or from one community to 
another in Ghana in search of opportunities to secure their livelihoods, has led to challenges they 
would otherwise not face in their home countries. One challenge they face in both AAND and GD 
is that their Fulani identity has been exploited when it comes to getting rights to access and use 
land in these areas. As Olaniyan and Okeke-Uzodike (2015, p.59) pointed out in their essay, 
AAND initially was large enough to accommodate migrant herders when they migrated to the area 
in the 1990s. Thus, the herders were allowed to occupy the main towns' outskirt main towns and 
villages' outskirts, which were not inhabited or cultivated. As the number of the Fulani herders 
continued to increase and at the same time, the population of indigenous farmers continue to grow, 
the need to expand more into lands that were not previously cultivated has led to competitions and 
conflict between the farmers and migrant herders. The population in the principal city of AAND 
(Agogo) alone was estimated to be around 10,000 in the year 2012 by a RESEC cited in (Nibelli, 
2019,  p.3) however, in 2017, the figure was estimated to be around 31,000 by report population 
(cited in Agyemang, 2017, p. 5). A expressed by indigenous farmers in the media; 
We have lived with the Fulani for decades. Since my childhood, Fulanis have tended 
my father and Grandfather’s cattle. They have children I consider as my brothers and 
sisters. But now you see them everywhere. I see new ones each and every time I go out. 
That is the problem here sir. (Interview on Ghanaweb.com , December 25, 2011).74 
 
 
73 Speech in parliament could be found here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b9--
CoEOATo&list=PLkBnfmwL4ER54A4oC5wVxwvqfurRa7i18&ab_channel=GhanaBroadcastingCorporation-
Kanda Last accessed on September 5 2019 
74 Interview with native of Gushegu retrieved from:  
https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Government-to-Review-ECOWAS-Protocols-On-




Following several invasions on their farms, a group of local farmers in the GD attacked the 
Fulani communities killing more than a dozen and injuring several others. In an interview, 
eyewitnesses explained the reason for the attack was due to the competition over land: 
This place is the largest cattle market in the region, so you understand why the Fulani 
are everywhere. I think the attack is due to recent happening in Kpatinga, Gbambu, 
Yawunga and Zamashegu. The Fulani are many in these towns and are causing 
problems for us. (Interview on Ghanaweb.com, December 15, 2011)75 
 
The above evidence is in line with Côté and Mitchell’s (2018) argument that anti-immigrant 
sentiment and SoS tensions become heightened when migrants arrive in large numbers. As Boone 
(2017, p.279) observed, most conflicts in Africa that centers on land occur in places where 
migration has contributed to increased pressure and competition over land. Although statistical 
data for Fulani migrants from outside Ghana and Fulanis in-migration does not exist, there is 
enough anecdotal evidence to suggest that Fulani migration into farming areas in both AAND and 
GD have led to ‘anti- Fulani’ protects and tension. The ensuing paragraphs further explain how 
the arrival of migrants with a different identity, autochthonous claims, and herders ‘strangeness’ 
plays out in their access to land in AAND and GD and how that translates into violent conflict.   
 
5.2. Landownership and Land Tenure in The Study areas 
 Land remains central to the struggle over livelihood among farmers and herders in AAND 
and GD. In Africa, traditional institutions are estimated to govern about 90% of all land in sub-
Saharan Africa on average (Deininger,2003, p.2; Boone 2017, p.280). However, Ghana's land 







ethnic groups (Kasanga and Kotey, 2001; Dosu, 2011). Although generally, traditional authorities 
owned and control about 80% of land forest land with resources and timber on them is held, 
controlled, and run by the State in trust of the traditional authorities (Agyemang, 2017; 
Bukari,2017). This land arrangement is under chapter 21, articles 258 and 267 of the 1992 Republic 
of Ghana constitution. This section discusses land tenure and land ownership in the study areas. 
First, I discuss land ownership and tenure in AAND, land ownership and tenure in GD, and do a 
closer analysis of the land tenure system in both study areas and examine Fulani Herders’ access 
to land in those areas. This discussion is relevant as land tenure in these areas has important 
implications for the conflict among local farmers and migrant herders. 
According to Njor (2011, p.69), the ‘indigenous groups’ in Africa refer to people living in 
their ancestry, while ‘strangers’ often imply people who live in areas where they do not trace their 
ancestry. The indigenous group in AAND refers to the Ashantis, which is a subgroup of Akans. 
The Ashantis are believed to have settled in the area as far back as the early 13th century (Odei, 
2004; Gedzi, 2009), making them the first comers as the area was not inhabited. (Gedzi, 2014). 
The native people of Gushegu, the Konkomba and Dagomba, belong to the same ancestral family 
known as the Mole-Dagbani, located across the length and breadth of Northern, Upper East and 
West regions of Ghana. Oral history has it that these groups migrated to the area of present-day 
Ghana from the north-east of Lake Chad between the 10th and 11th centuries AD (Twumasi,1996). 
Abdulai (1986) noted that prior to the arrival of tribes such as Ashantes (AAND) and Dagombas 
and Konkombas (GD), who were already familiar with kingship and chieftaincy, Ghana was 
perhaps occupied by acephalous territorial units in which political control was exercised through 
segmentary lineage systems. There was, therefore, no centralized control over land. Thus, these 




attendant rights. The land was vested in lineages or clans, internally unified by common ritual 
practices connected with ancestor worship (Abdulai, 1986). According to Abdulai (1986), ritual 
ownership of land was vested leaders of the families. Thus, heads of clans and families controlled 
land allocations and performed those rituals. 
In general, customary land tenure is the main form of land tenure arrangement practiced in 
Ghana (Ministry of Land and Forestry, 2003). It is estimated that traditional rulers govern about 
80 percent of Ghana's lands (Food and Agriculture Organization, UN)76. Lands in AAND are held 
and managed in the form of a common property management system. Traditional leaders manage 
close to 70% of lands in the AAND known as Agogo stool (Bukari, 2017, p.174). Thus, the land 
is being commonly referred to as "Agogo Stool Lands." These lands are being administered 
following customary laws that govern the area. Therefore, the traditional authority (Chiefs) has the 
power of control and allocation of land, including leasing lands to herders. Indigenous 
(autochthones) community members maintain the right to use the land for farming by applying 
through their respective "odikro" (community chief). They thus gain the legal right to use the land 
due to their indigenous status.  
Community chiefs (odikro) have the right to make land allocation of up to 2 hectors; 
however, it is only the paramount chief "Agogo Omanhene" of the area who has the power to lease 
out large tracts of land above (two) 2 hectors to non-indigenes (Kuusaana and Gerber, 2015, p. 
853).  Many families in AAND also own lands under the usufruct titles granted them by the 
community chief. These usufructs lands are held in trust for the families by their family heads 
(abusuapanin). The family heads manage these lands on behalf of their families and may lease part 
 





of those lands to another person in consultation with the chief. However, he does not need the 
consent of the chiefs. 
Besides, the Government of Ghana, after the 1983 bushfires, also acquired some lands in 
the Agogo area for afforestation and reclaiming damaged lands (Kuusaana and Bukari, 2015, p.56). 
The bushfires destroyed large areas, which were previously cocoa plantations and turned the area 
into a savannah land. The Forestry Commission of Ghana is charged with the responsibility of 
managing the forest and wildlife resources on behalf of the State. Additionally, the central 
government took charge of several lands for developmental projects such as schools and hospitals. 
Apart from the above land ownership arrangements, there are other arrangements for foreigners, 
migrants, and settlers who do not belong to any family or clan to acquire land in AAND. These 
other land arrangement methods include lease or concession, sharing agreement and land 
purchasing or hiring. 
Landownership and control in towns and communities in Gushegu District are similar to 
those of AAND above as it is also based on common property arrangement. However, GD has 
different indigenous tribes and groups, making it heterogeneous, unlike AAND, with a 
homogenous ethnic group with a single land ownership system. This makes the local land rights 
laws vary from community to community. Generally, the "skins"77 or chiefs are the "customary 
trustees" who hold the land on behalf of the people (Abdulai, 2002, p.74)). For instance, among 
the Dagombas, the land is owned by the "Yaa Naa" (paramount chief), who is represented by the 
"Gushie Naa" and village chiefs down the hierarchy (Abdulai 1986, p.76; Bukari, 2017, p.176)78.  
 
77 Skins are symbols of tradition power in the northern parts of Ghana just like the stool is in the south and 
middle areas. Thus, chiefs sit on a sacred stool or animal skin to show their authority. 
78 Gushie Naa is  the name given to the paramoun chief of the Gushegu traditional area. As paramount chief, he 




Writing on the Konkomba tribe in GD, who have a similar centralized political structure as 
the Dagomba, Abdulai (1986, p.76) observes that the Konkomba land administrative system also 
"emphasized on the idea of a  unified territory and community with centralized leadership." There 
is a clear distinction between land ownership laws and land use laws in GD (Abdulai,1986). The 
only form of individual ownership among GD people is the land being farmed on or the land on 
which they have built their houses. For instance, the Gushie Naa speaking to the researcher, 
explained the forms of land ownership in the area: 
For us Dagombas, Land belongs to the chiefs who oversee its uses and acquisition. The 
chief performs sacrifices on the land and has authority over all resources found on it. 
Land on which families have built on or farm on are included. The only problem is that 
these families have been farming or have lived on these lands for long periods that it 
has become theirs. However, these lands cannot be transferred to stranges without chiefs 
being consulted. The chief has the power to admit or evict anyone from the land. For 
migrants who want to settle in this area, they must come to see the chief for him to agree 
and give them the conditions before they can settle. Even if community members wish 
to expand their existing farms, the chief can agree or disagree. You cannot sell land 
unless in the big towns where you can sell for residential purposes (Interview with the 
Paramount chief of Gushegu/ Gushie Naa, 4/10/2013-quoted in Bukari,2017, p.177). 
 
The above quote suggests that individual land ownership is practiced in urban communities 
such as the Gushegu main town but not in small communities and villages. 79 However, among the 
ethnic groups in the GD area, there are varied land ownership and control systems practiced. 
Unlike the Dagomba, where chiefs have the exclusive power over all lands, among the 
Konkombas, individual families have the usufruct power over land, as happens in AAND. The 
land ownership and tenure arrangement, as practiced in both AAND and GD, limits land ownership 
to members of the indigenous families, clans and ethnic groups and ownership and use of the land 
can be transferred to one’s lineage. The rules and regulations governing the rights to access and 
 




use of land have favoured farmers who are mostly identified as the ‘indigenous’ or ‘autochthonous’ 
group. Thus, migrants who do not belong to the indigenous groups are marginalized. The lack of 
access to land and autochthonous claims made to land serves as an underlying driver of violent 
conflict between farmers and herders in AAND and GD.  
 
5.3. Land Rights in Asante Akim North District and Gushegu District 
The politics of identity and belonging are crucial in land conflict because ownership and 
land access are tied to it in most parts of Africa. From the above discussion, we notice that the 
concept of identity and belonging is translated into the rights to ownership, access, or land use. 
Indigenes have the right to access and use land within the study areas. According to Lentz (2005), 
in Ghana and most States in Africa, the oral transmission of rights and claims to land plays a vital 
role in land access and its use. Land rights and claims are informed by citizenship, belonging and 
the history of migration and settlers. Land access and use are based on what Lentz (2005) term as 
‘first-comers’ (indigenous) and ‘new-comers’ (migrants) labels. Thus, settled farmers in both 
AAND and GD are regarded as ‘first-comers,’ ‘autochthons’ or ‘sons’ of the land and therefore 
have rights and claims to land use and access. This is evidence in the land tenure regimes and 
modes of land ownership in both AAND and GD, as discussed above. The land tenure and 
ownership arrangements confer legitimacy and empower indigenous farming groups (via 
traditional institutions whose claims to authority are rooted partially in ethnic kinship and ancestral 
custom) to regulate and allocate land (Boone, 2017). 
   According to Asante (1965, p. 852), the concept of land ownership and rights is connected 





“Land belongs to a vast family of whom many are dead, a few are living, and countless 
host are unborn” (quoted in Ollennu,1962, p.4). 
The quote suggests that land is the most valuable resource of the community vested in 
the stool or skin (traditional leaders) and passed from generation to generation. The 
community's subjects enjoy usufruct rights to access and used the land for agricultural 
purposes80. Asante (1965, p.854) further noted that the doctrine of usufruct in traditional 
Ghanaian communities meant that a clan, lineage, or family held land right. However, 
individual members of the clan family or lineage were not prohibited from its acquisition. 
The term usufruct is used in relation to the lands because it indicates the landholder has full 
rights (Woodman, 1966, p.457), and those rights were perpetual and secured. The rights could 
be transferred to a successor (who was also a member of the family), and not even the 
traditional ruler or chief could alienate the rights to the land without the usufruct's consent 
(Asante, 1965). Thus, the rights to and control of land in AAND and GD have remained in 
the hands of lineages and descendants of indigenous farmers referred to as “founding settlers” 
(Moyo et al., 2015) or ‘firstcomers’ (Lentz, 2005). The ‘firstcomer’ status of indigenes 
renders other tribes who migrate to those areas, later on,  as ‘strangers’ or ‘latecomers.’ In 
fact, Fulani migrant herders have in several instances been referred to as ‘aliens’ by 
indigenous farmers in AAND and GD and thus do not have land rights. Let us consider these 
quotes; 
[…] The land of Agogo belongs to the people of Agogo, it was handed to us by our 
ancestors, and therefore we are the rightful owners. However, what do we see now, our 
 




lands are taken over by strangers and many Agogo citizens are now landless on their 
own soil… (Member of parliament for AAND, Ghanaweb.com, September 12, 2015)81 
 
[…]When the IGP (police) came here they came to lie to use. They said they were going 
to drive the Fulanis out, but they didn’t. …We, the natives of Agogo, will not stand for 
our lands to be taken away from us; our forefathers fought for these lands with their 
blood for us to have it. I am speaking on behalf of all the indigenes of Agogo. Nobody 
should sell lands to these Fulanis. When you do, they will take over our land (Opinion 
leader, Opanyin Kofi Oduro, UTV, 2016, 2:30)82 
  
Indigenous farmers claim ownership of all lands within their territories as they believe it is 
their natural ‘birth-right.’ Since Fulani herders are not indigenous, they have no rights to access or 
use the land. Boone (2017) noted that permanent land rights transfer among different ethnic groups 
is not common in Africa. Similarly, among the people in the AAND and GD, land transfers to 
members of a different ethnic group, especially (non Akans among the people of AAND) and (non-
Dagomba or Konkomba among the people of GD) is met with anti-ethnic or non-indigenous 
protests and sometimes violent reactions.  For instance, there have been protests in AAND (Agogo) 
and GD (Gushegu) over the presence and leasing out lands to Fulani cattle herder. Most of the 
protests have been violent and led to the killings and injury of several migrants, Fulani herdsmen, 
or vice versa. An instance was in GD in 2011 and 2020 83 and AAND in 2019. For example, local 
leaders have openly expressed their disapproval for the allocation and leasing out of land to the 
Fulani herders in AAND in the media: 
 
81 Minister  explains that Fulanis come here, take over our lands and disturb the rightful landowners on their 
own land 2017-11-05 https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/More-security-officers-needed-
to-tackle-Fulani-menace-Minister-597393 (last Accessed on November 05,2017) 
82 Agogo Residents Invoke Curses on Fulani Herdsmen https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7JmYoT5-
PPI&ab_channel=UTVGhanaOnline. Author’s own translation. 
83https://www.peacefmonline.com/pages/local/crime/201112/84746.php?storyid=100& Last Accessed on 18 
May 2020.  
https://www.myjoyonline.com/news/burkina-faso-requests-bodies-of-slainfulanis/ Last accessed on July 5, 
2020. 
https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Angry-youth-burn-Fulani-houses-over-alleged-





The Fulanis herdsmen come in day in, day out. They come, and when they find the place 
to be good, they invite other Fulanis to come. In this way, the number keeps increasing 
every day.I don’t blame them, when they come and the get land what do you expect.We 
have said several times, land belongs to indigenes of Agogo(AAND) so the chiefs 
should make sure these Fulani who keep coming don’t take over our land (Joe Nti 
Obeng, , MyJoynews, 2016)84  
 
Similarly, The DCE of GD also commented is the media; 
Somewhere last year, I told your paper the presence and activities of these alien Fulani 
herders were threatening the security of residents in and around the Gushegu District.  
They come here, settle in the bushes without permission, and cut down economic trees 
to feed their cattle. Residents, on several occasions, have engaged in a confrontation 
with these herdsmen and raised concerns over their continuous stay in the district. In 
fact, I have had several complaints from natives about how these people come and 
occupy lands that they have not been given by authorities and cause havoc in those 
communities. (Interview with DCE of Gushegu District, Alhaji Alhassan Fuseini, 
SavannaNews, December 16, 2011).       
 
 The leaders' comments show opposition even by the indigenous farming group's 




5.3.1. Migrants (Fulani herders) Lands Access In Ghana 
With no formal or historical claim to land under both the Ashanti (in AAND) and 
Northern (in GD), customary land tenure arrangements which generally bestows access rights 
to indigenes with “first-comer” status (Afikorah-Danquah,1997) migrant Fulani herders with 
ancestry from outside Ghana, typically rely on lease or sharecropping agreements which they 
 






secure through traditional leaders (chiefs) and family or lineage heads (Agyemang, 2017; 
Sward, 2017). Land access by migrants, especially the Fulani herders in Ghanaian 
communities, is particularly complex as the predominantly known land ownership system is 
vested in stools and or skins, and families and access to land are generally achieved outside 
a legal framework. In AAND and its environs, Fulani herders and cattle owners acquire land 
either from family usufructs or directly from the Agogo Traditional Council (ATC), 
depending on the land's location and size in question.85 Fulani herders, just like many other 
migrants in Ghanaian communities, are cut off from access to land. Subsequently, herders 
have resorted to acquiring land from individual family usufruct holders. In an interview with 
GHOne Tv, Professor Bari, the President of the Fulani Association of Ghana, confirmed that 
he has information from his people that is the Fulani that most cattle owners in most towns 
in AAND acquired their pasturelands from individual landowners or families and not from 
the traditional Council.86  
Chiefs have the customary authority that has been conferred on them by customs to 
safeguard their people's welfare when it comes to land matters. However, these powers 
conferred on chiefs by customs in some cases conflict with their interest, which leads them 
to incur their subjects' displeasure when they decide to allocate lands to strangers or migrants 
and deny natives their land rights. For instance, the legitimate claim to land in both AAND 
and GD is through membership of a clan or lineage, and therefore, autochthons do not have 
to pay rent on the land they use for farming (Tonah,2006; Berry, 2001; Baidoo,2014). 
Contrarily, as the chief's clients, migrant herders have to pay tributes and rent to the chiefs. 
 
85 | Agogo Traditional Council refers to a council of all chiefs who fall within the AAND area. 





These monetary benefits that chiefs get when they alienate land to migrants are varied and 
complex. In this regard, it would be worthy of examining further other ways under which 
migrant Fulani herders are able to obtain lands in both AAND and GD. 
To acquire  land in both Agogo and Gushegu, migrants have to go through several 
institutions and actors (Agyemang 2017; Bukari, 2017). A person who wishes to obtain a piece of 
land in AAND for agricultural purposes must first approach the chief and other customary 
custodians, including family or clan heads or their representatives, and request that piece of land 
or any suitable unoccupied land. The chief then consults his council of elders to discuss land 
availability and the terms under which the land should be given to the migrant. When the migrant 
header has seen the land and is satisfied with it, he begins negotiations. Once a fee is agreed upon, 
payments are made to the chiefs or landowner, and in exchange, the land is allocated to the migrant. 
The final stage of acquiring the land is cutting a thread (as is done in the south) or breaking of cola 
(as is done in the North). This act is locally known as tramma/guaha87 
From the accounts above, it is evident that land transaction between chiefs/family heads 
and migrant herders or cuttle owners is mostly done orally since writing and written documentation 
are considered alien to the people's traditional customs in the area. Cattle owners provided further 
evidence in a REGSAG meeting in AAND, held to listen to testimonies of Cattle owners and 
opinion leaders: The testimonies revealed that among the four cattle owners present (who together 
had a total of almost one thousand five hundred (1500) cattle, only one of them had legal 
 
87 According to  (Ollennu ,1962, pp. 115–121) the guaha ceremony ,also known as tramma, takes place before 
many witnesses for both parties (the renter/buyer and the seller. The seller and renter/buyer each provide a 




documents showing that the land they operate on were leased to them even though they had paid 
large sums of money for the land (REGSAG, February 14, 2012). 88 
As already mentioned, the Gushegu Traditional council (GTC), led by the paramount chief, 
controls all customary lands on behalf of the Ya Naa. However, all land title registrations and 
documentation are processed by the Lands Commission located in Yendi (the traditional capital of 
all Dagomba) (Bukari, 2017). A Fulani migrant herder seeking land usually comes with his host 
(who must be a native of the community he desires to acquire the land from) to the chief. Similar 
to what takes place in AAND, the chief has to consult his council. If the land in question is available 
to be given to the migrant herder, a contract (usually oral) is agreed upon with the herder. The 
contract establishes the terms under which the herder with be able to use the land.  
 
5.3.2 Fulani Migrants Herders Land Access and Land Conflict 
The allocation of land to migrant herders has various impacts on farmers and herders in both 
AAND and GD. Although these allocations of land to migrants have led to some positive impacts, 
such as opening up the economy of the areas where these migrants migrated (Tonah, 2006c; 
Baidoo, 2014). For instance, Baidoo (2014) argues that the alienation of lands to migrant Fulani 
herders has opened new opportunities for both chiefs and subjects, who have amassed wealth from 
the proceeds of leasing land to these Fulani herders. However, the negative impact of the allocation 
of land to Fulani migrant herders abound. Notable among them is the contestation of land between 
autochthons and the migrants, which leads to conflict. The allocation of lands in these communities 
 
88 This evidence comes from a REGSEC (Regional Security council) meeting in AAND. The Witnesses called 
to give their testimonies recent conflicts between herders and farmers in the communities and villages includes, six 
(6) Asembly members and four(4) cattle owners, namely Alhaji Gariba Dansofo (100 cattle), Alhaji Adam Ahmed 
(140 cattle), Alhaji Kassim Dauda (530 cattle) and Mr. Fusieni Hassan (700 cattle). The document have been attache 




has led to a shortage of lands in those areas, leading to resentments against the migrant population 
by the natives. In fact, as noted by Alhassan (2017), native farmers have been pitched against 
migrant framers who, despite having different livelihoods have to use the same tract of land. While 
local farmers want land to cultivate their crops, herder, on the other hand, wants the land to graze 
their cattle. The allocation of these lands to migrant Fulani herders has therefore intensified the 
competition for fertile lands. Most often, each group tries to advance arguments on the right to 
access the land. The local population often challenges the legitimacy of the Fulani migrant 
population to have access to land and claim they have been on these lands for decades and therefore 
have the right to these lands. The Fulani migrants also see no reason they should be denied access 
to those lands as they have paid for those lands and sometimes hold contract certificates and 
occupancy certificates they obtained from the chiefs. For instance, the president of the Fulani 
group in Ghana, in an interview on GHone Tv responding to calls by the Member of Parliament 
for AAND that Fulani migrants should be evicted from the land of AAND stated that; 
Well, I heard him and to me it is very unfortunate this is coming from a responsible 
officeholder who looks at it from just one angle. He is saying that the Fulani herders 
should be evicted from Agogo land, setting aside the fact that they have a lease tenancy 
agreement for 50 years. These people have paid money, and they have got a lease 
agreement for 50 years to graze their cattle and everything. This is clearly inhuman, we 
are in the 20th century, and the rights of the Fulani should be protected. Since they have 
paid money and agreed, they have any right to access the land just like any other person. 
(Prof. Osman Bari, GHoneTv, 2016, 42:09)89. 
 
Thus, given the statement above, it is clear that the migrant Fulani herders also believe they 
should have equal access to land as they have paid for it and have contract agreements to prove it. 







side of the local farming population, and the herders sometimes enter those lands they purchase or 
rent without the knowledge of the farmers. In an attempt to win back their lands, the indigenous 
groups instead attack the 'soft target’ (the migrant herders) since they cannot confront the chiefs 
and landowners.  To the local farmers, the soft target in the contest for access to land is the Fulani 
herders because they believe migrants cannot own lands and, therefore, should not have access 
since the land belongs to their ancestors. Hence, the resulting reaction in these situations is 
conflicts, as autochthonous groups feel their right to land has been denied them in favour of 
migrants who possess no such rights. In addition to conflict over land rights, the arbitrary use of 
the authority by chiefs to transfer common land to other land users, or in the words of farmers, 
'strangers' or 'aliens,' also triggers conflict. 
According to Mwesigye and Matsumoto (2016), land conflicts are caused mainly by land 
inheritance, land insecurity and eviction. However, Mwesigye and Matsumoto (2016) concluded 
that land conflicts arising from inheritance (between members of the same family or tribe) are 
settled amicably by clan elders and members due to the homogenous nature of the conflict. Unlike 
the land conflict among members of the same family or ethnic group, the conflict between Farmers 
and herders involves members who belong to different identity groups who practice conflicting 
occupations with the use of same resources. Land access and security over land rights are major 
issues faced by the Fulani migrant herdsmen group in AAND and GD. As already mentioned, most 
herdsmen who are able to acquire land for grazing their cattle have no formal legal title to the land. 
Therefore, they have no land tenure security as they are not regarded as indigenous and have no 
claim to the land. Thus, they are at permanent risk of being evicted without any compensation, 
making them further risk losing their livelihood. Land rights determine whether Fulani herders 




Fulani herders’ risk being subjected to autochthony discourse by indigenes, who see it as a crucial 
asset in the competition over claims to land access and land use.  
 
5.4. Autochthony, And Son of the soil claims and Violent conflict 
The ownership and control of land contribute to the definition of belonging and citizenship, 
and rights. Indigenous farmers acquire land through inheritance from family lineage and thus, have 
access to land. The customary mode of land tenure back ‘‘SoS” dominance over land within ethnic 
native territories since land ownership is vested in the stool (AAND) or skin (GD) with members 
of the indigenous group enjoying usufruct rights. The rights of customary institutions are captured 
in Ghana's constitution and given backing when the Constitution of Ghana defined the application 
of Customary laws as the “rules of law which by custom are applicable to particular communities 
in Ghana” (Ghana constitution, 1992). This, therefore, suggests that laws surrounding the control 
and allocation of land are grounded in the customs and traditional practices prevailing in that area. 
This is in line with Boone’s arguments that in most African states, the usage of customary land 
tenure institutions (traditional institutions) means there is the recognition of  SoS dominance in 
land tenure relations (Boone, 2017, p.280). Thus, the right to land for indigenous farmers is through 
the narrative of autochthony and SoS, which allows them to control and allocate lands. At the same 
time, Fulani herdsmen with their migrant status are left to compete to gain access or use those 
lands as outsiders. 
The claims by indigenous farmers and how Fulani migrant herders put land rights in two 
regards: right-based land access of the indigenes and social relation based, which gives both 
autochthons and migrants access to land other resources. While Fulani migrant herders conceive 




farmers conceive of access to land and other natural resources as their natural rights as ‘sons’ or 
citizens and not just their ability to use these resource. Therefore, the local population sees Fulani 
herders as 'strangers' and even non-citizens, thus excluding them from land access. Therefore, land 
ownership serves as a signifier of belonging to the relevant group of people with the community 
when (Lentz,2013). The claims and perception of rights and access to land held by each group 
influence the relationship between them, which is vital in fueling the conflict. This assertion is 
captured by several actions and claims by both indigenes and Fulani herder. I illustrate this with 
two major incidents in both GD and AAND, followed by an explanation and analysis of those 
incidents in relation to the links between the autochthony claims and the violence that accompanies 
them. 
 
Incident 1: Migrant Fulani Herders Attacked in GD on December 7, 2011.          
On Wednesday, December 7, 2011, all major media houses and newspapers reported that 
Fulani migrant herders living in communities in the GD have come under severe attack by the 
youth who were wielding offensive weapons.90  According to reports, at least thirteen (13) Fulani 
herders were killed, and 11 others were injured. The 11 wounded were in critical condition and 
were transported to Tamale (the Northern region's capital city) for further care due to fear of other 
attacks from indigenous youth. In an interview with the media, the Northern Regional Police 
Commander, Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP) George Tuffour, explained that the attack 
occurred at dawn on Wednesday when a group of youth who believed that the Fulani migrants are 
there ‘illegally’ and that they pose a threat to their livelihood attacked a Fulani community. He 
 
90 All major newspapers,Tv and radio stations across the country reported the incident. Peacefmonline.com, 




(the commander) further explained th most eyewitnesses who gave their statements believed that 
the Fulani herders who are not Ghanaians come to their communities with their cattle and their 
activities continue to pose problems to their farm when they want to expand91.                   
The District chief executive (DCE) Alhaji Fuseini Alhassan, also in an interview with 
Savannahnews Agency, said the incident came as a surprise to the people in the area. Although he 
could not tell exactly what caused the incident, he suspected that it was as a result of the “nefarious 
activities of the Fulani people.   The DCE told the newspaper that:     
Somewhere last year, I told your paper the presence and activities of these alien Fulani 
herders were threatening the security of residents in and around the Gushegu District.  
They come here, settle in the bushes without permission, and cut down economic trees 
to feed their cattle. Residents, on several occasions, have engaged in a confrontation 
with these herdsmen and raised concerns over their continuous stay in the district. In 
fact, I have had several complaints from natives about how these people come and 
occupy lands that they have not been given by authorities and cause havoc in those 
communities. (Interview with DCE of Gushegu District, Alhaji Alhassan Fuseini, 
SavannaNews, December 16, 2011).       
 
Following the attack, the Northern Regional Security Council (REGSEC) deplored heavily 
armed military and Police personnel to the district to protect the lives and property of the migrant 
Fulani herders in the area. However, on Thursday, December 15, 2011, there were reports of a 
fresh attack on Fulani and their cattle in the district.92 According to reports, the attack was 
instigated by agitations by some konkomba youth who were dissatisfied with authorities allowing 
some Fulani herdsmen to take refuge in GD's capital after being attacked in some communities 
and villages a week earlier. The attacks took place in more than ten (10) communities, including; 
Jingboni, Toti, Makpedanya, Sugu, Offini, Damdoboli, Timya and Nnagmaya. A report on   
 
91 Interview of the Commander of Police could be found on 
https://www.peacefmonline.com/pages/local/crime/201112/84746.php http://savannahnewsblogspotcom.blogspot.com/2011/12/ 
92 There were reports of fresh attacks on the alien Fulani herders by some unknown Konkombas just two weeks after a 





PeaceFMonline.com indicated that an eyewitness told the news agency; 
“[…]that though a section of the community resisted the attempt to attack the Fulani, 
their cattle were not spared. The attackers vented their spleen on the animals killing 
them indiscriminately and vowed to attack the community protecting the Fulanis if they 
continue shielding them”. (Interview of an eyewitness on PeaceFmOnlinline.com)93 
 
The new attack incident was confirmed by the Northern Regional Police Commander, ACP 
George Tuffour, who also confirmed that no serious injuries were recorded, and a team of officers 
has been dispatched to the area to restore order. The incident above depicts the critical role of 
autochthony and SoS claims in the conflicts between farmers and herders and how they can help 
mobilize one group against another group. Although the Fulani herders have been in the district 
for decades, they are still being attacked on land issues. At the time the Fulani herders acquired 
the land to settle, it was vacant. However, in a short period, indigenous farmers saw that the Fulani 
were a threat to them when it came to the contestation of land; thus, they decided to use the 
autochthon/stranger claims as a tool to attack the herders. The youth groups’ mobilization to attack 
and drive out the Fulani herders also shows that mobilization plays a vital role in the farmer-herder 
conflict. The youth's attack and their employment of autochthony correspond to Dunn’s (2009, 
p.119) argument that “the role of the youth in emphasizing questions of national belonging, 
employing autochthony discourses, and resorting to violence should not be underestimated”. Thus, 
GD's indigenes, particularly the youth, when competing for land access with the Fulani herders, 
employ autochthony discourse to defend their claims. These claims are used as a mobilizing tool 








Incident 2: "Yeegye Y'asaase" (We are claiming our land) Demonstration by indigenes of 
AAND 
On the 12th of April 2016, some residents of AAND took to the streets to demonstrate 
against the allocation of land to Fulani herders to settle in the area and what they call the traditional 
council’s disregard for the indigenes of the area. The four (4) hour demonstration was dubbed 
“yeegye yasaase’ which simply means ‘we are taking back our lands’ in English. The demonstrated 
was led by several key figures in the area, notably: the Member of Parliament representing the 
people in Parliament (Honorable Kojo Baah Agyemang), the area's queen mother (Nana Serwaa 
Afrakuma), the Catholic priest of Agogo and traditional priests (Graphic Online, 2016 April 12).94 
The demonstrators protested against the Fulani herders' presence on their land, which they claimed 
has been given to them by their ancestors. The queen mother wore her traditional war-dress to lead 
Agogo's indigenes, who were also chanting war songs. In the demonstration, the people of AAND 
threatened to take the law into their own hands to defend their land, their farms, and their lives 
against Fulani herdsmen (Graphic Online, 2016 April 12). The demonstration was to put pressure 
on the government to drive out Fulani herdsmen from their land.  
The report stated that despite the heavy rains and thunderstorm which happened during the 
demonstration, the determined demonstrators continued to march through the town, carrying 
placards, some of which had pictures of their dead relatives and some displaying messages such 




94 Retrieved from https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/Agogo-residents-demonstrate-over-fulani-


















Source: United Television News, 2016 
 During the demonstration, many demonstrators spoke to the media, among other things 
the said included: 
I met them and gave them a roadmap…the conflict between the Fulani and us has 
become very frequent in the past few years because there is no land. Fulanis are bad 
people because they came here, and we gave them rules to follow, but they did not obey. 
Some of them come from the north, while some also come from outside. They do not 
have lands here; they are ‘squatters’ on our lands. We are going to flash them out from 
our lands... (Mr. Francis Oti Boateng, Kessben Tv, 2016, 0:01)95 
 
 
95Kessben TV 2016, Interview withn MP Kojo Baah-Agyemeng  was retrieved from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rNLVVc38Ap8&list=PLkBnfmwL4ER54A4oC5wVxwvqfurRa7i18&index=18




The land of Agogo that we inherited from our forefathers is rich, but today Fulani 
herdsmen and their cattle have come to occupy our land and are killing and destroying 
our farms. Farmers can't even go to the farm. Previously today being Tuesday, you won't 
even get anywhere to stand; farm produce will be everywhere. We are demonstrating 
today because we see it as a last resort to call on the authorities to come to our aid in 
driving these aliens out of our land. If they do not drive them out, we will do it on our 
own We, as natives of this land, have the responsibility of protecting our land. The 
government should come to our aid. (Nana Serwaa Afrakuma UTVNews, 2016, 1:25)96 
 
The MP of the place was quoted in another media saying: 
[…]we are not preaching violence...our security forces are supposed to protect us. If 
they are not here to protect us, we will defend ourselves. We will not rely on anybody 
but rely on ourselves. Let’s come together to sack these Fulanis from here. (Kojo Baah 
Agyemang, Peacefm online, 2016)97 
The quotes above reiterate that although the conflict between farmers and herders in AAND 
is about land use and access, autochthony and belonging claims remain central in projecting one's 
right to access or use land. Indigenes claim that land belongs to them because they are ‘sons of the 
soil’ and that Fulani herders do not have rights because they are non-indigenous to the area. 
Subsequently, herders also lamented the difficulty they face in getting access to land due to their 
non-indigenous status. As the above statement shows, indigenous farmers repeatedly rejected the 
Fulanis as “the sons of the soil” even if they are born and raised in AAND or GD. This is because 
making such an admission would mean that those Fulani herdsmen have the right to compete with 
them for land ownership or land-use, which is the reserve of ‘autochthons’ or “first comers.” In an 
interview with a group of researchers and media in response to the demonstration and the attacks 
after the demonstration, a Fulani migrant herder lamented how access and use of land is difficult 
for them in AAND.  
We are being marginalized just because other tribes arrived in Ghana before us. What 
is more disturbing was the District Chief Executive's unpleasant utterances for the area 
against people of Fulani descent. I call on him to apologize for his tribal comment. 
 
96 UTV, 2016,UTVNews https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1146277082052103. Author’s own translation 




When it comes to accessing national facilities and resources, Fulani persons are 
discriminated against, and this is a sad reality. Fulani citizens in Ghana are being treated 
as if they are refugees in their own motherland. We humbly appeal to the authorities to 
bring justice and sanity or order because we are all Ghanaians ( President of Fulani 
Association, Ghanaweb.com, 2016)98. 
 
Again in a meeting with the press, the Fulani leaders  shared their problems with the media; 
 
We are appealing to the office of our in-law, the Vice President, and his wife, to 
intervene to remedy the problem. Government should instruct the immigration officers 
at our country’s borders to stop intimidating and extorting monies from Fulanis. 
Government should immediately stop the evacuation of the herdsmen in the forest… 
The recent unfortunate happenings in Agogo of the Ashanti region of Ghana are 
unacceptable. The position of the government and the utterances of the Member of 
Parliament of Agogo to evict the herdsmen at all costs and means, and the declaration 
of war, are a violation of their human rights. In any case, are the authorities in Agogo 
saying citizens of Agogo do not own cattle? Is the government saying that cattle rearing 
are not part of agriculture and that it is not interested in supporting Ghanaians in the 
cattle industry?...(Star fm, 2018)99 
 
 
The two incidents indicate how local farmers view the autochthony and sons of the soil claims 
as important assets when making land claims. Contrarily, Fulani migrant herders claim to land by 
emphasizing to have acquired the land through a lease agreement or purchase. These two different 
claims to land often result in violence in both AAND and GD as it raises questions of identity and 
belonging, which are used to mobilize groups for the conflict. For example, in GD, a village 
occupied by Fulani migrant herders was attacked on August 26, 2019, by a group of angry 
indigenous youth after they learnt from one of their leaders that the land on which the Fulani 
herders were grazing their cattle in one of that village belonged to them because of their ancestors 
 
98 We are being marginalized https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/We-re-being-
maltreated-in-Ghana-Fulani-Community-618937 (Last accessed on July 29, 2020). 




(Ghanaweb. August 27, 2019)100. According to the reports and confirmed by the District police 
commander (DSP Tanko), no Fulani herder was killed, 65 huts (houses) burnt, four herders injured, 
and several belongings burnt. He added that some livestock belonging to the Fulani were also 
killed. This report and the first incident focus on settlement history (first-comers), autochthony, 
and the violence associated with autochthony claims. The settlement history of Bulugu village in 
GD shows the indigenes’ ability to claim territory even though they do not settle there. Even 
though migrant Fulani herders are inhabiting the village, they still consider themselves strangers 
to the place, although some were born and raised there. This is because the claims to territory or 
land in the area are tied with indigenousness; thus, Fulani herders do not own resources. 
Similarly, in AAND, indigenous farmers and herders have resorted to using violence to 
defend land claims. While farmers rely on autochthony and sons of the soil claims over land, 
herders mention that they have made payments to chiefs and landowners and must access the land. 
In a protest on September 15, 2011, three local groups, namely, Agogomman Mma Kuo, concerned 
citizens of Agogo and Agogo Youth Association, embarked on a protest (modernghana.com; 
Peacefmonline.com)101. Their major reasons were that Fulani herdsmen are taking over their lands, 
destroying their farms, engaging in robbery and raping women in the bush; thus, Fulani herders 
should be evicted from their land. The ‘anti-Fulani’ protest, which began as a peaceful 
demonstration, soon turned violent, leading to three herdsmen being attacked and killed. The 
groups also boycotted all traditional ceremonies and celebrations, including funerals and festivals 
 
100 Fulani settlement attacked; livestock, houses burnt: August  27, 2019 : 
https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Fulani-settlement-attacked-livestock-houses-burnt-







(Peacefmonline.com, September 28, 2011).102  According to Kingsley Obeng, the spokesperson 
for one of the groups, the decision to boycott the traditional activities was to make the Chief and 
elders of the town, who are custodians of the land, take a swift decision and drive away all Fulanis 
herdsmen from the land of Agogo (Peacefmonline.com, September 28, 2011). 
In the examples of events in both AAND and GD above, violence appears to be an integral 
part of the indigenes' autochthonous claim over land. This is consistent with Dunn's (2009) 
suggestion of an “intimate relationship between autochthony discourse and violence” (Dunn,2009, 
p.123). According to Dunn (2009), the intimate relationship between autochthony claims and 
violence is because the narrative of autochthony is not just portrayed as ‘indigenes’ versus 
‘strangers’ but also ‘victim’ versus ‘aggressor.’ In the cases of AAND and GD, Fulani migrant 
herders are portrayed as criminals, robbers, rapists, and people who destroy other people’s 
livelihood. In the two incidents and the two examples of violent attacks on Fulani herders, we 
notice that indigenous groups raised historical narrative of victimizations by the Fulani herders as 
a justification for their attacks and violence, often citing destruction of crops, previous killings of 
farmers, rape, and robbery. Thus, in making autochthonous claims over land, there has been the 
employment of historical narratives of victimization, which have often led to violent encounters 
between the two factions in the two study areas. 
Although these protests and agitations are been organized by community groups and 
associations such as Agogoman Mma Kuo, Concerned Citizens of Agogo and Agogo Youth 
Association political actors have been actively involved. Their involvement came after numerous 






series of pressure and accusations from indigenous groups, leaders such as the DCE, MP, 
traditional leaders and religious leaders were compelled to join the indigenes' protest against the 
Fulani herders' presence. For instance, according to the Kontihene, Nana Kwame Nti, in an 
interview, traditional leaders decided to join the fight against the Fulani herdsmen somewhere in 
2010 when the so-called citizens of Agogo accused chiefs and government of non-commitment to 
control Fulani herders whose activities they believe are provoking continued clashes (Paalo, 2010, 
p. 8). In recent times most protests in the AAND are being mobilized by political leaders such as 
MPs and traditional leaders, as seen in the protests above. The involvement of these political actors 
has changed the scope and landscape of the farmer-herder conflict. As Bukari (2017, p. 28) 
observed, one such change is that farmer-herder conflicts in both AAND and GD have become 
arenas where actors build ties and mobilize support for their own political interests. Hagberg 
(1998) noted that local politicians have used the farmer-herder conflict in Ghana to garner support 
for their interest and that Fulani activists and politicians in Burkina Faso have also used the 
farmers-herder conflict in Ghana as a means to advance their political interests. As Moritz (2010) 
also observed, other actors' involvement, including political actors, affects the conflict. Similarly, 
Boas and Dunn (2013) observed that the use of autochthony and its attendant anxiety leads 
politicians to act in an ad hoc and tactical manner where they are able to manipulate issues 
surrounding land claims to achieve their personal gains. Thus, the involvement of local elite and 
political actors in the farmer-herder conflict who have sought to mobilize the indigenous group for 





5.5. Land Tenure Insecurity and Conflict 
Land tenure insecurity has received widespread recognition in identifying the conflict between 
farmers and herders in Africa (Moyo, et al., 2015). The customary land management arrangement 
and usufruct land ownership system practiced in both AAND and GD suggests that individual 
freehold ownership of land is not encouraged. The evidence provided above indicates that across 
communities in AAND and GD, land rights and access are viewed mainly through the lens of 
politics of first-comer (autochthons) versus late-comer (migrants) claims (Lentz, 2013; Boone, 
2014). Thus, Fulani herders can only acquire land through either long-term or short-term leasehold 
agreements between them and the Chief or landowners.  
Ghana's land tenure arrangements favouring indigenes while marginalizing migrants have led 
to more conflicts in Ghana. For instance, Abotchie (2006) noted that there were over 600 land 
disputes in Ghana as of 2006, most of them relating to land tenure insecurity. Land disputes 
between indigenous farmers and migrant herders have often escalated violent conflict (Asante 
Akim North District and Gushegu District). The Government of Ghana document in 1990 
attributes the Land dispute between the Fulani and indigenous farmers to undefined boundaries of 
customary land and arbitrary sales of land with proper documentation as well as conflict of interest 
between landowning groups and non-land-owning groups (Government of Ghana,1999). Yaro 
(2010) noted that a significant characteristic of the customary land tenure system, as practiced in 
many parts of Ghana, is insecurity. Thus, several evidence to support the claims that land tenure 
insecurity among Fulani herders due to their lack of land rights contributes to the conflict.  
         According to Bukari (2017), like in many places in Africa, the conditions under which 
farmers acquire land coupled with Fulani herders' inability to obtain legal documents for those 




led to land insecurity for Fulani herders. Fulani herders' insecurity is evident in the continuous 
confiscation of Fulani lands by indigenous farmers who mostly claim ownership rights. For 
instance, a Fulani herder in AAND, in an interviewwith the researcher quoted in Bukari (2017); 
You see this land where my cattle are, we acquired it two weeks ago. If you come back 
here in two weeks, you will see that we have been evicted from it. Even a week ago, 
some young men arrived here challenging us and asking us to leave until the landowner 
came to stop them (quoted in Bukari, 2017, p. 186) 
 
           According to the herder, these kinds of evictions from lands they have legally 
acquired are widespread in AAND. This coincides with Mwamfupe’s (2015) explanation of land 
tenure insecurity as a primary factor for persistent conflict between farmers and herder groups. 
According to Mwamfupe (2015), insecurity of land tenure arises from the marginalization of one 
group, which is later blamed for causing the conflict after being displaced.  Again, Fulani Cattle 
herders fail to regularize their land acquisition and go through the due process to acquire land titles. 
They get the land leased to them by either the chief or individual landowner without legitimizing 
the process by going through the legal process of land tenure acquisition. Farmers have often 
accused the chiefs and tradition council of giving out land to the Fulani herder without following 
the law.103 
 
According to Barume (2014), indigenous populations will not allow their land, which is their 
primary source of livelihood, and constitutes more than the cultural existence and identity, to be 
encroached or expropriated without reacting in one way or another. These reactions among 
indigenous communities who claim to be ‘sons of the soil’ have taken place in both AAND and 
 
103 Agogoman Mma Kuo one of the groups in AAND have often raised this issue in most of their press releases 






GD in many forms ranging from demonstrations, going to court and violent clashes. An example 
is the protests and calls for Fulani expulsion in AAND.  
      
5.5.1 Protests by Indigenes, Fulani Expulsion and conflict 
Indigenes in AAND have embarked on several forms of options in order to get Fulani migrant 
herders evacuated from ‘their land.’ Among some of the forms of activities taken by the indigenes 
include; demonstrations, open protests, organizing press conferences and press releases, going to 
court and even violent attacks. Protects for Fulani expulsion from AAND began on April 29, 2010, 
by Agogoman Mma Kuo and the Agogo Youth Association (Daily Guide News, 2011)104. The 
Agogoman Mma Kuo again staged another protest in January 2011 together with the Agogo Youth 
Association and the Concerned Citizens of Agogo, demanding and the expulsion of Fulanis from 
their land and calling for the paramount chief of the area, Nana Akuoko Sarpong, to be dethroned 
(mordernghana.com, 2011)105. According to a leading member of one of the groups, Kwaku 
Mensah, “the people say they do not want Nana Akuoko Sarpong because of his involvement in 
the Fulani herdsmen issue and other 'atrocities' that he and other sub-chiefs in the area have 
committed” (quoted in modernghana.com 2011).106 Subsequently, the groups boycotted all 
traditional events and festivals in the area, followed by three other similar protests in April 2011, 
 
104 Daily guideNews-‘The untoldstory of Agogo-Fulani conflict; 
http://www.ghanaforum.com/archive/index.php/t-12302.html 
105 Distoolment of Paramount Chief https://www.modernghana.com/news/365498/1/Agogo-residents-want-
nana-akuoko-sarpong-destooled.html 





September 2011 and November 2011 and issued a press release107. After exhausting all these 
avenues to get the Fulani herders out of their land, the indigenes resorted to court. The Kumasi 
High court ruled on January 20, 2012, that: 
The court hereby issues mandatory injunction directed at the REGSEC, Ashanti Region, 
(and by implication, the Regional Coordinating Council and the Executive branch of 
Ghana) to take immediate, decisive efficacious and efficient action to flush out all cattle 
in the following villages and localities in the Agogo Traditional/Area in the Asante 
Akim North Municipality: Aberewapong, Mankala, Nyamebekyere, Kowereso, 
Adoniemu, Bebuoso, and Brahabebome. The only exceptions are cattle that have been 
properly confined in a permitted locality…( Oduro, Tweneboah, Obeng, Akyaamah, 
Boamah, Anokye, Nyame and Danquah v. Attorney-General’s Department, Kumasi and 
Agogo Traditional Council, 2012, p.19.See Appendix 2). 
 
This judgement asking for the evacuation of the Fulani herdsmen and their cattle from the land of 
AAND has sparked further protests and violence among indigenous farmers and migrant herders. 
The local people often cite the court ruling as a means to confiscate and drive out the herders from 
land, even if they acquired the land through from the chiefs or individual landowners, which is the 
right process. However, the court deemed the natives of AAND to have lived and farmed within 
the AAND area's lands and hold usufructuary right on those land (Kumasi High Court Ruling, 
2012, p.3); thus, the Fulani herders should be expelled. Following this ruling by the High court, 
the government of Ghana has implemented the policy of expulsion (popularly termed ‘operation 
cow-leg’) of the Fulani herdsmen in other parts of the country, including GD, whenever tensions 
between the herders and farmers escalate. This expulsion (operation Cow-leg) is usually carried 
out by a police force and military forces who use force to carry out the order. 
 






 The incidence above and the expulsion policy that followed to evict Fulani migrant herders 
from lands some of them have acquired through due process as customary law demands clearly 
demonstrate the land tenure insecurity faced by Fulani herders in AAND communities. Herders 
acquire land from signing agreements with individual landowners or from the traditional leaders, 
but the lands are shortly taken away from them without regard to the lease. In this incident, despite 
many of the Fulani present in AAND have signed and paid for the lease of the land, their contracts 
were revoked after the Kumasi High Court Ruling without any compensation. The eviction of 
Fulani herdsmen from lands they have paid for has led to the Fulani's reprisal attacks. The latter 
believe they were not treated fairly by the indigenes of AAND. One of such incidents is the attack 
on indigenous farmers in Aberewanko, a village in AAND. On February 16, 2019, at around 3 pm, 
seven armed |Fulani herders attacked the village, killed one person, injured one and set the whole 
village on fire (Ghanaweb.com,2019)108. According to the reports, the Fulani herders who were 
previously occupying some lands in the village were evicted from the land by some indigenes who 
converted the grazing area into a farm. The Fulanis had a lease agreement but were evicted without 
any compensation.  The Fulani herders then came back and asked the indigenes to vacate the 
village or be killed. This incident is a clear example of how eviction, which is based on whether a 
person is an indigene or not, leads to the escalation of the violence between herders and farmers 
in AAND. 
 










Similarly, there have been several reports of Fulanis being evicted from lands they acquired 
in the north (GD), resulting in violent reprisal attacks. An example is the Konkomba-Fulani clash 
on Tuesday, April 3, 2018 (Ghanaweb.com, 2018)109. The media reports and a statement from the 
DCE mentioned that in January of that year, the pastureland on which a Fulani herdsman had to 
acquire was converted into a farm by an indigenous farmer who claimed the land was their 
ancestral land. Subsequently,  Fulani herder defied the warning and still took his cattle to graze on 
the land, destroying the farmers' crops. Recounting the incident to star news, the DCE stated that: 
“A Fulani and Konkomba man had a misunderstanding and it resulted in the Konkomba man being 
butchered; so, when it happened like that, the Konkombas launched something we call reprisal 
attack” (quoted in Ghanaweb.com,2018). This example again highlights the frequent use of the 
autochthon-stranger discourse whenever there is a land argument between farmers and herders. 
This corresponds with Gleditsch’s (1998) suggestion that autochthony discourse is an asset to 
exclude competitors in the struggle between indigenes and migrants. The land tenure insecurity 
faced by the Fulani herders has intensified the violent conflict. Most of the major forms of land 
acquisition by the Fulani herders are informal. The informal nature of the contract (oral 
transaction) agreement makes it prone to confiscation and evictions. Thus, in addition to lack of 
access due to the non-indigenous status of Fulani in AAND and GD, the high land tenure insecurity 
associated with the process through which they acquire land in this location all contribute to the 
escalation of farmer -herder conflicts within the study area as the discussions have shown.  
 
109 One hacked, houses burnt in Konkomba, Fulani clashes 
https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/One-hacked-houses-burnt-in-Konkomba-Fulani-




A closer look at the incidents of conflict in this chapter helps to enhance not only our 
understanding of the drivers of the farmer-herder conflict in AANA and GD but also explains the 
variation in the frequent occurrence of violent conflict in AAND and GD. As this research has 
already noted, GD witness less violent conflict than AAND. The incidents above follow a trend of 
mobilizing groups from one side to either undertake an attack or defend an attack. The conflict 
often starts as a conflict between individuals over access to land and escalates into group conflict. 
In AAND, indigenous farmers have a single primordial identity and are of one ethnicity (Akans) 
Osei (2015) noted that ethnicity and tribal ties are the most substantial ties that facilitate cohesion 
among groups in Ghana. AAND has one indigenous ethnic group (Ashantis) who share the same 
history, ancestry and are of a single tribe who face competition from Fulani migrants. Thus, 
mobilization of members are easily done as it relies heavily on primordial identity. This can be 
witnessed in how members of the different youth groups and leaders of the community, including 
traditional leaders, politicians, and religious leaders, can come together to protest the presence of 
Fulanis on their land. 
Contrarily, GD has two major indigenous tribes (Konkomba and Dagomba) who themselves 
have been in conflict over land with each other in the past (See Immigration and Refugee Board 
Canada, 2000). Since groups' mobilization in the conflict is heavily reliant on tribal and primordial 
identities, the conflict only occurs when members from one tribe take part. For instance, in Incident 
one, the comments reveal that members of the Dagomba tribe were consulted to take part in the 
attack, however because the initial encounter between the Fulani and indigene did not involve a 
member of their tribe, they declined. This depicts the importance of intra-group ties in the form of 
primordial identity driven by ethnicity. In fact, Fulani herders in GD and areas in northern Ghana 




on a whole village in 2018 shows how they are able to mobilize on their identity based on their 
identity as Fulani,  their minority and ‘vulnerable’ status in the area, thus the need to come together 
and defend themselves.  
Identity, especially ethnic ties of both autochthones and migrants, are used as a mobilizing 
tool to either attack, protest or defend themselves against each other. The attack by the Konkomba 
tribe in GD succeeded largely due to the group being able to mobilize members of the tribe despite 
the withdrawal of the Dogomba tribe. Whereas violent conflicts in AANDA are viewed as 
indigenes versus Fulani, conflicts between farmers and herders in GD are viewed first as a conflict 
between one indigenous tribe against the Fulani migrant herders. Thus, all conflict between 
farmers and herders in AAND can escalate into a violent conflict because each faction can 
mobilize; and mobilization is embedded in the use of identity, driven by ethnic or primordial ties. 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed land rights, land ownership and land access centred on 
autochthony in AAND and GD in Ghana. Land in the study areas symbolizes one's identity and 
belonging to the indigenous group in the study areas. While indigenous farmers in Agogo and 
Gushegu have land rights and access because they are ‘first-comers’ or sons of the soil, Fulani 
herders have no land rights. Their access to land is limited since their access to land is conceived 
in terms of autochthony/belonging claims. To acquire land, they need to rely on long-term or short-
term lease from traditional authorities or individual landowners. Whenever there is a 
misunderstanding or conflict between Fulani herders and local farmers, the Fulani herders are 
evicted from lands, and the lands they acquired through lease are confiscated. With no land rights 




in conflict with farmers. Local farmers (autochthons) in AAND and GD claim to be ‘sons’ of the 
soil and therefore have rights over the land. Thus, this “politics of belonging”  has triggered Anti-
Fulani(migrant) sentiments and led to conflict between indigenous farmers and migrant herders 
when the latter arrive in large numbers searching for land for their livelihood.110 This chapter's 
evidence indicates that the conflict between herders and farmers goes beyond just the conflict 
triggers discussed in chapter four. Autochthony and identity claims play a major role in the 
conflict. 
Again, high land tenure insecurity associated with Fulani migrants’ land acquisition also 
results in violent conflict. The expansion of farming activities, which increases the competition for 
land, is used justifying confiscating and evicting migrant herders, which hinges on sons of the soil 
claims. Indigenes use autochthony discourse as the claim to land since Fulani herders have limited 
property rights. The insecurity arises from the process through which Fulani migrant herders 
acquire land. Thus, when a Fulani migrant herder acquires land, their right to access and land use 
is being challenged, and even sometimes, they are evicted, leading to conflict. The eviction of 
Fulani herders has also exacerbated the conflict. It has led to reprisal attacks by those Fulani 
herders who are evicted and counter-attacks by farmers whenever herders attack them. The 
insecurity of land and the expulsion of Fulani herders from lands they have acquired and paid for 
leads to violent conflict escalation. Therefore, the main driver of farmer-herder conflicts in both 
Asante Akim North, and Gushegu hinges on land – whether the crop destruction, encroachment, 
resource scarcity, as discussed in chapter four, or land tenure insecurity, and lack of access as seen 
 
110 Côté & Mitchell (2018) used the term “politics of belonging” to explain the tensions and violence clashes triggered by 




in this chapter, land is at the centre of these conflicts. Fulani herders’ land tenure insecurity 
heightens these conflicts through continual confiscations of their lands by indigenes, evictions by 
landowners in times of conflicts, and Fulani’s continuous migration and informal land contracts.  
Thus, this research has argued that the access and use of land, which is the primary 
resource needed by both farmers and herders for their livelihood, is contested and interpreted 



















  CONCLUSION 
The violent conflict between indigenous farmers and migrant Fulani herders in Asante 
Akim North and Gushegu in Ghana is often attributed to resource scarcity and competition over 
these resources. However, a more in-depth analysis of the farmer-herder conflict in these areas 
reveals that the cause of the conflict goes beyond just the competition over resources to include 
other factors that directly or indirectly trigger violence. This MA thesis sought to examine the 
causes of the conflict in the Asante Akim North and Gushegu Districts in Ghana. The findings of 
this research show that the root of the farmer-herder conflict in these areas goes beyond just land 
use and land access to include other factors such as livelihood differences between the parties 
involved and the employment of autochthony and identity discourse to either exclude others in the 
distribution and access to resources. Both indigenous farmers and Fulani migrant herders depend 
on land for their livelihoods. The arrival of migrants Fulani herders in these areas intensified 
competition over land between the two groups. As they both have to rely on the same tract of land 
but practice different systems, the activity of each of them impedes the other. Therefore, the land 
use of the two has resulted in circumstances that trigger violent conflict between them. Triggers 
such as damage to crops, the encroachment of farming or grazing lands, and the indiscriminate 
burning of farms to allow for fresh grass were the immediate leading causes of the conflict that 
indirectly resulted from land use among two groups with different livelihoods. 
Indigenous farmers who were the “first-comers’ and ‘sons of the soil’ had unrestricted 
historic land rights and access. In contrast, Fulani migrant herdsmen, who are regarded as ‘aliens’ 
and ‘strangers,’ did not have land rights and access. This meant that Fulani herders have to enter 




conflict in Asante Akim North and Gushegu District also results from the allocation of farmlands 
to cattle owners and Fulani herdsmen by community chiefs. The nomadic activities of the Fulani 
herdsmen have caused many damages, especially the destruction of farms and crops, hence 
threatening the farmers' livelihoods in the area.  
This research's findings are not meant to downplay other factors that have been used in the 
existing literature to explain the farmer-herder conflict in Ghana, such as climate change, resource 
and environmental scarcity argument, stereotype prejudices, and the diminishing powers of 
traditional authority and weak state institutions. This thesis’ primary focus is to expand the 
conflict's explanation from the traditional argument as a land conflict to include other factors that 
are often ignored in the discussion of farmer-herder conflict.  Issues of land use and access are 
often overlaid with other features such as identity, belongingness and livelihood differences 
(Komey,2010). The inclusion of these factors allows the research’s argument to go beyond farmers 
and herders' social and economic life to include their ethnic divisions, belongingness, and identity, 
thus enabling us to capture an essential aspect of the conflict between the indigenous farmers and 
migrant herders. Therefore, this thesis not only brings to the limelight the importance and 
contributions which are ignored in the literature of farmer-herder conflict but also contributes to 
the literature on land conflict and autochthony in Africa. 
 Although the conflicts in AAND and GD escalate under different circumstances and 
through different triggers, this study's major contribution is that it helps identify the underlying 
drivers of the conflict and how they play out in the escalation of the conflict. Thus, it goes beyond 
structural factors such as resource scarcity, environmental change and population growth to 
include multiple and processual factors (Moritz, 2010).  The research provides a deeper 




develops from conflicts between individual farmers and herders to group conflict by including 
multiple causes of the conflict.  
Like any other research, this thesis is not without limitations. It is therefore important to 
acknowledge these limitations and to put them into proper perspective. One major limitation of 
this study is the lack of official data and statistical evidence on conflict and Fulani migration in 
study areas. Neither government agencies nor the police at the district, regional or national levels 
could provide comprehensive conflict data for the two districts or nationwide. Precise data on 
critical issues such as the Fulani population and migration both across the nation and within 
communities and district, data on the number of cattle and size of land required to rear them, data 
on conflict occurrence and the number of violent clashes and non-violent clashes could not be 
gathered as they were unavailable, and the research’s timeline did not afford this study the time to 
embark on such avenues. 
This research was mainly based on the qualitative research method. The lack of data and 
statistics to draw from and the qualitative approach analysis used for the investigation meant that 
this research did not yield any statistically significant finding which could be relied upon to make 
recommendations for conflict solutions in these areas. Despite the lack of statistical significance, 
this research's findings have demonstrated any attempt to discover the underlying drivers of the 
conflict between herders and farmers in AAND and GD requires an examination of the livelihood 
and identity dynamics involved in the conflict. Future research by government agencies and 
researchers who aim to find a lasting solution to this conflict must therefore delve much deeper 
into these issues and engage in attempts to gather data and statistics such as migration patterns of 
Fulani herders, the population of Fulani and cattle within these areas, area of land required for both 




This could be done by employing large respondents' statistical modelling and broader research to 
gather data on the clashes. These data and statistics are essential for planning and finding measured 
recommendations and remedies to the conflict. 
 This study examined instead self-reported data from people interviewed in the study areas 
by various media. However, self-reported data from these interviews and accounts in the media 
are limited because they cannot be easily verified; that is, whatever the people interviewed say or 
whatever accounts reported in the media has to be taken at face value. Thus, answers to interviews, 
statements and accounts made on media platforms are likely to be biased as members of each group 
(indigenous farmers or Migrant Fulani herders) are consciously or unconsciously likely to give 
accounts or statements that will favour their group. This limitation needs to be duly acknowledged 
and taken into consideration when referring to or consulting this research for further studies. 
Moreover, the use of media sources as the main primary source of data meant that the most 
remote district among the two, Gushegu District, will have fewer data and reports due to 
unavailability of media, that is, there are no major accredited newspaper, radio station or TV within 
the district (National communication Authority, 2017). Unlike GD, AAND has several media 
outlets, especially radio stations, which frequently report a daily conflict between indigenes and 
Fulani herders. Thus, there were many more reports and interviews of people in AAND than there 
was in GD.  The availability of information on the conflict in AAND and fewer reports on GD 
affected the research's findings. Also, one of the main focuses of the research was to extend the 
argument of the escalation of violent conflict between farmers and herders in Asante Akim North 
and Gushegu from just structural factors such as resource scarcity and environmental change to 
include analysis of other factors such as livelihood, resource use and access and mobilization of 




extended period by gathering conflict data or statistics over a significantly more extended period. 
As already mentioned, the lack of data on the conflict and the research’s timeline did not allow the 
researcher to research the time to engage in the observations required. However, the study adopted 
multiple cases, incidence and gathering news articles from media over an extended period (from 
2010 to 2020). These helped to mitigate these limitations as the study gathered enough primary 
evidence, which was analyzed to produce a consistent result. 
 Other districts in Ghana, such as Afram Plains North and South Districts, which used to be 
hotspots of farmer-herder conflict before the establishment of cattle ranches and grazing laws, 
have witnessed a significant reduction in the number of conflicts within the area. The president of 
the Republic of Ghana, Nana Addo Dankwa Akuffo Addo, in November 2018, speaking at a durbar 
of chiefs and the people of the place, thanked the chiefs and indigenes of Afram Plains for agreeing 
to release lands to be used as cattle ranches and mentioned that the project was the sure best way 
of solving the conflict in Ghana; hence more of such projects will be undertaken in other conflict-
prone areas. He again reiterated the importance of respecting each other's livelihood and making 
sure that neither Fulani nor indigenes use land in such a way that will not lead to a clash of 
livelihoods. Thus, further studies need to be done in areas where the government seeks to prevent 
the two different livelihood interests from competing for the same piece of land to ascertain the 
full ramifications of those interventions on the occurrence or otherwise of the conflict. 
Further, the research could also be extended to other districts in Ghana where the conflict 
between farmers and herders continue to grow. This is because the majority (an average of 70% 
according to MOFA) of Ghana’s indigenous rural population are farmers, whereas Fulanis who 
relocate to these areas are herders. Also, Ghana's land laws remain largely under the customary 




theoretical premise developed in this MA thesis could be applied to many parts of Ghana. Again, 
the conflict between farmer-herder is not just in the two study areas and Ghana, but across the West 
African sub-region.  With the exception of Guinea, the Fulani population remains the minority in 
all countries they are located in and are in conflict with other indigenous ethnic populations 
(Sagnary, 2019). Fulani herders remain the dominant herder population in countries where they 
migrate to, such as Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Togo and Burkina Faso, where the majority of other 
indigenous groups remain farmers. Thus, this research's theoretical premise could be extended to 
cases in these countries where Fulani herders have relocated to in search of pasture to sustain their 
livelihood (Folami and Folami, 2013, p.105). 
Another area worth investigating is the current trend of the use of firearms (guns) in the 
conflict. Recent reports indicate that violent attacks and clashes have shifted from the use of 
machetes and sticks to sophisticated weapons. This is evident in the following headlines in various 
media: ‘Agogo farmers, youth stockpile arms against Fulanis’111 ; ‘Gunmen kill Fulani man in 
fresh attack’112; ‘Fulani herdsman shoots farmer to death at Asatoase’113; ‘Farmers arm themselves 
to fight fulani herdsmen at Begoro’114 etc. The divisional Police commander of the Asante Akim 
area was quoted in (Paalo, 2020, p. 9) to have revealed how they (police) are surprised with the 
kind of guns used in the farmer-herder conflict;  
[. . .] during violent escalations, the Fulani herdsmen have more powerful guns than our 
‘men’ . . . and you wonder where they get such powerful machines from . . . with such 
 
111 The following news reports indicates that both groups have resorted to the use of arms: 
https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Agogo-farmers-youth-stockpile-arms-against-Fulanis-











heavy machines, they can easily overcome our ‘men’ on the ground, who mostly have 
less powerful guns, and sometimes run out of bullets . . . the police service cannot even 
afford some of those guns. 
 
The sources, proliferation and implication of the use of these arms in the farmer-herder 
conflict in Ghana must be examined as various scholars (Schroeder and Lamb, 2006; Austin, 2002; 
Ayuba et al., 2014; Nna and Pabon, 2012; Ojakarotu and Okeke-Uzodike, 2006) have all identified 
connection between the proliferation of arms and the escalation of conflict into a widespread 
national conflict. This makes the current trend of the use of arms worrying and thus needs further 
studies to ascertain its overall impact on Ghana's national security. 
Additionally, a conflict that generates adverse outcomes such as the farmer-herder conflict in 
Ghana, where lives, properties and livelihoods have been lost, are conflicts that many institutions, 
including national governments/ local governments/NGOs/international organizations, wish to 
prevent or minimize. Over the years, national governments have spearheaded the attempts to 
mitigate the conflict between farmers and herder in Ghana. The resolution proposed and 
implemented by national governments in AAND and GD in Ghana has been politicized. The 
absence of local stakeholders mostly characterizes the policies and therefore reflects the interests 
of those who proposed them. Future attempts to mitigate the conflict between farmers and herders 
must be decentralized to include local governments, traditional leaders, local farmers, cattle 
owners, and Fulani herders. These interested parties are in the areas where the conflicts occur and 
are better positioned to understand the issues that impact the conflict between them. Further, 
conflict resolution mechanisms that have been proposed and implemented to curb the farmer-
herder conflict, notably, ‘Operation Cow Leg’ only seeks to ‘flush out’ Fulani herders from those 
communities. This proposed policy has been politicized and reflects the political leaders' support 




involve Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). This is because these NGOs are unbiased and 
are likely to mediate and propose better conflict resolution mechanisms to improve cooperation 
between the farmers and Fulani herders. 
In this MA thesis, I have emphasized that the farmers-herder conflict in Ghana shows that 
theories that seek to identify and explain group causes of group conflict must consider complex 
processes and factors. Critical factors such as historical experience, identity and socio-economic 
of the diverse actors involved in the group conflict should be considered rather than relying on 
simple linear explanations such as environmental factors and the immediate drivers of those 
conflicts. Thus, the farmer-herder conflict in AAND and GD  shows that conflict between groups must 
be examine broadly and multidimensionally as shown through the lens of land use, livelihood, 
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APPENDIX 3: INDENTURE AND LAND LEASE AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
TRADITIONAL LEADERS AND FULANI CATTLE OWNERS AND HERDERS. 
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